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SUMMARY 
In the first chapter we investigate the strategy of exchange rate pegging as a 
solution to the lack of credibility of domestic monetary policy in the context of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). Existing theoretical models cannot explain 
the following features of the EMS and its crisis in 1992: its progressive hardening 
from 1987 onwards; the fact that credibility was 'shared"; the progressive dete- 
iior; ition of credibility after the first Danish referendum without changes in the 
economic fundamentals. We argue that the reason lies in the fact that the liter- 
al iii-c has not incorporated the changes in the perceived prospects of EMU. We 
show that an adjustable peg regime that incorporates those prospects can explain 
the three features listed above and provide an alternative interpretation of the 
EMS crisis. 
We then focus our attention on the short-run dynamics of U. S. inflation. U. S. 
price inflation exhibits substantial inertia. The source of that inflation inertia is 
however controversial. In the second part of the thesis, we derive a wage con- 
h-acting specification that implies inflation persistence to investigate the role of 
noininal rigidities to explain that degree of inertia. The contracting specification 
is derived from intertemporal optimisation under two basic assumptions: (i) wage 
staggering; (11) relative wage concern by wage-setters. The novelty is the analy- 
sis of relative wage concern. In chapter 2 we review the existing evidence and 
theoretical support pointing at relative wage concern as a fundamental factor in 
the wage contracting process. In chapters 3 and 4, we build a dynamic general 
equilibrium macromodel to study its implications. 
In chapter 3 we investigate two potential sources of inflation inertia: the con- 
tracting specification described above, and the lack of rationality of expectations. 
We then carry out a test for the source of inflation inertia. Our empirical results 
silggest that alternative sources of inertia beyond that imparted by the lack of full 
rationality of expectations are needed to characterise U. S. inflation dynamics. 
In chapter 4 we focus our investigation on the persistence of the real effects of 
money shocks. In contrast to previous models of staggered wages/prices, output 
aild inflation persistence are robust findings of the model. Moreover, persistence 
results hold for all the sensible parameterisations. Given the empirical evidence in 
faN,, otir of the existence of a strong relative wage concern, we conclude that relative 
concern may be the missing piece in the money shocks persistence puzzle 
raised by recent literature. 
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Introduction 
It is now widely acknowledged that the primary objective of central banks is 
- or should he - the maintenance of a low and sta, ble rate, of inflation. In fact, 
after more a. decade of research, the literature on the optimal institutional 
design of the Central Bank and its objectives seems to have decisively influ- 
enced the politicians' view on the matter. The recent developments towards 
increiised independence of many central banks from their corresponding gov- 
ernments mid the explicit inmidýiteý in their statutes for controlling inflation 
ýis inain objective are ýi clear reflection of that influence. In the United States. 
congressional resolutions setting inflation targets for the Federal Reserve have 
been proposed. The Bank of Canada,, the Bank of New Zealand and the Bank 
of Englmi(I 1mve announced in recent, years explicit near-term targets for in- 
flation. In Europe, the overwhelming majorit. -v of the national central banks 
N\'(11*(, 0)1NVII LAw", of ilidependence from the political power in the List few years. 
Moreover. the "'tiltilte", for the European Monctary Institute and the current 
Europemi Conti-A Bank in Mawstriclit iii December 1991, stiite that 
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stýthillty is the primary objective. In this respect. these statutes Just 
reproduce the primary responsibility of the Deustche Bundesbank. namely 
to safegum-d the stability of the currencY. 
Economists have devoted substantial research effort to the analysis of the 
costs of inflation (see Fischer [1986], Chaps 1-4 for a review). As ýi result. 
ýi widespread agreement has been reached in the profession about the fact 
that such costs are of enough magnitude to bear the potential costs of erad- 
icafln, ý,, them. The problein however arises from the fact that once inflation 
does rise, even for the modenite values experienced in western economies, it 
proves stubbornly persistent and, consequently. costly to reduce. Conven- 
tional estimates for the United States put the cost of ýi I percentage point 
reducti0ii in inflation A about 2 percentage points of higher unemployment 
for a, period of ýIt ýI year (Blinder [1987], pp. 38-39). The unemployment 
or output losses associated with reducing inflation appear to be widespread 
ýwross countries and over time. Ball [1993] for instance has documented 
costlv disinflation in 19 countries over a, 30 yeýir period. 
InfLition maY be persistent for a number of reasons. Despite the wide 
on the f; i(-t that disinflat ions have been costIv, the reason for the 
of disinflation is not upon. At the core of the controversy is 
the iimurc of Alort-nill inflatioll clyliainics. which seems to be better (-Ii; ii, - 
ýi ihst alit lal illflation inertia. However. that inertia liýis several 
L\'TROD(, 'CTIO-\- 
potentlýil explan at ions. Three main factors have been considered in the lit- 
eniture. Firsl-ly. it may ýtri,, se from the inertiýi that wage and price colitnicts, 
impirt to t-lie, inflation rate. Secondly, from the fact that Inflation expec- 
tations iiiýiy adjust slowly to changes in monetary policy stance. ThirdlY. 
inertia, may arise from imperfect credibility of monetary policy. Those three 
factors are considered along this thesis in the context of two specific macro- 
models. 
The import,, ince of the current effort to investigate inflation inertia, stems 
from the fact that it is fundamental for related research in (i number of areas. 
Firstly, it is crucial for the interpretation of past disinflationary episodes. 
Secondly, and even more importantly in our opinion, it is fundamental for the 
study of alternAive nionefin-Y policy rules and for considering the potential 
costs of disinflationary experiments. This thesis is mainly motivated by the 
belief that h) study such questions ýiccurately n inodel that properly accounts 
for the persistence of inflation is required. The purpose is to analyse different 
soinves of inflation persistence in an attempt to highlight, their implications 
and i, cLifive importance for explaining some stylised facts. 
Different sources of inflation persistence bear different iniplicatimis for 
the conduct of monetary policy. If inflation persistence ýirises hecmise. the 
celitral bank Lwks crodibilitv. then the central bank should determine whether 
mid liow it cmi improve its and maintain it. Oil the ()tlier hand, 
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if inffiition persistence arises because economic agents slowly adjust their 
exjwctýlfiolls to cllýlllgws in the environment, or if inflation is inherentlY stickY 
ýis a result, of the way in which prices and wages are negotiated, then monetary 
policY must take into occount the associated costs of disinflation unless, those 
practises change. A thorough investigation of the reason why such price-wage 
setting behaviour arises and how expectations are formed is then needed. 
We will first consider the lack of credibility of central bank's announce- 
inents of disinflation ýi. s a common explanation for the output and unein- 
ployment costs associated with Atempts to reduce the rate of 
widely-used framework to highlight the problem of the potential lack of cred- 
ibility of such policy announcements follows the seminal contributions of 
KydIand and Prescott [1979] and Barro and Gordon [1983]. In such a model, 
the government (()i- the central kink) optinuses over a loss flinctiOll SUbJect 
to ýi Phillips curve constraint. The loss function is specified to capture the 
fact that the government, dislikes deviations from inflation and output from 
some tm-I(-)pt levels. Whenever the output target is above the "natural rate", 
the crucial implication of such a niodel is that a disinflation announcerm: Imt 
is "t, iiie inconsistent" in the sense that the government (w the centra, l bank 
cx-po"; l Ilas an ilicentive to ivilcoc from the announcement. Whenever the 
prlvýlte "'ectol. is n's'sunied to have rational exi)ectations. it takes fliat 
tive into ; wcoulit. The result is a peristent "inflation hias" afflicting the 
INTRODUCTION II 
economy in the absence of a, commitment technology that counterm-ts that 
incentive to renege. 
Chýipter I preýciits a model which is an extension of the framework of 
Býirr() and Gordon [1983] to an open economy context. The purp()se is the 
ýmýilysls of the strategy of pegging the exchange rate as a, commitnient tech- 
nology. The model follows the line of research that employs that framework 
to justify the policy decision by many European governmenfis to enter the 
European Monetary System (ETVIS) as, a, strategy to "import" a, credible mon- 
etary policy. This argunient, i,,,, well-known at least, since Glavazzi and Pagaiio 
[19861. The key feature of our model is tli(It we incorporate a more specific 
definition of the reneging c(),, -,, t,, s faced by policy-makers of the participating 
countries. This is the reýison why the model may provide a better description 
of the EMS history. 
The account for additional facton, in the description of the EMS also 
allows the model to provide a. better explanation for the collapse of the ex- 
change nife systeiii in the summer of 1992, ýAvhich occurred after more than 
five veiirs without ali, v realignment. A substantial part of the chapter is de- 
votod týo the explililation of the 1992 events. The contribution steiiis from 
tlic Eict Him existing) theoretical models cannot eiisily explain the following 
of the EMS and its crisis in 1992: its progressive hardening from 
oS7 onwm-ds. the fm-t that credibility Nvýis *shm-(, (I'; the progressive deterl- 
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oration of credibility after the first Danish referendum without changes in 
the economic fundamentýils. Our model argues that the reason lies in the 
fact that the litei-mure has not accounted for the changes in the perceived 
prospects of EMU. We show thýit an aqjustable peg regime that incorporates 
these prospects can explain the three features listed above. 
In the second part of the thesis we consider two other alternative sources 
of inflation inertm, namely the lack of rationalit, y of inflation expectýitions 
and the existelice of inertia, inherently introduced in the inflation dynamics 
by the price-wage contnicting behaviour. 
We, motivate our investiption of wage contracting as source of the ob- 
served degree of inflation persistence in Chapter 2. Specifically, the contract- 
ing specification we advocate for is derived from intertemporal optimisation 
un(ler hv() basic assumptions: (1) wage staggering, (ii) relative real wage 
concern on the part of the workers. 
Chapter 2 explains the reasons why we propose the contracting specifi- 
cAlon (tescribed in the previous paragraph. T\Iore specifically, we show there 
that the famous Taylor model (Taylor 1979.80) does not incorponite rela- 
tive cmicern on the pnrt of the workers. contrary to what wns lintlally 
thought. NN'(, ; dso show that without relative wage concern. the implied infla- 
tion dviminics does not exhibit the inertia that characterise,, actual inflation 
(l. viiianics. The evidence on the of relative Nvage concern is pre- 
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sented ým(l our approwfi to account for it is then described. In the remaining 
chapters of t1w thesis westud. v the implications ofsuch a contractingspecifi- 
cýitlon focusing on two stylised facts of aggregate U. S. datýi: inflation inertia 
and the persistence of the real effects of money shocks. 
In Chýipter 3, we first derive a, contracting specification that displays 
inflation iiwrhýi by incorporating relative wage concern on the part of the 
workers, who solve an othei--ýNisc standard problem of intertempora-I opti- 
misýttion. However, we also consider the argunient, recently put forward in 
Roberts [1997]: if expectations are not formed under rational expectýitions, 
they may well incorporate the degree of inertia necessary to characterise ac- 
tua-I inflation dynamics. The purpose of the empirical analysis carried out, in 
Chapter 3 is therefore to investigate whether relative wage concern in wage 
contracting is a preferred exphination to characterlse inflation inertia, Our 
approach Is based on relaxing the assumption of rational expectations by 
employing direct observations of inflation expectations from two well-known 
surve. vs: flic Livingston survey of professional economists and the 
We present some elvidencesupporting the idea 
that, ýiltenmtive sources of iliertia, beyond the la, ck of rationality of inflatioll 
expectatiolis, should he considered. 
Chapter 4 further alialYses the model introduced in the previous cliap- 
t er. The foclis of mir almIN-sPs NN-111 be whether ail explicit account of relative 
INTRODUCTION 14 
( w *,, Iie coilc(, rli on the. part of the workers iiiýiv contribute to explain another 
puzzle nused by recent literature. Specifically., the standard contracting spec- 
ific(ation derived from imposing staggered price/wage setting in an optimising 
framework cannot generate the observed persistence of the real effects follow- 
ing money shocks. The intuition behind that result is the lack of endogctwa,, ý 
embodied in the contracting specification. that is. the lack of an in- 
centive, for price/wage setters not to change their prices/wages by much when 
they re-set them. The existence of relative wage concern can potentially gen- 
erate thýit enclogenous stickiness. We thus look for plausible values for the 
paranietens governing relative concern in our model, and investigate 
whether it can generate both output and inflation persistence. The approach 
is based on ýissessing the dynamic a(tjustment of output and inflation follow- 
iiig,, -,, Iio(-. ks to the rate of growth of the money supply in our dynamic general 
equilibrium inacroniodel. Our results show that, relative wage concern may 
he the source of endogenous stickiness that staggered wa-e models need to 
gollerme output and inflation persistence. 
Chapter 1 
Gaining Credibility through 
Exchange Rate Pegging: the 
EMS 
1.1 Introduction 
The European Monetar, v System (EMS) was launched in 1979 as a system 
of fixed but ad. justable parities, and indeed realignments took place fairly 
frequently in its earlyyeýirs. However. from 1987 onwards, when the project 
of a, Single European Currency emerged on the political agenda, the ,, Ystem 
", ressive1v hardened. 
In Eict. between 1987 and 1992 the central parities 
were not chmil-, -ed. although realignments were still pos, "Ible. As a result, the 
t5 
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system in this p(ýrlod became known as the -New EMS". After more than 
five years of stable parities, the confidence of markets and politicians in a 
smooth transition towards the Single Currency seemed to be complete. Yet. 
in the summer of 1992, the system collapsed under unprecedented specuLitive 
pressures. 
The results of the empirical work on the credibility of the parities prior 
to and during the EMS crisis (see e. g. Rose and Svensson [19941 or Ozkan 
[1996] for two different, approaches) can be summerised by five main find- 
ings: (1) credibility was steadily increasing during the New EMS period; (h) 
movements in the credibility of the parities were usually common to all EMS 
currencies; (iii) there was little correlation between credibility and macroe- 
conomic, fundamentals; (lv) credibility started to decrease when a, majority 
voted "No" in the first Danish referendum on the Maastricht, Treaty; (v) there 
nevertheless very few indicators of strong pressures on the parities until 
shortly before the collapse. 
Theoretical models of the EMS crisis typically assume an optimising pol- 
ic. ymaker who inaximises an objective function subject to a, Phillips curve 
coii, sti-aiiit. The collapse of the system is then viewed as the result of the 
p(dic'N"limker's rational decision to devalue when the benefit of a devalua- 
tion the cost of abandoning the parity. As fundamental determi- 
iumt, of the beliefits of devaluing, the literature has highlighted negative 
CHAPTER1. GAL\'I-V(, CR. EDIBILITY THROUGH THE EMS 17 
output shocks (Obstfeld [1994])., high interest rates (Ozkan and Sutherland 
[1993,1995])., high and persistent, rates of unemployment (Drazen and Mas- 
soil [19941 and Masson [1995]), and the lack of co-ordina, tion among member 
countries concerning a, realignment (Buiter et al. [1996]). Existing litera- 
ture has nevertheless difficulties explaining several of the stylized facts found 
by the empirical works. In particular, it remains puzzling why the system 
was progressively hardening from 1987 onwards and why credibility was typ- 
ically shm-e(l. Furthermore, there is no explanation for the striking contrast 
between the increase in the credibility of the parities in the first months of 
1992 and its progressive deterioration after the first Danish referendum, since 
it Occurred without substantial changes in the economic fundamentals. 
We here argue that the reason for the shortcomings of the existing the- 
oreticA models is that they fail to account for changes in the perceived 
prospects of EMU. Although early informal discussions stressed the role of 
these prospects in understanding the crisis (see Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
[1993] and Group of Ten [1993]), the literature on the EMS crisis has ne- 
them. The reason appears to lie in the standard assumption of a fixed 
cost of devalunig,. which is taken to he state and time invariant. In the con- 
text of the EXIS. arguing that, the realignment costs were st a te- independent 
and nilt through the crisis i, -ý hardly j ust ifiable on aqv grounds. Instead. 
the'se costs should be related to the risk of foregoing participation in the 
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-Monetary Union ýmcl to the likelihood of the Monetary 
Union itself. 
In this chapter, we model the EMS ýus iiii ad . justAle peg regime with 
ým optimising policymaker. The benefits of a devaluation are, kept in line 
with those in previous work (i. e. accommodation of adverse output shocks). 
Our framework however incorporates endogenous costs of realigning, which 
are state, dependent, and non constýint over time. The crucial feature of the 
model is however thýA our cost of realignment accounts for the prospects 
of EMU. In our inodel, the possibility of ýi Mouctm-, y Union in the ftiture 
increases the cost of resorting to realignments. The key idea, is that. once 
the project of a Single Currency was launched, devaluations might lower 
credibility of monetary policy andjeopardise the countries' participation in 
f1w, Single Currency. This allows our model to provide a better description 
of the New EMS. Specifically, we may explain the gi-mving credibility of the 
parities prior to the crisis, mid the fact that credibility was shared. 
Our interpretation of the crisis in September 1992 rests on the concur- 
of two fiwtors that had not been simultaneously present in the system 
prior h) the summer of 1992. ilamely micertaint. y about EMU and a deepen- 
Ing NVith our endogenous cost of realignment. 'It is 1)()ssible toshow III 
t lj(ý I ilic '\ItT niodified , ()vernments' jncentjý-(, s to , ertmiltv ahmit 
E'- 
t() realig-iiiiients and made the sYstein more fnigile to ýidverse output shocks. 
FliumciiiI illarkets were mviin, of the fiwt that a realignment could take pLice 
I-ITT, 
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ýts soon as the economies were afflicted by sufficiently large negative shocks. 
The -credibility shock` ýirlslng from the Danish "No" and the uncertainty 
surrounding the French referendum, in the middle of the recessloii, sef the 
kisis for the inýissive ýittacks on the currencies. The changing pr(), spect of 
ýi, Single Currency is shown to be an essential factor to understand: (1) the 
timing of the attacks., just four days before the French referendum; (ii) the 
ivýisoii why countries with weaker fundamentals, which were thus less likely 
tosýltisfy the, convergence critei-iýi ( o. g. Italy, Spain). and countries with gov- 
ernments less committed to EMU (e. g. the UK), were the first suffering those 
explosive attacks. In addition, our inodel sheds new light on the reasons why 
rew-bing mi agreement on a, general realignment, was so difficult, and helps 
to understand conditions under which the presence of multiple equilibria, is 
possiblepistification for the speculative attacks. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section 
2. In Section 3, the implications of floating and pegged exchange rates are 
and a credible adjustable peg regime that better describes the EMS 
is derive(l. Section 4 explimis the hardening of the systein from 1987 onwards, 
iise to the,,,, ()-callcd New EXIS and Section 5 preselits an interpretation 
of its colLipse in September 1992. Finally. section 6 cmicludes. The cmles 
us, ed ill the simulation of the model are in an appendix at the eild 
of the cluiptei,. 
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1.2 The Model 
Our analytical framework is an extension of existing models of optimal mon- 
etary policy in small open economies (see e. g. De Kock and Grilli [1993] or 
Obstfeld [1994,97]1). Variables are expressed in logs and we take domestic 
and foreign goods as perfect substitutes. Besides, Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) is assumed to hold. The (log of the) foreign price level is taken as 
constant and is normalised to zero, so that exchange rate depreciation, et, 
and inflation, 7rt, are the same: et = et - et-1 = 7rt. Domestic output in 
period t is given by a Phillips curve relationship, 
e) Yt = ce (7rt - 7rt - Ut (1.1) 
where the (log of the) natural rate of output has been normalised to zero 
for simplicity. Furthermore, ut is a serially uncorrelated shock to output, 
which has zero mean and a variance (Tu. Its density function is assumed to 
be continuous on the compact support [It, Ul. The nominal rigidity in this 
economy arises from the fact that, the one-period nominal wage contracts 
I The starting point from which the policy implications of the different exchange rate 
regimes are derived is very similar as that of Obstfeld[1994]. However, there are substantial 
differences between his approach and ours: in his model the cost of realignment is exoge- 
nously given; and market expectations of governments' decisions are history-independent. 
Hence, lie argues that the ERM crisis was the result of a switch from one of multiple equi- 
libria to another. The present model shows that this is not the only possible explanation 
and establishes conditions tinder v, -hich multiple equilibria m, -: i. N- be a valid explanation. 
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m-e signed before the output shocks are reallsed. We assume that those 
contracts cannot be stýite-contingeilt, so wages are not indexed to the value 
of the shock. The contrýwts are signed so as to maintain a cmistaiit real 
wage and, thus, incorporate the expected rate of inflation based on nitional 
expectations. To give stabilisation policy a role, the government observes the 
realisation of the output shock before implementing the exchange rate policy. 
The government's objective is to minimise the following loss function: 
00 00 
Lt, = Et, E /3i-'lj = Ei, ý:, W -'(0 7rj 
2+ (yj 
_y 
j=t, j=t 
In the government"s loss for period t, It, the first term reflects the policy- 
inaker's desire for low inflation, or equivalently, her concern with exchange 
rate stA)ility. The second term incorporates an output target, y*, that, is 
larger than the imtural ratc, (y* > 0). The parameter 0 reflects the weight of 
inflation reLitive to output stabilisation and 0C (0,1) denotes the discount 
fact or. 
1.3 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
In this sectl()11 Nve aliallyse the implications of floating and pegging the ex- 
i-; tt(, to highlight the k(,, N- fiictors in the choice of the optimal exchange 
Justable peg regime ýý rate n-inw. Then, we build n1i ad* -hich captures better 
soille, keY fi, iltlin's of the EMS. 
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1.3.1 Floating Exchange Rate 
VVe ýissurne that there ýire no reputýitlonal effects or commitment possibilities 
when the exchange nite floats (see Herrendorf [1997,981 for a Justification). 1 
Hence, current policy actions do not affect the policy problem to be faced 
future periods. Consequently, in any period t the government solves the opti- 
misation problem of the stage game, minimising the one-period loss function 
11, subject to (1.1). The Nash equilibrium outcome can be shown to be 
F= (), 
,*F0 7T -t-y lltý v+ t0 0+0,2 t 0+ (1,2 
where the superscript "F" indicates floating. Equation (1.3) implies that 
the shock at, is Imi-tially stabillsed by the monetary authority and that the 
econoiny suffers from a systematic inflation bias. equal to (a/0) y*. A gov- 
ernment (leciding which exchange nite regime to choose evaluates the losses 
conditional on information available in the planning period t-1. The ex- 
pected present. value of the losses tinder floating is therefore given by2 
00 1 [0 +20 
Et-, oj-t IF -_y *2 +- (T 2 1 1-3 00+ (), 2 U 
j=t 
1.3.2 Fixed Exchange Rate 
Ill the of the process towm-ds EMU. it Ims been argued that inflation- 
prolic periphery countries eiit(, i-(, (l ýt fixed exchange rate iig)iveitwitt with the 
2, -i,, Iit hand side of (1.4) is independent of the thne index. so a time Note that the i 
i,, tiot liecessai-Y. 
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centre countries (mainly Germany) to import credibility and the low inflation 
of the latter (see Giavazzi and Pagano [1988]). The rationale behind this 
argument is that if the commitment to a fixed exchange rate is credible, then 
it is possible to eliminate the inflation bias that afflicts the domestic economy 
under a float. On the other hand, a peg also implies the loss of a policy 
instrument, the exchange rate, which can be used to stabilise output shocks 
in the presence of short-run nominal rigidities. Consequently, there is only 
a case for fixing the exchange rate if the benefits of avoiding high average 
inflation exceed the costs caused by the lack of policy response to output 
fluctuations'. A credible peg implies that 7r"' = 7r' = 0, and y"' = ut. The ttt 
expected present value of the losses under a peg is 
00 
peg *2 2] 
. 
LP'g = Et-I 
1:, 3 [y + (Tu 
j=t 
Comparing (1.4) and (1-5), a peg is the preferred regime if and only if 
(T 
20+ 
u 
y *2 
However, it is well-known that the policymaker has an incentive to renege 
ex-post on her commitment to a fixed parity and resort to a devaluation. For 
this reason, two questions are of primary interest to choose the optimal ex- 
'Since the foreign monetary authority stabilises only foreign shocks, it is the difference 
between domestic and foreign shocks which is not stabilised by exchange rate pegging 
and leads to costly fluctuations from the domestic point of view. We can simplify this by 
liori-nalising foreign supply shocks to zero. 
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change rate regime: first, whether there are forces thýit may prevent, reneging 
from the ýiiijioiinced parity; second. whether there are "intermediate" r(,, (, )jjjj(,,, ý 
which inýi. V be preferable to either a peg or a float. We now miiilYse these 
questions in greater detail., and relate them to the features of the European 
Monetary System. 
1.3.3 The EMS as an adjustable peg regime 
In the EMS years, realignments did take phice. yet currencies remained in 
the, systein. To be consistent with that fact, we model an EMS-like system of 
pegged but a, djiistable parities in which the government's dilemma, is whether 
to devalue or to maintain the p; irlty. Such a, system can be interpreted ýis a, 
reginle in \vlilcli the commitment to the announced parity isstate-contingent, 
a peg with ; III escape clause. ? \1ore specifically. when the si ize of Hie shock 
hitting the exceeds a threshold value u*. the 'trigger - point, the 
breaks its commitment to the fixed parity to stabillse the adverse 
output, sliock. and in the following period returns to a new parity, which is 
in turn ad. jiishible In extreme circunistances. 
We forlilýillsc the adjustable, peg as a trigger-strategy equilibrium of the 
iiionet; iry policy game presented in the first The private sector 
'In what follows we ýipply the niml. vsls developed hy De block and Grllll[1993] in all 
optililal tnx niodel to the Barro-6orclon frainework. 
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is ýiware of the (-, pý-erilineids incentives to implement surprise devaluations, 
but it is assumed to 1()se confidence in the adjustable peg regime only if the 
government resorts to a discretionary use of t1w exchange rate policy when 
tiq < u*. In this cýise. the private sector punishes the government by playing 
Mish f(wever after the devaluation occurs', and the exchange rate reverts to 
floating. 
Determination of the equilibrium trigger 
The equilibrium trigger point thýit charactcrlscý the adjustable peg regime 
(-. an be derived as follows. Let T (vt, u*) denote the net benefit of a deva, lua- 
tioill 
k1l (tit, u*) =- B'(ut. u*) - C'(ut, u*), 
ýN711('r(, Br(U,,, U*) ý111(1 Cr(,, I, t, U*) m-el respectively the benefit and the cost 
(defined below) of a, realignment of the parity ývllen it is not. justified. that is, 
when the size of the shock is not sufficiently large (ut < W). The equilibrium 
tri-wl- poilit. imist then , ýitisfv: 
kTj(ti*, it*) = T(iit, it*) <0 foi- ut< it* atid flut. it*) >0 for it, > it*. 
('. ) 
'This wssumption follows De Kock and Grilli ý1993] and is inade in order to keep the 
model iis simple ýis possible 
(shorter 'punishnient' perlod,, can be eisily accoinmodate(l hy 
lower values of the , overiiiiielit's dis o int f( ()i "I cIa -t 
)- 
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Condition (1.8) defines an interior trigger point, that is, a threshold value u* 
in the interior of the interval of support of the shock, u* E (u, ii), such that 
the policymaker devalues if and only if ut > u*. Consequently, u* describes 
an adjustable peg regime, in which the credibility loss, captured by the term 
C'(. ) in (1.7), can deter the government from devaluing. The key feature 
of this exchange rate regime is that the closer u* is to u the more frequent 
realignments are, and thus the closer is the adjustable peg to floating. On 
the other hand, the adjustable peg gets closer to a peg the closer is u* to the 
upper bound d. 
6 
To obtain the equilibrium trigger we have to compute the benefit and cost 
of realigning in this adjustable peg regime. Consider first the benefits. They 
are assumed to arise in the period in which the realignment takes place, and 
are given by 
B'(ut, u*) = 1'(ut, u*) - 1'(ut, u*), tt 
where 1P (ut, u*) is the one-period loss if the peg is maintained and 1r (ut, u*) tt 
is the loss if the parity is realigned. It is important to note that these 
one-period losses incorporate the expected rate of inflation under this mixed 
6 Note that a permanent peg is incentive-compatible only if the cost of an unjustified 
realignment of the peg exceeds the benefits for all possible realisations of the shock, that 
is if xP(u,, ? L*) <0 for all ii,. Equivalently, floating is an equilibrium regime if the 
government has no incentive to peg the exchange rate provided that the public expects 
the exchange rate to float forever, i. e. if >0 for all u, 
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is adjustable peg regime regime. Positive inflation expectations arise in th .1 
lwcýmmý ýttleilfs take into account the possibility of a Justified devaluation 
in the following period. Inflation expecta, tions incorporate the inflation rate 
expected to prevail Ater a realignment. weighted by the probability tliýit a 
realignment, takes phice. This probability is determined by the value of the 
equilibrium trigger point and the distribution of the shocks. Formally, we 
have: 
7T'tfa*) = F(u*) Et-1(7rtl peg Zo, t) + [I - F(u*)] Ei, -1(7rtl rc(dignmentlo 
t) 
(i, [I - F(u*)] 
0+ (1ý2 F(qL*) 0+ (1,2F(u*) 
11', f (ut) dut. (1.10) 
where f (. ) Is the density of ut and F(. ) denotes the probability that ut < W. 
Given the knowledge of the realisation of the shock, the benefits of re- 
aligning cAn beshmvii to equal 
B'(iij. it') Ot(tit, it*) - It' 
*+ ut] 
2 (tit 
ý it*) - 
'(U*) +y 
0+ 
la7rt 
Considei- ilow the cost of realigning, Cr(ut, u*). The cost is assumed to 
m-crue in future periods, arising because the private sector loses faith in the 
-'oveviiiiient's commitment to the ad ustable peg. It is therefore formallsed as 
t he discounted vahic of being under floating rather than under our adjustable 
pe, (), from I-Ile period Ater the unjustified realignment oinvm, ds, i. e. 
C'(ti*) =ý [LF- L'lf (11*)]. (1.12) 
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where L' denotes the present discounted value of the losses under floating 
as derived before. The loss under our mixed regime is given by 
LM(u*) = Et-, ,0 
j-' lj'(uj, u*), 
j=t 
where the expected one-period loss is 
Et-ll'(ut, u*) =: F(u*)Et-llp(ut, u*) + [I - F(u*)] Et tt 11, (ut, U*) t 
(1.13) 
(1.14) 
Since ut is i. i. d., the losses under the adjustable peg regime can be written 
as 
LM(u*) 2ay*7e(U*) +Ce27re (U *)2 _a O+a2 
Ju 
+Y*2 + (T 2 
a2 [1-F(u*)] [y*2 + a27re (U*) 21 
u0+ OZ2 
2f (u) du - 
2Ce3 [1-F(u*)]y7rlu*) 
ut 
0+ Ce2 
_ 
2a 2[Y*+7re(U*)] U- 
utf(u) du 0+ Ce2 
lu 
* 
(1.15) 
The cost of reneging can be expressed as 
Cr (u*) =Et 
00 
oi-t [1F 
j=t+l 
ljp(uj, u*)+ [1-F(u*)]B(uj, u*)Iuj>u*)], (1-16) 
Using the previous results, one obtains 
r (U m= ý2 
Ce2 + 20 - OF(u*), Y*2 _ (T2 _ [0 + a2 F(u*)] 7re(U*)2 + 
il-t 
u 
2f (u) du tt 0 
lu 
* 
-2 
0+ ce 
2 F(u*) 
7r'(u*) y* + 2[a 7r e 
(U*) + y* 
U 
utf (u) du tt 
al 
=a where Q_ 10/(o + a2)(1 
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1.4 The "New EMS" 
The KXIS experienced a dc facto forswearing of realignments from Januar. v 
1987 onwards, which gave rise to a, different exchange rate regime, the so- 
called "New EMS. The striking feature of this regime was the sound cred- 
ibility of the parities. In fact. empirical analyses show thýit credibility wýis 
steadily increasing until the summer of 1992. There was however little cor- 
relation between credibility and macroeconomic fundamentals- even in the 
first nionths of 1992, despite the deepening recession, the credibility of the 
parities was surprisingly sound 7. Nloreover, movements in credibility were 
typically common to all EMS currencies. These empirical findings are a se- 
rious, probleill for many existing currenc. v crisis models, which cannot easily 
provide mi explanation for thein. The institutional changes in the EMS do 
not offer ýi sound explanation either. It is true that the Basle-Nyborg Agree- 
ii wnt, of 1987 contributed to the stability of the system by extending the Very 
Short Terin Financing Facility ainong centrýd banks '. Yet. the existence of 
; Iddit-1011ill fillailcial resources to cope with speculative attacks is not by itself 
ýi explanation for the growing credibilitY of the paritics. 
'For detailed anah-ses of the credibility of the parities the reader is referred for example 
to Ro,,,, (, and Sveii. ss()a ý19941. 
'Tll(, Basle-N-yhorg, Ag)reeiiieilt extended exchange market intervention at even intra- 
iiian, ilial level if between the Central Baliks involved. 
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In mir opinion., the hardening of the EMS wýis funclamentallY linked to 
the project of a Single European Cul-i-ency. We. m-om, here that this project 
iiwreýused the costs, of resorting to realignments, since unjustified devaluat lolls 
could. jeopardize. p(ji-ticipation in the future Nlonetary Union. As a result. it 
is not surprising that the system hardened and credibility steadily increased 
since t lie proj ect of ýi Monetary Union emerged in the political agenda, and 
started heing developed. 
The New EMS can he described by our adjustable peg regime if the 
cost of ivýiligiiiiig accounts for the possibility of a Monetary Union in the 
iwýir future. This is done by assuming that EMU may take place in some 
ffiture period "T". To enrich the analysis, the probability that EMU is 
implemeiife(I is introduced ýus '-p". and "q" denotes the probability that the 
country under consideration actually qualifies. We also assume that if EMU 
is not implemented (a probability (I - p) event)., an EMS-like arrangement 
would be inaintained aniong the inember countries., whereas if ýi country 
not, qualify, but EMU is implemented (which occurs with probability 
Hie cmultry's curiviw. v will float The cost of realigning is then 
! )This issuniption is takeil to simplify the nnalysis. It could be argued that if a cmultry 
left, ()iit at period "T", a sort of -New EMS arrangement could be al. so maintained 
i abelliiii [1996] argues. hot weei i currencies left, out and the Euro. However, iý,, Persson and T, 
it seenis, rnther difficult for "outsiders" to keel) a peg with the Euro. Hence it is most likely 
t li; i tn float the only option f()r outsiders. 
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modified w,, follows: 
T-1 
ýý oi-t [iF 
- 
PlSi C'(u*, p, q, T) Et fii 
j=t+l 
X, 
+ Et, 13k-t fpq [IF k 
k=T 
00 
iEAIUI + (i - P) 
[iF 
- 
1EAISi 
kkk 
-1 [IF - 
iEAISi 
, 
Ei, 
+ Et ok-t lpq [l EAIS k 
k=T 
iEAIIII 
- p(i - 7) 
[iF 
A. k 
(1.18) 
Eqivition (1.18) clearly indicates that accounting for ýi Monetary Union adds 
an extni cost to the option of devaluing: this equation is composed of the 
c()st Are; idy derived in equation (1.17) plus the term in the last line of (1.18). 
This n(, Nv term captures the additional gains from participating in EMU with 
respect to the EMS, ad. justed by the possibility that the country is left out 
of the Molletm-Nr Union. These situations are weighted by the probabilities 
ýmd "q". Note tImt obviously if EMU is' not possible at all (p = 0), 
Hie List line in (1.18) výuiislies and we are left with the same endogenous 
c()st ; i,,, in the section. Besides, note that given "j)", and -'q", the 
addit, loll; II t(IIIII ill (1.1S) also depen(Is on --T": ccfcris paribus. it is larger the 
t1w skii-ting, date of the Mmietary Union is. So. getting closer to EMU 
II the of devalunig, which iii turil i-niscs the point toNVM, dl--'l 
ii. This feAure of the model is c(nisistelit with the pr(), -ressive lial, (jellilIg of 
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the systom and the increase in the credibility of the parities. 
To coinpufe the additional cost of realigning resulting from the prospect 
of EMIT, we formulate the coiiiitr, v's expected loss under EMU along the 
lines of recent literature ". The postulated advantage of a Single Currency 
over the EMS is that, the European Central Bank (ECB in what follows) 
could credibly pre-commit due to ýi successful institutional design. The ECB 
thus implements an optimal policy of stabilisation at an "European level" by 
accommo(lating the output, shock common to the EMU economies. Under 
this assumption, the ECB",,, monetary policy would result in 
7TEAlU 
OIEJIVIU 
2 OECB + aEAIU 
where (1.3) lias been used to derive the expression for A. A Single Currency 
implies that all countries share the above rate of inflation. Thus, output in 
(, ýwli country would be 
()'(7EAIU - 70) (1.20) 
where "c" is the common European shock, and "ti, " is the shock affecting 
(,; wh count i-v ". As ii result. the expected one-period loss under ENIU is 
'", 
] NVI I hY 
EAIU I [(O+(12)A2 (T 
2+ 
Y*2ý 
. r-, --, 
It +I - 2(1 A/),. ] u 
'()See Alesin(i and Grilli [1992]. 
"For simplicitY Nve linve Inade the additional assumption that the sllocks f and iii have 
the saine vm-imico hut are ilot perfectlY correlated. 
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Benefits and Costs of Devaluing 
0 00 
0.00 
O. oc 
0 oc 
0 Of 
0. 
Figure 1.1: Benefits and costs of Devaluing 
where p,,, is the correlation between c and ui . 
Figure 1.1 presents a numerical simulation of the benefits and cost of 
realignment in our model ". 
The two cost functions we plot represent the cost of realignments with 
12 The parameter values for the simulations are: )3 = 0.9,0 = 0.15, y* = 0.01, 
a=0.6, it - U[-0.03,0.03], A=0.75, pEu = 0.85, EMU in T= 1999. The 
qualitative results are quite robust to changes in parameter values. Here we present the 
results for the uniform distribution used in Obstfeld [1994]. His work emphasises the 
presence of multiple equilibria when a, lump-surn specification of the realignment cost is 
employed. In order to compare his results to ours, our choice of parameters a. lso follows 
Ills. 
001, 
-u utl -u. u2 -001 00 01 002 0.03 
Trigger Shock 
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The two cost functions we plot represent the cost of realignments with 
and without a Monetary Union in the future. For illustrative purposes, the 
cost function plotted here corresponds to the case in which EMU will take 
place with probability p =: I and that the country will certainly qualify (i. e. 
q= 1). As a result of the prospect of EMU, credibility is enhanced by two 
forces at work. First, as expected, the value of the "good" equilibrium trigger 
(the one on the positive part of the horizontal axis) increases: in Figure I 
the parity becomes nearly fully credible. In fact, only in the event of a severe 
recession, that is, an adverse shock close to the upper limit of the support of 
the shock, -U, would a realignment take place. Second, and most noteworthy, 
although our model features an escape clause as in Obstfeld [1994,97], the 
trigger point becomes unique ". This is due to the explicit account of the 
likelihood of a Single Currency, which increases the cost of realignment for 
"The New EMS can be represented as an adjustable peg with a trigger point close to 
the upper bound of the support for the output shock, very much resembling a permanent 
peg. No EMS government ever made ally announcement of a level of interest rates, unem- 
ployment or threshold whatsoever that would trigger a departure from the system. In fact, 
governments repeatedly announced their intention not to leave the system at all. Such an- 
nouncements obviously turned out not to be state-consistent. Furthermore, despite their 
progressive reduction, inflation and interest rate differentials remained at non-negligible 
levels during the New EMS period. This fact points to nonetheless imperfect credibility 
of the parities. The actual governments' commitment to the central parities is thus better 
characterised by a high trigger point. which would only be reached in a severe recession. I 
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all the realisations of the output shock. Our model can then explain the 
ENIS liwl coped well with mlvei-se circiiiiistýmceý before 1992. In the words 
of Rose and Svensson [1994, (p. 1214)]: 
[. ] the old parities had stood well, weathering a variety of 
events since, 1987 which might have been expected to result in 
reýillgniilents including the removal of capital controls, German 
Reunification, the Gulf crisis [. ]. The New EMS had weathered 
these situations well, with constant or enhanced credibility and 
(lid not appear to be very well described by traditional models. 
This suggests that the credibility of the New EMS parities can only be 
understood in the presence of a trm', quc point. Under multiple equilib- 
ýi suddenswitch in market expectations from one equilibrium to another 
triggers a devaluation given the self- fillfilling property of expectations. It is 
then difficult to understand why any of the events enumerated by Rose and 
SI vensson did not force a realignment. 
Acc(mlitHig for t1w prospects of EMU can explain the increasing credibil- 
itY of the parities eveii during the first months of 1992. when the European 
(w(moinies suffering a recessi(m. Wo can offer two main reasons. First, 
wit-11 the il(q. ville triclit TreatY. the prolect of E-MtT ( I-it, oll the Maiis 
. 1ke "'Ilape. Ill our model. we cail capture it by an increase in the 1111n, tot( ,I 
likelillood of EMU taking place. ý)('(-()lld. the -t; ll-tlilg date of EMU, 
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wýis definitely set mid goetting closer. 
A, ý shown above. both Hiese fac- 
tors increase the expected present value of the cost of not quallfy'ng . thereby 
enhancing credibility. A related point worth noting is that since these factors 
were common to most participants in the New EMS. our model also explains 
why credibility was shared, as found in the empirical analysis of Rose and 
Svensson [1994]. Provided EMU would take place as planned, only a, very 
severe recession could then trigger realignments. G)iisequentlY, whenever 
market tensions emerged far from the unique st ate- consistent trigger during 
the period 1987-92, there was no disagreement among the participants that 
financial support to defend the parities should readily be available. 
On 2nd June 1992, the, scenario changed. The Danish voted "No" to the 
NLuisti-iclit, Treýit. v. and ýi EMU, the additional source of credibility of the 
parities, was suddenly under threat. In addition, in the summer of 1992 all 
Imi-licipants in the New EMS except Germany were experiencing a deepen- 
ing recession. The next section provides an interpretation of the events of 
SI 'epteinher 1992 111 the light of these facts). 
1.5 An explanation of the ERM crisis 
WO IM1111 I. ('s lilt, .. M crisis: (1) s alise from the empirical analyses on the ER'- 
t verv few Indicator" of pres"llres on the existing parities mitil 
shol-th- before the collapse: (11) nollethele". s '-"týlrted to (Ieclvýlse 
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when a i-na, jority voted "No"' on June 2. Theoretical interpretations of the 
crisis J)ý,, se(l on multiple equilibria cannot convincingly explain these facts. 
While they do well with respect to the first finding, they ha, ve trouble Nvith the 
timing of the ýJtacks: neither the increase in expectations of realignment in 
thesnininer of 1992 nor the level of these expectations were without historical 
precedents. As argued in the previous section. an additional weakness of 
multiple equilibi-hi models is that they a, re not consistent with the sound 
stability of the parities during the EMS yemýs. 
We, ýirguc that the explanation of the enipirical findings mentioned above 
in the uncertainty about EMU. This factor has been clearly overlooked 
by existing literature. Uncertainty about EMU had not emerged before in 
the New-EMS period and, thus, itm, v explain the otherwise puzzling insta- 
of the system in the summer of 1992, as the economic conditions did 
not suffer substantial changes. The fiict that the credibility of the parities 
st arted to dccreýisc. shortly after the negative outcome of the first Danish 
referendum is consistent with this vimv ". Moreover, the reason is straight- 
fonvm-d in our inodel: EMU. tli(, ultimate goal that had strený(-))thene(I the 
, -ývstelll. becilille 1111certain for the first tinle. While the inessa-e sent to the 
markets \výis that the project of E-MtT NN-ýjs still on track exýwtl. v as (lesigned 
in the ýLmstrlclit Tivýitv (including tli(, convergence criteria), the deepening 
II Sol Mld ! -), vells, -ýOll [19ý) 1-. 
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recession had already made restrictive policies more harmful for a significant 
number ()f c(miii-ries. As ýi i-eslilt, governments . resolution to maintain the 
parities received renewed attention by the itim-kets and the ldcýi of a iiiiiii 
currency unionstarted to gain momentum 
Our model explains the crisis by the concurrence in September 1992 of 
t, w(-) f'ý, (ýj(ws. namely doubts about the future of EXIU and a deepening 
sion. Thu are cýiptured by reductions in the likelihood of EMU the 
probability of qualifying, "q"', and ýi large adverse realisation of the output 
shock "n. ". Figure 1.2 below illustrates the effects of a reduction in the prob- 
ýIbilitics' by stm-ting, ýIt a, point, where the New EMS enjoys high credibility 
The i-eduction in "p" and "q" lowers the cost of devaluing, the value of the 
equilibrium trigger shock (I(wivlýiscs ýind a realignment becomes more likely. 
As a result, the expected nite of devaluation increases (see equation (1.10)) 
and the credibilit. v measures deteriorate.. In this model, speculative attacks 
mvur whenever the adverse output, shock is believed to he large enough, that 
j, ý 11, f > tl*, sinc,, e ail optinilsing policy maker will then find it optimal to 
abalidoll the parit-Y. 
1-5S(, (, Financial Thiles, 20th June 1992 and the --Survey of Foreign Exchange Markets 
in Elcliengreen and \Vvi)losz ý1993), in particular Tables 3 and . -) 
"ýTlie first plot of the cost, filliction. assuming p=q=1, implies a trigger point 
11, - jill(I ill, (, xl)(, (, t(, (l devaluation of 0.19( ('. 
CHAPTER1 
0,001, 
0MV 
0 OOOE 
0.000( 
0,0002 
0.000 
0,0 
GAINING CREDIBILITY THROUGH THE EMS 39 
Trigger Shock 
Figure 1.2: Benefits and Costs of Devaluing 
The Referendum called by President Mitterrand fueled further the doubts 
about the stability of the parities in September 1992. The future of EMU 
was undoubtedly linked to its result, as explicitly acknowledged by the Com- 
mission President Jacques Delors 17. This situation led financial markets 
to consider a set of alternative scenarios, accounting for both each country's 
probability of qualifying and the process towards a Single Currency itself "'. 
Table I below presents some numerical simulations of the model to illus- 
trate the effects of decreasing "p" and "q" on the trigger points. 
17See Financial Times, 31st, Avigust 1992. 
lsSee Financial Times, 20th June 1992. 
. 00ý 
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Tible I. I: E(Auilibrium Trigger Points 
p q Trigger Shock p q Trigger Shock 
1 1 0.0275 0.5 1 0.023 
1 0.75 0.024 0.5 0.75 0.0215 
0.75 0.75 0.023 0.5 0.5 0.0205 
0.75 0.5 0.0195 0.5 0.25 0.0185 
0.75 0.25 0.017 0.5 0 0.0165 
Table I below presents some numerical s1mulatlons of the model to 'llus- 
trate the effects of decreasing and '*q" on the trigger points. 
Them, numerical resultsshed soine light on particulm- aspects of the crisis 
that still remain puzzling. For the sake of concreteness, ývc assume p=0.5 
is the situation before the French referendum, and that. a positive outcome 
Consider first the timing of the ýittack,,,,, just four days c, iii is (,,,, 1) =0- 15. 
before the French referendum. The table shows ýi "perverse effect"' of ým 
expected French -Yes- oil the triggers of countries that were believed not 
lo qiialýfy (giveli the increosilio)- runiours that a mini-E-'\ItT Nviis unavoidable). 
Nl()I-(' specificAly. for ;I probability of qualifyin, (). of q :::: --0-75- Nve see that 
implics, ti' = 0-0215 and I)-=0.7, -) w' = 0.023 . but 
for the lmver probability of 
(Illah (v i it (,, of q-0.25. an I'licl-ca,, c in the probabilitY of E-MV from p-(). 5 io 
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1)=0.7T) implies a dc(;, rcasc in the trigger point from u* = 0.0185 to ii* = 0.01 T. 
For Hie first time in the New EMS years. a successful ýittýick on the curren- 
cies of countries believed unlikely to qualify became possible: these countries, 
could no longer benefit from a, positive outcome in the French Referendum to 
partially restore the credibility en. joyed after 1987. In fact. a narrow but pos- 
itive outcome of the French referendum was probably anticipated. Of course, 
in the event of ýi French "No" , the process of EMU would have been seriously 
damaged. The trigger point of the countries expected to qualify would have 
then dccivýised. The most likely result would have been speculative attacks 
on all the currencies in the system, since. the co-ordinated defence of the 
paritw, s would have been very unlikely 19 - 
The interior trigger points presented in Table 1 nevertheless remain unique, 
for countrics with a positive probability of qualifying. The model implies thýit 
an interior would cause a realignment, and not a, reversion to float. 
This i,,, consistent with the experience of several currencies in September 1992 
(the Spanish pesct; i, or Portuguese escudo). Yet, some currencies floated af- 
"The niodel has the implication that the triggers of the countries unlikely to quallfY 
III the event of ii negative outcome III the French Referendum. The intuition 
behind that re'sult is that such countries would benefit from exchange rate pegging rather 
I -as delayed beyond -T'. However, if the thail floAllig f, ()I, longol. if the project of EMU ýN 
ies of coiilltri(,,,,, witil stroligwr fundanientals come tinder attack. it is natural to 
thA (. 01 lilt I'le"', likely to qualify would also suffer the attacks. 
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I ev the Atacks (Italian lira, sterling). Moreover. they seemed to be expected 
to flwt. Our e11(1()P)ell()IIS c()st may ýdso explain wItY that wýis the cclse. In 
pm-tlciihir. our model predicts that countries belleved very unlikely to qualify 
could fýwe multiple equilibria. Figure 2 also illustrates this case. For p=0.5, 
q=0 multiple equilibria arises: the "second"' equilibrium implies an almost 
necessary reversion to floating. The experiences of sterling and the Italian 
lini ýav consistent, with this scenario, since those countries believed to 
he the most unlikely to qualify for the Single Currency (the UK due to her 
()pting-out, clause). Our model shows that their low probability of qualifying 
inay have been a fundamental factor in understanding the attacks. 
There ýuv several additional aspects on which our model can shed some 
light. First,, it. cim explain the Bundesbailk's selective defence of the cur- 
roncles on 16th September "). The reduction in -'p" and "q"crea, tes a hedge 
between the t, riggers of countries likely to qualify and those unlikely to do so 
(11* - 0.023 and U 
*(q = 0.017, respectively). even when they were (q=0.75) -=0.2 5) 
suffering a, sinlilm- recession (captured here I)Y size of the adverse shock u). 
'I ýccoiid, our model also provides a sti-aightforward justification for the dif- 
21111, OlIr ýN-(, , , d), stnict froin (, -,,,, I)ectatioiis of aii. v delay iii EMU beyond 1999. 
pect', t loils' of Such I delay, for example to ýillow inore countries to qualify. would 
here the credibility of the parities of those countries likelY to qualify. We 
(to not follow Him argument liere, but it is clear that the case of the French fr. mc in the 
; II'lorillath ot . tll(, 11ý11.1, ow would fit in that sceiiario. 
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ficiilti(ý, s in an agreement on the co-ordinated general realignment. 
Such ýi reýiligimwiit had been repeatedly proposed by the BunclesWnk since 
w, early ýis 1991. But, a. devaluation implies validating the trigger point at 
which it takes place for the formation of inflation expectations in our model. 
Thus, countries with higher state-consistent triggers ýis a consequence of their 
st ronger fundamentals and higher probability of qualifying (France, Nether- 
lands) were obviously reluctant to accept (i realignment at other countries* 
lower triggers ". Third, in the present model it is possible that attacks take 
pl; i(-, (,, without any previous remarkable decrease in the credibility of the par- 
ity. despite a sub4mitial decrease in the trigger point, 22, ýis found bY Rose 
and Sveiisson [19941. 
1.6 Concluding remarks 
This paper liýis presented an EMS-like adjustable exchange rate regime com- 
pi-Ising ýl peg With all clscýlpel clause allowing for realignments in unusual 
circiiiii, stance., s. The escnpe clause is forniallsed as a trigger value for an a, d- 
output shock, where the equilibrium trigger is derived from an explicit 
21 Thesv iii ýi iiiiiIntend peg fraineivork support the case for a lack of co-ordination 
III i Ile poriplierY, an explanation hY Buiter ct a/. [1996]. 
ggers 
depicted ill Figure '2. -, ý"(O. 017) = 0.1)7' '. which '2'2For tlie lowest of tlie iiiii(Iiie trig 
C(Alillot si-lial 11"gh expectitions of i-(, (, ilioiliil(, iit -iveii the width of the ERM bands. 1 
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formulation of benefit, s and (,, wlogenous cost of realigning the parities. In (, ()ii- 
tnisl - existing \\, ()rk ýissiimed the c()st of realigning) to be exogenouslY lo)-iven 
and c()nsfant over time. 
We. argued tliýit existing formal analyses have overlooked the fact tliýit 
Hie cosf of realigning had decreased prior to the EMS crisis in September 
1992. The ivýv,, ()ii for such a, decrease was that the likelihood EMU proceeding 
smoothlyw,, planned decreased due to the "No" in the first Danish referendum 
and the increasing uncertainty tImt, preceded the French referendum on the 
Nlmstriclit Treaty. A decrease in the likelihood of EMU inade it less costly 
to devalue and. jeopardise qualifying for the Single Currency, given that EMU 
involves iiet beliefits. The ii-iodel shows that incorporating this effect, allows 
for ;I satisfilctory explanation of the iiia, iii st. ylized fm-ts of the collapse 
of the New EMS in September 1992. 
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1.7 Appendix 
In this appendix we include the codes used to simulate the model. The 
numerical simulations were carried out by S-Plus. The package required the 
construction of each function that were used later to generate the data and 
the figures presented in this Chapter. 
11 c"If" <- 
fillictioll(n) 
lit <- 1 
1) <- 1 
(1/0.06) * dbctt((u + 0.03)/0.06, it, b)j 
91 ej cf " <- 
fillictioll(n) 
jintegrate(cif, -0.03, u)$integrall 
11 ej fil" <- 
flinctioll(x) 
(1/0.06) * dbc. ta((x + 0.03)/0.06, it, 1)) xj 
17e. jfu2" <- 
fullctioliN 
it <- 
(1/0.06) * dbvtt((x + 0.03)/0.06, it, b) (x-2)1 
fillictioll(II) 
j integritte(c 
' 
iffi, u, 0.03)$integrall 
7'(jint2" <- 
flinctiol 1 (11) 
I integrate(c 
' Ifu2, u, 
0.03)$integrall 
Ilejeillf"<- 
filliction(u) 
it <- 0.15 
betit <- 0.9 
Y <- 0.01 
al <- 0.6 
((al * (I - e. jcf(u)))/(t + (al-2) * ejcf(u))) + (al/(t + (al-2) ejcf(u))) 
(jint(II) 
" Lff " <- 
filliction(u) 
I t. <- 0.15 
y <- 0.01 
beta <- 0.9 
- 0.6 al < 
varu <- 0.00029999999999999996 
(1/(l - beta)) * ((((al-2) + t)/t) (y-2) + (t/((al-2) + t)) varli)) 
" Lpeg" <- 
filliction(u) 
i betal <- 0.9 
varn <- 0.0003 
v <- 0.01 
(1/(l - beta)) * (varn + (y-2))l 
" Lerin" <- 
fillictioll(II) 
lbeta <- 0.9 
t <- 0.15 
v <- 0.015 
al <- 0.6 
varn <- (0.00029999999999999996) 
k2 <- (1/(l - beta)) 
prinwra <- k2 (y-2 + (al-2) * (((j6nf(u))-2) + varu +2' N' al (jeillf(u)) 
segmidat <- k2 (-I) * (l - (Jcf(u)) * ((, tl-2)/((. tl-2) + (y-2 + 
(, 11-2) 
v. jvinf(u))-2)) 
CHAPTER I. GAINING CREDIBILITY THROUGH THE EMS 46 
tercent <- k2 (-2) (1 - cjcf(u)) *+y* (jehif(ii) 
cuarta <- k2 (-I) ((, tl-2)/((, tl-2) + t)) * eiiiit2(ii) 
quinta <- k2 (-2) ((al-2)/((al-2) + t)) * (y + al ejeinf(u)) (,. jiilt(ii) 
prinwra + segunda + tercera + cuarta + quinta 
I 
11 costo I" <- 
flilictioll(II) 
a <- 0.6 
<- 0.01 
<- 0.9 
t <- 0.15 
1 <- 0.75 
rho <- 0.85 
varn <- 0.00029999999999999996 
e. jilit <- integrate(effli, 11,0.03)$illtegral 
(jint2 <- int-egrate(effu2, u, 0,03)$iiit(! gi-, tl 
ejehif <- ((a * (I - cjcf(u)))/(t + (a 2) * ejcf(u))) y+(, I/(t + (a-2) vjcf(u))) 
(jilit(u) 
kl <- ((, c2)/((a-2) + t)) 
priment <- kl (((a-2) +t*2-t* (jcf(u))/t-) * (y-2) 
segunda <- kl val-ii * (-I) 
tercent <- kl (t + (a-2) cjcf(u)) * (((jeinf)-2) * (-l) 
cuarta <- (kl (t + (a^2) vjcf(u)) *y* ((jeilif) * (-2))/, t 
quint-a <- kl (jint, 2(u) 
sexta <- kl *a ((Jeinf) * eiint(u) *2 
septima <- kl eiint(u) *2 
year <- 7 
ye, <- 0.01 
pellill <- 1 
(III <- I 
prinienteins <- (y-2 + (a-2) * ((c. jciilf)-2) + varu +2*y*a ((iieiiif)) 
seguild, wills <- (-I) * (I - vjcf(u)) * ((a-2)/((a-2) + t)) (y-2 + (a-2) * ((c. jeinf)-2) 
tercerae, ins <- (-2) (1 - cjcf(u)) * ((a-3)/((a-2) + t)) * (cieillf) 
cuartacins <- (-I) ((a-2)/((a-2) + t)) ejillQ(u) 
quintaviiis <- (-2) ((, t-2)/((, t-2) + t)) (y +a* (ejeinf)) * e. jint(u) 
pi-iincraciiiii <- (t + a-2) 1-2 varil 
seglindae'llill <- vai'll 
terceraviiiii <- ), ^2 
cuartaciiiii <- (-2) *a*I rho varn 
((priilicra + segunda + tercera + cuarta + quinta + sexta + septinia) b)))) + 
(l)-year/(l - b)) * peiiiii * (III * (primenteins + segundacins + terceraviiis + 
citartavins + quintacins primenteiiiii - segundammi - terceraelim - cuartavinii)) 
l)-year/(I - b)) * peinit (1 - qu) * (primera + se. gunda + tercera + cuarta + 
(Illilit"i + sexta + septillia)) 
I 
"costo" <- 
filliction(u) 
i 
beta <- 0.9 
t. <- 0.15 
v <- 0.01 
al <- 0.6 
vai-ii <-0.00029999999999999996 
(jedlif <- ((al + (al-2) (jcf(u))) + (, tl/(t + (al-2) cid(ii 
))) * (jilit'(11) 
kl <- ((al-2)/((al-2) + t)) 
prinicra <- kl (((, tl-2) +t*2-t*c,. jcf(ii))/t, ) (y-2) 
segunda <- kl varn * (-I) 
tercera <- kl (t + (al-2) cjcf(u)) (ejehif-2) (-l) 
cuarta <- (kl (t + (al-2) (jcf(u)) Y* (jehif (-2))Iktl 
quinta <- kl * (jiilt2(u) 
sexta <- kl * al * ejehif * (Jint(u) *2 
septinia <- ki * . 1, 
* (jint(u) *2 
year <- 7 
laiii <- 0.75 
Ye <- 0.01 
penni <- 0.75 
(III <- 0 
rho <- 0.75 
prinivi-avilis <- (y^2 + (al-2) * (vicinf-2) + varn +2*v* . 11 (Jvillf) 
segundavilis <- (-I) * (I - (jcf(u)) *+ t)) * (y-2 + (al-2) ((!. i(! iiif-2 
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tercm-avins <- (-2) (1 - ejcf(ii)) * ((; tl-3)/((, tl-2) + t)) *y 
cliartaviii-s <- (-I) ((, tl-2)/((, tl-2) + t)) (jint-2(li) 
(Illilitamius <- (-2) ((, tl-2)/((, il-2) + f)) (y + al * (jehif) (Jiilt(li) 
Pfillicravinli <- (t + al-2) * laili-2 varn 
segillidavilill <- val-li 
terceramim <- Y^2 
cuartaviiiii <- (-2) * al * lain * rho varn 
+ seguilda + tercera + cuarta + quinta + sexta + septinia) beta) 
+ ((beta-year/(i - beta)) * pe'llill * (111 * (prilliel-aelil" + segillidaellis + tercel-avill", + clial-tacill", + 
(Illilitacills - segundaenin - terceraenni - cuartaelim)) 
beta)) * peiiiii * (1 - (ju) * (primera + segunda + tercent + ciiarta + quint"I + 
+ septillia)) 
I 
" belle" <- 
function (11) 
I 
1) <- 0.9 
t <- 0.15 
y <- 0.01 
a< - 0.6 
varu <-0.00029999999999999996 
(jehif <- ((a * (I - vjcf(u)))/(t + (a^2) ejcf(u))) Y+ (a/(t + (a-2) (jcf(u))) 
(jint(n) 
k3 <- ((a-2)/((a-2) + t)) 
primera <- U (e. jehif-2) * (a-2) 
segunda <- U (y-2) 
tercera <- Uy*a* eivilif 2 
citarta <- U (11-2) 
(Iiiinta <- k3 a* (johif * 11 2 
sexta <- k3 **u*2 
+ seglinda + tercera + cliarta + (Illilita + sexta 
I 
Chapter 2 
The Case for Relative Wage 
Concern 
In this second part of the thesis we will investigate nominal rigidities arising 
froin wage contnicting ýis source of the observed degree of inflation persis- 
The contracting specification we advocate for is derived from in- 
tertemporal optimisation under two basic assumptions: (i) wage staggering-, 
(iii) relative wage concern on the part of the workers. In the remaining chap- 
t-ors Nve stmly the iniplications of such a contracting specification focusing on 
two stvIlsed facts of ý1("-Ivpte U. S. datw inflation inertia and the persistence 
of I he ivid etfi, cts of inoliev sliocks. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the reasons why we propose the 
w previons panior c(mtn)(111n), spccificýitloil dosci., bed ill H ,, aph. 
To that eild. 
4, 'ý 
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ýi brief summery of the literature on the topic is in order here. 
We, willstýirt this introduction by describing previous work onvvýigeshi, -)- 
gering. The seminal contribution by. J. B. Taylor, Taylor [1979., 1980a]. should 
be mentioned first as all the literature on staggered price/wage setting origi- 
n, ites from it. Taylor's model had been a standard response of the literature 
N-) ýicc(mnt for the two features of U. S. aggregate datýi mentioned before. We 
will highlight the properties of the model that justify its extensive use. We 
will also review the contributions that have tried to provide some micro- 
foundations that justify the assuniption of staggered wage setting decisions 
embodied in theseninuil contribution by Taylor. 
Recent re"somvIl Im's however seriously questioned the Taylor contracting 
c(puit ion ýus ýi sound exphiliAlon for the two features of ýictual data, mentioned 
before. We will also present, the criticisms recently raised to the contracting 
specification embodied in the standard Taylor model. In fiwt. such criticisms 
mv to ;i large extent the motivation of the mialysis we carry out, in the 
i-ei, mining clmpters. A brief description of thein is therefore logical before 
our own woi, k on the subject. 
will then proceed to niotivýite the introduction of relative wage concern 
()II the pirt, of "ettens into a model with staggered Nwige setting. 
pivý, ('Ilt the (. ýIse for approach ill two steps. Firstly. iis ýi filial remark on 
our brief de", cript loll of the Tllvlor illodel, Nve shmv that. (le"pite, the explicit 
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claims in Ttylor's seminal articles, relative wage considerations had been left 
out of the anAysis. In a second step to make our case, we start by reporting 
the numerous references in the literature to the introduction of relative wage 
consideratious. and present the recent evidence from individual &týi that 
points ýit relative wage considerations as fundamental for workers' Pay and 
. job Satisfaction. 
2.1 The Taylor [1979,1980a] Staggered Wage 
Model 
In Taylor's [1979] model the economy is divided into two sectors, henceforth 
referred to as sectors A mid B. Ill each sector the nominal ývage is negotiated 
every two periods and it is kept fixed between the two periods. 
Nviige contracting in those two sectors takes place in a staggered fashion. In 
other Nvonls, wage negotiations are not made at the same time in the two 
"'ect, ors. SpecificAly. sector A fixes the wages in periods t. f+2, t+4.... I 
wlille sector B in period t - I. t+1. t+3... . 
' In his original m-ticle. 
TlYlor justifie's flil's timing structure on the basis of the ohservation of wýigc, (, 
,,, (, tt, leilieilt,,, in major U., '-). sectors. However. iis argued in Ills recent chapter 
1 --To makc fh/lupý siippo., ýc that wagc contracts last one ycor ood thot dcci., ý, *Oj? 
doh", arc cccldy ., 4o, (pjc /-(, (/: holf Qf thc cootivct., orc cf in 
Jomi(ir. il mid half' M July. - 
(TaYlor [19719]. p. 109) 
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for the Handbook of Macroeconomics, it seems to apply to the majority of 
industrialised countries as well. 
Let us call xt the 'new' nominal wage contract which is negotiated in 
period t. 2 Then, the fundamental equation of Taylor's model is the following 
wage setting rule 
xt =b xt-, +d Et-lxt+l + -y (b Et-lyt +d Et-lyt+, ) 
where p- price level, x= 'new' nominal wage; y= output and all the 
variables are expressed in terms of log-deviation from an initial trend. Et-, 
is the expectation operator and in front of a variable represents its conditional 
expectation based on the information available at the end of period t-1. 
The wage contracts are assumed to be signed at the beginning of the period, 
that is, before the realisation of period t shock. Consequently they are based 
on period t-I information set. As Taylor explains: 
Equation [(2.1)] states the assumption that the contract wage set 
at the start of each semiannual period depends on three factors: the 
contract wage set in the previous period, the contract wage expected 
to be set in the next period, and a weighted average of excess demand 
expected during the next two periods. Since, by assumption, xt will 
prevail for two Periods, hrms andlor unions contemplating a wage 
') Hence -I't , -I't+2 , -I't+4 ... are the wage contracts negotiated in sector A, while 
ý"t-l , "''t+l I 'I't+3 axe the ones negotiated in sector B. 
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adjustment in period t will be concerned with wage rates which will 
be in effect during periods t and t+1. (Taylor [1979], p. 109) 
Most theories of wages adjustment suggest that labor market 
conditions will influence wages and, in particular, that wages will be 
bid up relative to the prevailing wage during periods when the unem- 
ployment rate is low, and conversely when the unemployment rate is 
high. (Taylor [1983], p. 987-988) 
A further assumption is introduced on the wage setting equation concern- 
ing the parameters "b" and "d". Taylor himself explains the reason for such 
an assumption: 
Let us assume that b+d -- 1 so that the current contract decision 
is homogenous of degree 1 in these lag and lead contracts. If b=d= 
112 then the lag and lead distribution is symmetric. This has been the 
parametric assumption of My previous work and reflects the plausible 
assumption that current negotiations weight other contracts according 
to tile number of periods that they overlap with the current contract. 
In this sense, when b and d are equal to 112, contract decisions are 
unbiased. Wage setters look forward to the same degree they look 
backward. However, I ivill allow for the possibility of biased weights 
in this paper by permitting b and d to differ from 112. This permit a 
spectrum of contract determination 4ypotheses between the extremes 
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of pure backward looking (b -- 1) and pure forward looking (d = 1). 
As will be demonstrated below the size of b vs. d is important for 
the dynamic behavior of contracts, and for the sensitivity of wage 
behavior to excess demand. (Taylor [1979], p. 109) ... more backward- 
looking wage determination increases the persistence or the inertia of 
the aggregate wages. [ ... 
] more forward-looking contract determination 
increases the impact of aggregate demand policy on wages. (Taylor 
[1979], p. 110-111) 
The model specification is completed with the following two equations 
I (xt-i + xt) (2.2) 2 
Yt Mt -A (2-3) 
Equation (2.2) is simply a mark-up equation, which states that the aggregate 
price level is given by an average of the existing nominal wage contracts. This 
equation implicitly assumes constant returns to labour, as we will show in 
this thesis. Equation (2.3) is just a static aggregate demand equation, where 
m is the log-deviation from trend of the money supply. 
Taylor in his original articles [1979,1980a] focused on real shocks and on 
the optimal monetary policy response to such shocks. However, the sub- 
sequent literature mainly focuses on monetary shocks (e. g., West [1988], 
Ambler and Phaneuf [1989], Phaneuf [1990]) in ail attempt to exploit the 
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properties of the contracting scheme assumed in the model as propagation 
mechanism. The money supply is usually assumed to follow an exogenously 
given stochastic process. For a given expected path of the money supply, the 
model exhibits the following saddle path solution 
xt Asxt-I 
Oo 
v (ýo - I)AS 
Z--. w b i=O 
(-) 
[bEt-, (mt+i) + dEt-, (mt+, +i)] (2.4) AU 
where A, and A,, are respectively the stable and the unstable root of the 
saddle equilibrium. They are given by 
AS 
Vý02- 4d(l - d) 
2d 
AU (p 
-d-( 11F --d) 
. 
1+ 
2 2d 7 
(2.5) 
To further clarify the implications of the structural parameters in the wage 
contracting equation postulated in the model, suppose that mt follows a 
random walk. Then, (2.4) becomes 
Xt = Asxt-l + (I - As), Mt-i (2.6) 
The dynamics of output are given by 
yt = Asyt-, + (mt -, mt-i) +1 (1 - As) (Tnt-I - Tnt-2) (2-7) 2 
The equation above makes evident the fact that the model can potentially 
generate persistence in the real effects of money shocks. This feature has 
made of it one of the most importýAnt forms of introducing nominal rigidities 
in dynamic general equilibrium macromodels. It is however crucial to note 
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the fundamental role played by the parameter -ý in the model. It captures 
the sensitivity of real wages to the business cycle conditions. An immediate 
conclusion of equations (2.5) is that persistent real effects of money shocks 
only arise for low values of that sensitivity. A low sensitivity of wages to 
business cycle conditions implies a slower adjustment of the nominal variables 
which allows for the deviations of output from trend to persist over time. 
A second crucial feature is that the Taylor model was originally developed 
as an ad hoc log-linear structural model in which the behavioral equations 
are exogenously specified from the very outset. It lacks microfoundations 
and intertemporal. optimisation. This point is openly acknowledged in Taylor 
[1979]. 
With respect to the rationale for staggered price/wage setting, some lit- 
erature following Taylor's contributions has shown that it could be optimal 
to stagger price setting decisions. For example, Fethke and Policano [1984, 
1986] demonstrate that staggering can arise as a stable equilibrium when 
there are sector specific shocks, while Ball and Romer [1989] do the same 
assuming asymmetric seasonal shocks. Ball and Cecchetti [1988] show that a 
staggering equilibrium can be supported as an equilibrium because it allows 
3 "Unfortunately, the assumed contract. formation behavior is not explictly derived. from 
a utility maximization model. [ .. 
] the micro foundations o. f the staggered contract model 
presented here arefarfrom complete. " (Taylor (1979), p. 111) "The microfoundations of 
such models need to be developed more rigOILMUS171" (Taylor [1979], p. 112). 
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price-, "("ttel. ýIgellts to obtain inforination about the prices of the other,,. be- 
fore, choosing their own prices. 'NIaskin and Tirole [19881 and De Frap [19931 
show that staggering can arise endogenously in oligopoly models because of 
stnitegic consider at ions - In a more recent contribution, 
Bhaskar [1998] liaýs 
proved thA staggering can be an equilibrium in a, model with inanY lietero,,,, (,, - 
iw()iis firms, which liýive a stronger within-indii,, ti-. ý,,, ýtiýAtegicý complenientaritY 
tltýin ýwross-lndustry. This latter result may be paxticularly important since 
it does not rest on strategic considerations between 'few large' price-setters. 
In contrast to the previous results, it arises in a model with 'many smalF 
firins, ýis iii the standard monopolistic competition set-up usually employed 
in imicromodels. 
N; I()i-(, importmitly for the approach we. take here, a new strand of research 
in inonetm-y dyiminic general equilibrium macromodels lias in recent years 
incol-poi-Med prlc(, /ývage staggering a la Miylor into an explicit intertemporal 
optiiilisýitloli probleill . 
The alin Nviis to open the 'black box' of the Aructural 
(,, (I pantinciel-s of Taylor's famous wagge setting equation and show how 
these Imniiiietei-s depend iipoli the microeconomic fundamentals of the un- 
dorlyiii, -) economic structure. Besides , intertemporal optlinisation adds ii(, NN- 
features to the model due to the intertemporal links iiiisýsin, ()) in the simple 
Tivlor model. This important resem-ch effort li; is highlighted smile 1,,,, 
Nvoaklio, s, sos ()f the cmitnictilig specificialon postulate(I hy Ta. vlor. In fact. re- 
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cent research has seriously questioned that the Taylor contracting equation 
generates, substantial output or inflation persistence following money shocks. 
We, briefly analyse these problems next. 
2.2 Implications of Taylor's model of wage 
staggering 
2.2.1 The persistence of the real effects of money shocks 
Modern business cycle research is almost entirely carried out within the con- 
text of quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) ma, cro- 
models. In recent years, monetary DGE macromodels have incorporated 
varlovis forms of nominal rigidities to study the role of monetary shocks in 
gencrating the output fluct u at, ions observed in ýActual datýi- In that approach, 
t1w overlapping contracts models of Ca, lvo [1983] and Taylor [1979,80a] have 
played ýi prominent role. The reason is that such contracting schemes bring in 
not, milY the nominal rigidity necessar. y for the impact effect of the monetary 
innovation, but also were believed to provide a nomina, l propagation meclia- 
iusin for the nionetm-y shocks. This is a fundamental property, since the fact 
that DSGE frainework otlionvise lacks endogenous propagation mechanisins, 
is I)v now ; wknowledged. 
The introduct loll of Mid nonlinal rigidities into the frame- 
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work developed by the propoilents of the so-called Real Business Clycle theorly 
cýiii coiisiderably enhance our understanding of the effects of monetary pol- 
icy in the re(d economy. Besides, it has also allowed researchers to open 
the "black 1)()x"*' of the directly- postulated structural parameters in the wage 
contnicting e(Imition proposed by Taylor. Two studies deserve ým explicit 
mcid ion ill that research effort. 
Climi, Kehoe and McGrattan [1996] (CK-NI henceforth) place a, staggered 
contract mechanism into ýtii optimising model in which price setting rules are 
derived assuming monopolistic competition. Ascari [19981 develops an opti- 
inising model of staggered wýigc setting. Both models find little persisteiwc 
of the rcil of money shocks beyond the length of the longest con- 
tract. The existence of a, powerful contract multiplier induced by staggering 
price/wage setting has since then been put tinder serious doubts. 
To explain the intuition between such results, the fact that the price/wage 
ting rule derived ill CKM and Ascarl [1997], when log-linearised around the 
Z(, I-() iiif4ition sfcild, v-, Stýlte, keeps the same structure of the Taylor equation 
vs, fundamental. An exýunple of the analytical insights one (-, an get from 
jilt (, yt-ciliporal optlinisation is the fact that a clear link between the ad hoc 
stvuctural parameters of Tiylor contracting specification and the parameters 
()f the lllld(, l, l, v11110ý structure cmi be established. We have, shown 
ýIbmv the (. 1-licial role of a 1mv výiltie of the parameter -1 for the existellce of 
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output persistence in analytical terms. Recall that, -y captures the sensitivity 
of real wages to business cycle conditions, which is shown to explicitly depend, 
among other things, on the intertemporal elasticities of both labour supply 
and consumption. Once that sensitivity is precisely identified as a composite 
of the parameters of the underlying economy, it can be calibrated from well- 
established evidence from micro data. The main finding of the two studies 
mentioned above is that the resulting value is far too high to generate output 
persis ence. 4 
Intuitively, the reason why the Taylor-type model of price/wage stagger- 
ing cannot account for persistent real effects after money shocks can be sum- 
marised as follows. The model incorporates exogenous stickiness through 
the assumption of the price/wage setting structure. Generating monetary 
business cycles is then a trivial task in such a model. To do so we just 
need to assume that prices/wages are exogenously sticky for a period of say 
four years in the sense that firms/unions are prohibited from changing their 
prices/wages for that period at a time. Such an assumption is however im- 
plausible. To generate persistent, output fluctuations following money shocks 
'It should be noted that the actual expression of -y as function of the underlying pa- 
raineters is, of course, model-specific, since it captures some features of the underlying 
economic structure assumed in the model. For a thorought analysis of different economics 
structures on the composition and calibrated value of -y, the reader is referred to Ascari 
and Garcia [1998]. 
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whýtt is however required is endogenous stickiness in thesense that price/wage 
setters cboos(ý not to change prices/wages very much when they can do so. 
The standard model of price/wage staggering fails to generýite the required 
degree of endogenous stickiness. We will investigate this problem in greater 
depth in Chapter 4.1 when we analyse the implications of the contracting 
sp ecific at, ion we derive here. 
2.2.2 Inflation persistence under conventional wage con- 
tracting 
In ý111 influential contribution, Fulirer and Moore [1995] (FM henceforth) have 
shown thm the conventioml Taylor inodel of overlapping contracts stands in 
sl-ýirk c(niti-a-st with important features of U. S. macro datýi. Of fundamental 
importance for the topic of this thesis is that it implies far too little inflation 
persi, steuce. Though the Taylor model clearly imparts considerable inertia, to 
t he of wages and to the price level, it bears less desirable implications 
for the inflation nite. Their m-gument can be briefly illustrated as follows. 
By combining equation (2.2) ýibove with the Taylor contracting specification 
i; it i0i i one can obtain the inflation dynamics implied the model 
Apt - Et--ýpt+j -z ý jit, (2. cý) 
Thus. n olw-perlod sllock to output will affect inflatioll for olle Period 
oillv: the coliti-actilig, specificýitioli adds il() iliflation persistence of 1 -11. 11 1t , -ý m 
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Similarly ii ()ii(, -period shock to inflation that does not alter jj-t affects inflation 
for a single period, after which inflation returns to its expectation. Unh-, s 
the shock itself persists, the effect on inflation will not persist. 
Fuhrer and Moore present autocorrelation plots that nicely document 
soinc. of the difficulties with the ability of the Taylor model to reproduce 
inflation persistence. They show that the cross autocorrelation functions 
based on m-. tual inflation and output were not matched by the simulated 
(bitýi from the býisic staggered contract model. 
Drawing on Buiter and Jewitt [1981], FM propose an alternative con- 
tnicting speclficýltloll to tackle the problem. Buiter and Jewitt [1981] were 
t lic first. to highlight that the contracting equation proposed by Taylor could 
A most, account for relative wage concern in aommal tci-Tns. In fact,, they 
to Tiylor's contracting equation ýis the Relative Nominal Wage (R. NW) 
inodel. Binter and Jewitt [1981] argue that relative wage concern is more 
plausibly modelled on the bnsis of ýi comparison of the wages In real terms. 
Wo will show that it, could be better defined ýis a, contracting specification 
which reflects exclusively own real wage concern on the part of wage setters. 
FM explon, in ,,, reater detail the implications of the following contracting 
for Iliffel t lon pel-sistelice 
yt (2.9) 
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The similarities to the Taylor equation are evident are first sight. ' Cru- 
cially however, nominal wages now appear deflated by the price level. to 
capture relative wage concern in real terms. The model specification is com- 
pleted with the same equations as those in Taylor's original work, that is 
I 
Xt-i + Xt) 2 
Yt - Mt - 
The implications of the alternative contracting specification for the in- 
flation dynamics are however radically different. Proceeding as before, after 
some algebra one obtains 
Apt -1 [Apt-, + EtApt+, ] = -y (yt-1 + yt). (2.10) 2 
As this equation shows, the inflation rate exhibits now inertia of its own. 
As a, result, the contracting specification postulated by FM is better equipped 
to match the properties of U. S. inflation. In fact, FM also test their contract- 
ing specification against the Taylor model under rational expectations. While 
5Note that in order to easy their empirical work on the paper, FM introduce some 
simplifications into the wage contracting equation. Specifically: (i) the moving average 
structure on the term capturing business cycle conditions is simplified by the current 
period value; (ii) the expectations are taken based on the available information at period 
t. Both simplifications are however not crucial for their argument. 
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I hey re,, oundingly reject the Ti, vlor contracting model, they however cannot 
re. ject their contracting specification. 
2.2.3 Taylor's contracting specification and relative wage 
concern 
Equatioii (2.1) J)ove simplyst(ites that the nominal wage set in t, for periods 
t and t+1, depends on the other sector's wages in those two periods; that 
1S, on the wage negotiated hist period by the other sector but still valid 
in t, i. e., and on the wage the other sector will fix period. i. c., 
ýrt, +,. This feiturc is crucial since the niodel was thought, of incorponiting a, 
"KCY"OSMIC component of relative wage concern on the part of wage-setters 
kused on the fiict that wage settlements were staggered. Taylor explicitly 
de, scribe his niodel as incorporating such a concern, 
"[1 the behavioral equations reftect a relative wage concern on the 
Imi-t of tlie Nvorkers** (Ti. vlor [1983], p. 987-988) 
However, ýIs noted by Buiter and Jewitt [1981] and Blanchard 
[19901, the ilbove Statement 1", inaccurate. Substituting equation (2.2) into 
1) yields, 
= (vt + E1_1pi) + (2.11) 
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which shows that 'Liylors -",, ýige contracting specification actually has a 
different interpret ýit ion. By setting the wage according to equation (2.1), 
workers only (-. are ýihouf the level of their own real wage for the length of the 
contract. Workers care about the wages in the other sectors only through the 
these wages have on the aggregate price level and, in turn, on their own 
ýihs()Iute real wage. Hence, there is no actual rela, tive wage concern pc'v,,; c in 
Taylor's model. ' In Blanchard's [1990], p. 805] words: "[ 
j It is smact. 
wyucd that flu, Taylor's rnodcl depends on the assumption that workcrs cavc 
divccf/y aboul their tvages 'M comparison to other wages thZs /*I's 'llot the 
77 
The omissi0ii of relative wage concern in Taylor's contrýic II ion ting specificat" 
in finidamental for our approach in this second Imi-t of the thesis. In the 
I'(11IM111111o C , hapters, following ývhich was most likely to be the original aim of 
Miylor [1979]. Nve Nvill consider explicit relative wage concern on the part of the 
w(wkcrs. Specifically. the argument we will develop is tliat the weaknesses of 
a Ta Y specification that have been briefly described above ylor-type contracting 
umy lim-c their origin in the omission of relative wýige concern in wage -,, ett in, ()ý- 
With lvspect to Buiter and Jewitt [1981] and F'-\I, our analysis extends their 
; ipproadies bY deriving, the Nvage contracting specification from an explicit 
'Thl, " 11,11"t I-, ' ill (T- I aild Ascm` [19971, which derive a TaYlor- '('tlY demonstrated 
-po wnt'o "'ott Ino equation liliposlilpý the structure on a Standard lltlllt\- inax- 
framework. 
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intertemporal ()ptImI,, (-ttiOn problem by wage setters. We next review some 
litercIture supporting our approach. 
2.3 Relative wage concern in the literature 
2.3.1 Theoretical justifications 
The issue of relative comparisons has ýi long tradition in economics, starting 
from Adam Smith [1976]. Smith considered satisfaction as a relative concept. 
He argued tImt peoplejudge tlie value or utility associated with any job by 
c(miparing it, with the other jobs ýiva, ilable and the utilitY associated with 
tII el I I. 
However, beyond any doubt, the most influential account of relative wage 
concern and it,,,, potential implicat ions came undoubtedly from John Nlay- 
liard KeYnes. Apýirt the quite radical view of Cambridge economists close 
to KeYlles, Robinson [1937], Kalecki [1944]), inany others celebrated 
ecommists 1mve held the general view tliýit central to the explanation of 
w; ige stickiliess is the fact flmt workers, individually and in groups, are con- 
cerned with f1wir relative wage. The most often quoted argument, in favour 
of wiwe is the follo-, ATllig extnict from Keviie, 11 s 
[1936] (1). 14): 
Thou-11 the over monev-iv; w-cs botivecii indiviclimls and group,, -ý J, -ý often 
-()(I to determine the general level of real it Ili fact. u(nicci-iied i6th heffin I 
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a diff6rent objoct. Since tlwný is imperfect mobility of labour. and ivaqrs do not 
tend to an exact equality of net advantage in different occupations, ý-uiy individual 
or group of Inclividimals, who Consent to a reduction of money-ivýý,, ffes relativelY to 
others, ivill sufkr a relative reduction in real wages, which is sufficient justi-fica- 
tion for them to resist it. [.. ] hi other words, the struggle about mo11e. y-ivýiIg-(-,,, 
prhimi-il. v affects the distribution of the aggregate real iv. ýigc betivoell (liffereiit 
labour groups. and not its amount per unit of emplo nent, The 
eff'ect of conibination an the paft of ýi g-r-oup of woi-kens is to pi-otect then, relative 
1-cal lvýlgc. 
This fragnient of Dw Gcncral Theory has inspired several contributions, 
incl'ading Taylo7- [1979,1980a]. Keynes' words have however been inter- 
preted as supporting a number of different, reasons why relative wages may 
be m-gunwitts of the labour supply function. 
P'slychological or Sociological considerations form the basis for the a, rgu- 
inclit tliýit reLitive wages an, crucial for tlie, morale and , ýitisfaction of the 
worker on the. joh place. The pioneer work of Ruciman [1966] or very recently 
Bewle. v [1988] providestrong support for such approaches. -'\/Ia, croecoilomists 
haNv already explored that argunient with respect to the effects of relative 
lolls Oil effort. Part of the efficielicy wage literature has in- 
troduced relatiVO ýis fundamental for a fair Nvao)(, determination mid its 1ý I 
7The emphasis is as in the orig-iiial- 
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impact on effort (e. g., Akerlof [1982], Frank [19841, Akerlof and Yellen [1986], 
Summers [1988], among many others). In fact, those efficiency wage models 
incorporate relative wages through an effort function that determines both 
the labour supply and demand functions. 
However, given those psychological and sociological considerations that 
form the basis for the efficiency wage literature, it seems natural that rel- 
ative wage concern also arises whenever workers, individually or as union 
members, enjoy market power in wage bargaining. This is our purpose here. 
The literature is full of supportive statements on this somehow more literal 
interpretation of Keynes's words. Before proposing the wage bill as unions' 
maximand, the founder of the modern economics of trade unions states 
Wage changes may spread by the simple method of imitation and 
social transference. Wage increases originating in one sector may be 
diffused because wage earners are determined to fare just as well as 
their associates. The argument that "everyone is getting an increase" 
is not simply a superlicial point advanced in all negotiations but a 
vital force in the labor market that deserves more detailed attention. 
[] The community of housewives, with the inevitable "you are good 
-is the next fellow", is not to be underestimated. [J. T. Dunlop [1966], 
1261 
Appealing to direct observation J. Hicks [1974] is even more explicit with 
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respect to the existence of relative wage concern 
Everyone, on some comparison or other, feels left behind. The elec- 
tricians get a rise, so the gasmen must follow; but when the gasmen 
get their rise, it is the electricians who feel themselves to be treated 
unfairly. In terms of just two industries, the behaviour sounds exag- 
gerated; but generalize it over many, and is it not what happens? 
Relative wage concern may also arise from customary or institutional phe- 
nomena. In fact, the aim to obtain fair wage determined in relative terms 
was certainly behind the development of unionism in its early days. Theoret- 
ical foundations of union "rivalry" and inter-union "jealousy" in wage setting 
have been studied in Oswald [1979] and Gylfason and Lindbeck [1984]. Strong 
evidence of the existence of "fairness" can be found not only in episodes that 
can be reported from simple observation. Survey evidence such as Kahneman 
et al [1986] shows that people have strong views about fairness in economic 
exchange. Results from laboratory experiments on the so-called ultimatum 
games (Fehr and Schmitt [1998]) strongly suggest that individuals will throw 
away real income to obtain a fairer division of a certain pie. 
Empirical evidence supports the presence of very strong wage interde- 
pendence. as found in Ashenfelter et al. [1972]), Risager [1992], de la Croix 
[1994] and many others. After reviewing the empirical evidence and present- 
ing some potential explanations, Fallick and Elliot [1981] conclude their book 
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-Inco'locs Pol, 11(, 11, Inflation (rlid Relohm Pay" by stating: 
the (tryirment is cssentially that relative wages entcr Hic tabour supply 
funcho, n** and that "[]substantial evidence now exists of the considerable 
that cxist between the wage settleme'n ts of d7.,, ffCYCPf, baTaining 
groups throughout tvide areas of the economy p. 251-252. 
We briefty review mi alternMlve source of evidence on relative con- 
cern ii(, xt. 
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence from Microeconomic Data 
In recelit yom. 's a liew Source of empirical evidence has received considerable 
al tention by economists: surve. vs on self-reported levels of satisfaction of 
workers, which already form the fundamental material of study for a, large 
enipiricýil literature in social psychology. Such data has been used as proxy 
for uhlitY (Lita. Despite its p otenti al short comings, the relevance of this new 
s(mi-ce of evidence should not be overlooked. As pointed out, by Clark and 
qUCd, in the extreme, that these are random, Oswýild [19Wij: "'It inight be (IT' 
witni, bers mc, rclY madc up by surccY respondents. Psychologists. who are at 
lco,, ýf os ow(ra, of thl's possibility (Is ccooo, mists. borc long sl`occ (iba, odmicd 
a riCIP. 
III fact. t he 1111"w litenitiliv oil job , ýJisfiwtioil in ps. vcIio1(), (-))Y journals - 
althom, li often concerned Avith different ls: siies of the mies Investigated bY the 
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papers reported here-is a testament to the seriousness 'with which research 
psychologists treat such survey data. We here describe in certain detail the 
results of two contributions in the economic literature: Capelli and Sherer 
[19881 and Clark and Oswald [1996(l]. 
Capelli and Sherer [1988] use data from a major, heavily unionised U. S. 
airline. Their sample is composed of 579 employees selected at random (ap- 
proximately a, one in 20 sample), and stratified to ensure a, mininium of 50 
I-i 
respondents in each subgroup or cell considered in the analysis. Given the 
survey dah) Oil pay ""ilti""filction, they investigate e(,. oiioiiii(! arguments that 
use Hie inm-ket context and opportunities elsewhere to explain the variance iii 
pay satisfaction across individuals. Their aim is to provide a direct measure 
of the extent to which the outside market is an important factor in employee 
-is, , sessincilts of pay by asking respondents questions about the importance 
t licy attýich to different pay comparisons. The prevailing wage for equivalent 
ph, mid selilorit, v in the outside market is calculated by unweighted mealls of 
the w; i(ges, paid A carriers of comparable size. Regression results consistently 
found the outside market wage statisticall, v significant.. 
Clark aild 0swii1d [1996a] use data from the British Household Panel 
Survev, which includes detalled information onjob satisfaction from approx- 
illiatelv 10,000 individuals in approximately . 5,500 households. The s; iinple 
lised excllld(-ý tll()"(, w1lo a,. (, .,, (, Jf-e. iliplo, N-(, (I, those who are retired, and I li()s(, 
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who m, (, younger than 16. 
TheN, treM people*,,, reported sýitlsfacflon levels as proxy for ut'llty data. 
Tli(, ýoiii is testing a simple form of the textbook utility function that ýis- 
sumes thýit well-being depends on the level of income and the number of 
hours worked on that data. With respect to hours of work, they enter in 
I lie them-etically expected negative way. However. counter to the spirit of 
the standard economics textbook, regression results suggest that satisfaction 
is more strongly correlated with relative income than A)solute income. This 
nmin result is robust to some alternative s peci fic at ions of the regression equa- 
tl()ii, Including the use of an exlernýil source of income data for the relative 
conilmi-ison: the N(, NN, 7 Earnings Survey. 
These findings from individual survey data, provide quite strong support 
for litility functions tImt allow for relativitles in wage setting. Besides, they 
justify t1w presence of the union rivAry mentioned A)ove from the personal 
of their potential members. This inay provide an explanation for 
flic fact Hiat, even if employers are increasin-h- trying to establish bargaining 
norms thA focus on attention on circumstances at the firm, they find it 
difficult to act ýiwýiv from union demands based on Nva-es ýuld settlenients 
and from jj(,, O, ()tlýitl(ms in collective bargaining. 
In fact, ()tll(, I. studie's have asked citiph)yci-s which are the determinants of 
W; 10(1 with workers. Campbell and Kainlaill [1! 071 (Table 11) 
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report ýi survey of them. Results from other studies based on surve. v data 
from employers/firms suggest that relative wage concern is very significant. 
e, ýpecially in heavily unionized firms (see Agell and Lundborg [19951). 
2.4 Our approach 
The purpose of this introduction to the remaining chapters of this thesis is 
to highlight the main motivations behind our analysis. As mentioned before, 
the mi; dysis ()f the implications of relative wage concern on the part of wage- 
settens is the fundamental contribution of the research carried out here. A 
last effort to put our contribution in the context of the recent, literature we 
have just, reviewed seenis to be appropriate before reporting our results in 
detail. More s 1) ec ific ally, some basic comments on the structure of our choice 
of i lie analytical fi-ainework are made next. As nientioned at the beginning 
of t he chapter, the contracting specification w-e advocate for is derived from 
int-citemporal optimisation tinder two basic assumptions: (1) wage staggering, 
(ii) relative Nviigc concern on the part of the workers. 
2.4.1 Why wage staggering? 
With respect to wa-estao-o'ering, it is wm-tli mentioning that ým m-ei-whelmilig 
Part of the I -atllre on staogering decisions focuses on pric I vcelit litel v stagger- 
In- rather thall , ýtijao-(1I., jj IIII-, i g. As reported before. the original contribu- 
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tion by John Taylor considered wage staggering. However. his work wýis soon 
extended to the analysis of price staggering by Blanchard [19831. The sub- 
sequent lit erýtture has mainly followed this latter approach, both in directly 
Postulated log-linea. r models and those incorporating nominal rlgldltl(,,,,, into 
DSGE. 
We here focus on wage staggering. We can offer three main ivýisoiis for this 
choice. Firstly, we believe that persistent nominal rigidities are more likely 
to m-ise in the Libour market rather than in the goods market. Secondly, we 
Will m-, -jic 1-hat, the wage setting process is better represented as the result 
of the combination of small nominal and real rigidities, in contrast to the 
simpler ýipproa, ch of the alw-ve. previous studies. Our source of re; il rigidity 
in the labour market ýirises from an explicit account of relative real wage 
(11011 ('(11'11 - 
Finally, the purpose is to focus the ýmal, vsis on wage rigidities. The need 
for Nvýige rigidities to complement price rigidities has been recently acknowl- 
1). v two recelit ilifluential papers. When considering the ability of both 
the so-(-ýdled '-limited participation models" and the stick. v price models to 
m-c(mid for the salient, fiwts iibout, how the economy responds to an antic- 
ipitted niolietm-Y shock, Christiano ct a/. [19971 conclude that both iiio(lels 
froin iniportmit. and related shortcoinin,, -,, s. 
Their results that 
ýi model ainied iit (-()nvin(-m, (), Iy accountin, (. ), for the keY ()f a molictai-Y 
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policy shock, in addition to the frictions considered in their paper, will have 
to allow for labor market frictions. Specifically., the role for labour market 
frictions they have in mind is to inhibit strong cyclical movements in marginal 
costs (by mickmiking very high labour supply elasticities) s() ýis to ýillow for 
endogenous stickiness. 
Focusing exchisively on inflation dynamics, in particular on inflation per- 
sistence, Gali and Gertler [19991 derive and estimate an structural Phillips 
curve froin an account of price staggering by monopolistic firnis. They m- 
rive to t1w same conclusion as Christlano ct al. [1997]. Their analy,, ýis sug- 
gest, s thýit persistence in inflation and the costs of disinflation are likely to 
be reLited to the shiggish cyclical behaviour of marginal costs. Given the 
link between unit labor costs and marginal costs, a candidate source for the 
strong counterfactual contemporaneous positive correlation between output 
and reýil marginal costs in the st-andard sticky-price niodel is the absence of 
mi. v tlype of labor market frictions. 
A similar conclusion is found by Ellison and Scott [1998] in a standard 
(I'vilaillic "u'lelleral equilibrium inacromodel with price staggering and a casli-in- 
adviince colist ni ii it. Their paper extents ý tin [1997]. which reports that the 
introduction ()f nominal price rigidity in such models contr1butes to explall, 
tlic iiii1mct eftect of iiloll(,, tai-, N- on output and the co-moveinent of 
inflatioll with the Component of output. Ellison aild Scot fill(I 
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that while simulations reveal a, strong positive correlation between inflation 
and output there is no evidence of any cyclicýil movements along a Phillips 
curve- instowl the economy oscilLites counterfactually between periods of 
high mid low output. 
Our purpose here is far more modest than accounting for all the effects ()f 
ýi monetary policy shock. But we believe that by considering wage staggering 
alone, a better understanding of the implications of relative wage concern will 
he achieved. The, task of combining it with price rigidities may be a, promising 
ýivenue for further research on the topic. 
2.4.2 The role of intertemporal optimisation 
To i ncorp orate intertemporal optimisation we consider relative wage con- 
(, (, i-ii in DSGE. The purpose is to follow recent literýiture that has extended 
the em-l, v Nvork of Taylor [1979,80] by casting relative wage concern into an 
explicit iliterteinporal optimisation problein. The power of general equillb- 
rium fnimeNvork is then incorporated into the analysis. Recent research has 
ýi nurnber of additional insights (see the discussion above for 
an (, \(miple of theni). NN e aim at a, better understanding of the directly- 
po'stillated loo. -1111(ýal, contracting equations hy Bulter and 
Jewitt [19(Sl] and illore recently F-M. 
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2.4.3 Modelling Relative wage concern 
Taking support on the evidence presented in the previous Nýve model 
relative, wage concern by including an additional a, rgumeiit in 1 lie utillty 
function of the represent, ýi tive household. This approach runs against the 
deeply-rooted resistance to modify the structure of preferences of agents. 
However, as Akerlof [1997, p. 10051 states: "Traddional ccono, mllcs has been 
based on tncthodologlcal 7ndividualtsm, Unt7,, l pute mccidly, with sonic rarc 
c: rccpb*, o, ns, it has not bcc'n apprcelilated that this nicthod can. bc., or pcrhaps 
I sltoidd safl, should be, c., r1cii dcd in des (-, t -11', b1lng soc7. al dccisimoý to incbidc 
dcpc, ndc, ncc of iadividuals' utility an the utility or the actzons of othevs. " 
Similar kind of preferences have been nevertheless proposed as an expla- 
nation for sonic puzzles in ýisset pricing (Abel [19901, Gall [1994], Campbell 
and Cochrane [1995]), consumption (Carrol and Well [1994]), and growth 
(Carrol ct al. [1997]). ' --More geiierall, ýý, in recent years ýi growing 
literature 
has (, merged encompassing economic and social elements. and in particular 
stýltlls (see Frank [1984,19851 and the references therein. Baxter 
[19,8)81. X-midel a, iid Lazear [1992]. Clark and Oswald [1996a, b] and Akerlof 
[19971). the ýivailiihle empirical evidence on unions" be- 
'Dependiiig on the particular specification mv referred to as "lilt erdependent 
prefOrelices"', "exterilal liabit formation-, "Neeping up (or catching up) with the Joneses" 
or "relative income llypotlle, -ýIs-. 
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haviour, and sociological and psychological considerations, our introduction 
of relativities in the utility function may be seen as an ad hoc unjustifiable 
short-cut. It should however be seen as a first step towards a complete under- 
standing of its implications. In fact, further microfoundations are certainly 
desirable and even necessary given our results. 
Chapter 3 
An Investigation into the 
Source of Inflation Persistence 
3.1 Introduction 
U. S. I)i-l(-(, niffition data exhibits substantial persistence. An account of in- 
flation persistence is therefore crucial for the study of monetary policy and 
business However. most of the existing dynamic general equilibrium 
iii; wrolnodel, s Nvith nioney, though fairly successful in reproducing other em- 
I)lrl(,. a, l regulmities, fall to m-c(miA for inflation persistence. ' The explanation 
for that failure inav Nvell lie on the contnictim) specificiitions embodied in 
those dvimmic niacroniodels. 
'See 
-Nelson 
[199, Sj for the inflatlon (tviinlincs lmplled by some related literature. 
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Goodfriend alld King [1997] among others, have coqjectured that a --New 
Neochl""""Icý11 Sylithe'sis" to study the role of money in (I. viiamic macromodels 
liýis in recent Nýeýirs. A vitýd component of that emergIng syntlies's, 's 
the combination of intertemporal optimising behaviour and nominal rigidi- 
ties. With respect to the latter, the most popular models of sticky priccs 
today arc the overlapping contract models of Taylor [19801 and Calvo [19831. 
While the Ttylor-type contracting specific at, ions imply jn-icc stickiticss, they 
do not imply ýmy Vriflabl'oli Inflation behaves ýis a pure forward 
looking variable under those contracting specifications, so it exhibits a coun- 
tcrfiwtual flexibility. 
Recent literature have addressed that weakness of the Taylor-t, vl)e con- 
tnict ing, specification. Two different potential sources of inflation inertia have 
beell proposed. III a, first contribution to the debate, Fuhrer and Moore [1995] 
(FM henceforth) have proposed n departure froin ýi sGindard (Taylor-type) 
wag-e colitracting equation. The alternative contracting equation considers 
nominal wa--e coliti'actI110, as iiiotiva, ted by pure relative real wage consid- 
evýlt lons. 11 M show that Such a, cmitracting specification can reproduce the 
of inflation inertia. Furthermore, FAI tosted their equa- 
tion ; i,, -, -ilust 
TiYlor's contracting spocificýitioli and found ,,, troiig evidence in 
1-1 oiitril(. 
t ill- c(pintion based on pure relative real Nvýigo rilvour of ;) wil"'e (1 1 1- 
ceni. The inain lvýis()n is that such ýi contracting specific; ition w-c(mlits for 
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inflation persistence under rational expectations, while a TaYlor-t. vpe wage 
conti-m-Aing equAion cýiiiiiot. FNI"s result suggests that inflatioll persistence 
s1muld be a must for any model aiming at replicating stylized facts of U. S. 
macro datýi. Yet, more importýiiitly. their results (-. an be interpreted as, de- 
nmnding ýi richer treatment, of wage contracting decisions so ýis to account 
for inflation persistence. A weakness of their approach is however that, the 
contracting specification is not, derived from an explicit, intertemporal opti- 
mi, sAlon problem, in colitrast to the standard contracting specification. 
We, liere cýist relative real wage concern into mi explicit intertemporal op- 
timisation problem. Recent research has, derived a, Taylor-type contracting 
sp (wific at, loll by ýIssunilng pri(. (, /Wa, ge staggering in a dynamic general equillb- 
viiiiii framework (Chaxi et a/. ý19961 (section 4), Ascarl [19971 among others). 
We extend li(, i-(, that line of resc; irch and cast relative real wage concern into 
thilt opt, 11111'sing fi-milework. Specifically. ýNve look for a richer treatment of 
tll(, coutnicting specification arising from the existence of relative real 
Nvýigc concern on the paxt of workers. who optimise intertemporally tinder 
WýIlff(l Stýl,, o. crlljo 
The ci-m-ml novelt. v of the Nviige contracting specification derivc(l liere is 
tlj(ý pp'sclice of ýI combination of both own real concern and rclativc real 
concern. Both arise liaturallY fl-oill interteinporal optlinisation under 
and relative wage concern. Our contnicting SPH'ification 
CHAPTER 3. SOURCES OF INFLATION LVERTIA 81 
--standard** sticky-price models characterised by no relatIV(I thits nests, the 
Nviige conceni. and F\Fs sticky-inflation model as tw() particular cases. The 
re, sult is ýi richer contnictin, ), specification that implies inflation persistence. 
In ýi very interesting contribution, Roberts [1997] has, however presented 
mi alternative explanation for the source of iliflation inertm. The inflation 
dyna-inics implied by the contracting specification proposed bY FM could 
be observAlonally equivalent to a standard sticky-price model if inflation 
expectýitioiis mv liot, fully rational. Hence, EM's evidence oil inflatioll inertia 
do not allow us to determine whether the contracting specification or the 
imperfect rationality of inflation (ap ect at, ions is the ,, ource of that inflation 
111(li . tUl. 
Taking support, on the evidence of lack of full nitionality of surveys of 
inflation cxpcctýitioiis, Roberts [1997] develops a direct, test for those two 
cmapeting, sources of inflation inertia. The test is based on relaxing rational 
hY making lise ofstirvey data, on inflation expect ýitlons - 
Roberts 
[19971 that, inflation inertia, actuall. v arises from the presence of 
lioll-fidlY-nitional expectAlons. 
Exist in- empirical on the s(mi-ce of inflýition inertia mv therefore 
controdict ory. Both ýipproaclws iniplY sticky dynamics for inflation. Cru- 
('iilllN- for further res'e; Irch. the re, ýults however point at ()pImsite directiolls 
tmvýlnls a liliderstmiding of hiflation dyiiaiiilc, ý: one points at 
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sistent inflation arising from richer wage coiitrýicting specifications while the 
points at sticky-prices complemented by non-full, v- rational expecta- 
tiolls. 
In this chapter we investigate whether the contracting specification de- 
rived liere (-, ýin slied some new light in the debate. We first derive the con- 
ditioiis under which the implied sticky- inflation dynamics is observation ally 
equivalent to an sticky-price model in presence of non-fully-rational expecta- 
tions. We then proceed as Roberts [19971 mid test the two competing hypoth- 
esis on inflation expectation survey datýi. In sharp contnist, to Boberts [1997], 
()Ill. 1. (""Ults sllhggeýt tllýlt alternative sources of inertia, beyond that imparted 
by the lack of full rationality of expectations are needed to characterise U. S. 
inflation dy1minics. The fiwt that intertemporal optimisation provides our 
contracting specification with a, richer structure compared to that of FM is 
the re; ison behind our results. 
The i-est of the chaptei- is organised ýis follows. Section 2 presents our 
dynainic iiia, croniodel. We present a log-linearisation of the optimal nominal 
11 ýjre decisiollinsection 3. Its impl, catlons for jnflatlon persl, 
the focil", of the, mlilh-sis. Section 4 shows that our contracting specificýition 
ohserv; itionally e(pilvii1ent to all sticky-price inodel if we relax 
-itions. NVO then develop a test for the the ýIssliiiiptioil of rational ('Xl)(, (-t( 
collipetill") hYpothosis of sticky-prices and 4 ick. y-ilifiat loll. Our empirical 
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results are reported in Section 6, and we explore subsample stabilit. v in section 
7. Finally., some concluding remarks are presented in Section 8. 
3.2 The model 
The aim of this section is to derive a wage contracting specification from 
interfeniporal optimisation under two ba, sic assumptions: (1) staggered'"Tage 
setting ( il ) reLitive real wage concern on the part of the workers. Our frame- 
w, (wk is ýi fairly standard monetary dynamic general equilibrium nia, cromodel 
in which nominal wages mv negotiated in staggered fashion. It should be 
, sti-essed from the very outset that providing ýi detailed analysis of 
forces at 
work in business cycle fluctuations is he, volid the scope of our analYsis. The 
key iissuniption of the niodel is the presence of relative real wage concern on 
the part of the workers. The purpose of the -analytical framework is simply 
that its, cffiýcfs in the wage-setting decision are readily identifiable. In fact, 
our inodel P, deliberately st. ylised in many aspects. For example, capital ac- 
culutiLition is ignored for the sake of simplicity and the contracts are assumed 
to I)c sigiled for Just two periods. 
The model ccmioinv colisists of a, continuum of uniformly distributed iii- 
(Ilistrics bY I C- [0.1]) aild a continuum of industi-, v-specific --hOu, -,, (, hOId- 
1111 on's" bv E 
[0,1]). 2 1, "very indiuti-v produces a different lat(, (l 
ýlt(' Of 111 tll(' l'Olls(', 1101(1', 2T]w liouseliold-11111011 "I'Olild be thought of as all ( I- 
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iwl'ishable product and, in turn, comprises ýi continuum of firm-s. Household 
c(mSurnes a composite good., defined by a CES index over the consumption 
goml of ea, ch indlistry, i. e. 
0 
0 di Ci Ciit 
1 
where 0>I is the elasticity of substitution among the different goods. This 
specification gives rise to the standard demand function for good 1' by house- 
hold 
Pit 0 Xjt C. j 
lpt I- 
Pt, 
(3.1) 
is houseliold"s total nominal expenditure on goods. Pýt is the price 
1-0(1- of good 'i and the aggregate price index is given by Pt, Pit z 0 
3.2.1 Firms 
All firms (, 111ploy a, production function given by Yit =:: ()L'it. The firm's 
(-, ipitA stock is taken as fixed and labour is the only variable factor of pro- 
duction. Individual firms within each industry behave as price-takers both 
in the goods and the labour market. Consequently, firms maxiiiiise profits 
pci-iod by period fAcii iis gnven the nominal wage TV, t . -ývhich i,, -, set by the 
NN-m-kers. and Pit - the price of their product. 
The profit inaxiinising labour 
which work in the iii(lustrv. who collude in wa0e colitnictin', 
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demand and output of firm 'i ýire then -)lveii h. v 
Pi, t 
Yt 7. 
n, (T Pi, t 
85 
(3.2) 
Imposing the equilibrium condition in the goods market for each good, /', 
1 
cit = 
-fo 
Cjitqj z-- Yit Vz c [0.1], (3-3) 
yields the following relation between the labour demand and the nominal 
wage 
Lit, =:: KtW, -t' where E 
9 
(T + (I - 
and Kt =(Tý 
Xt 
-(apt, 
), -"- 
(3.4) 
The labour demmid function faced by the monopolistic in each 
indust, ry thus exhibits ýi constant money-wage, elasticity equal to E, which de- 
pends on technology and preference parameters. Note thýjt Kt is parametric 
to since they take aggregate variables ýis given (Xt = fO Xjtdj 
ýiggivgýitc nominal expenditure). 
3.2.2 Households 
We ; issuitie that inclustry-specific workers enjoy monopoly power in wage 
s -1 v the simic preferences (to be belmv) and ett iil-). Households lim 
labour iliplit. slipply idelitic 
'ITT 
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Wage Contracting 
The structure of wage setfing in the model is chýu-Cicferised by two features: 
(1) wage setting; (ii) relative concern. 
(1) Sf(lfjgCT*Cd W(IgC, SC. tt7. ng 
rFl, l,, Is standard in the rela, ted literature. The economy is divided 
infi) 2 sectors, for simplicity of equal size. Industries indexed by /, C [0.1/2] 
and the industry- specific households indexed byj E [0,1/2] compose sector 
A. Nominal wage contracts, denoted by X. mv. then fixed for 2 periods in 
shiggered fa, slilon. More specifically, sector A fixes the wages in even periods, 
\%, hll(- sector B does so ill odd periods. We, denote by Xt the 'new Nvage' in 
'114AI Sector A for periods t and t+1, so II-t, =II- t+j = Xt. Meanwhile, in period 
f, sector B workers are locked into thewage, contract they signed one period 
1)(, foI, (" so It I Bt = ll-Bt-, = Xt-1. Therefore Xt, Xt+2, Xt+4,..., are the wages 
fixed 1). N,, sector -4. and 
Xt+,, 
-Vt+: 3 ý -Vt+, 7 ..... are 
the fixed by sector B. 
Denote by Pj/ the comilion price charged by sector-A industries. and 
likewi, se PBt, forsector B. The supplied output levels of a, typical m(histry in 
of the two sectors in period t (-an then be expressed as 
-vt 
xt_i 
Bt (T PBt (T Pjt 
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and the demands for the outputs in each of the two sectors in period t are 3 
[P 
Bt dt At] 
-0 Xt 
.d 
-0 Xt yy 
t= 
[p 
(3.6) 
Pt Pt Pt pt 1 
where Pt = [! Pý 0+Ip 1-011 0 2t2 ýt 
(ii) Relative Wage Concern 
denotes the aggregate price level. 
Here we incorporate relative wage concern to the wage staggering struc- 
ture described above. Note that staggered wage setting breaks the complete 
symmetry among households in different sectors. However, the complete 
intra-sectorial symmetry implies that all households belonging to the same 
sector receive the same wage. That is, in any period t there are just 2 dif- 
ferent contracts in effect. Our purpose is first to characterise relative wage 
concern based on the existence of those two different contracts each period. 
Then we proceed to highlight its implications for wage setting behaviour. 
Taking support from the empirical evidence reviewed in the previous 
chapter, we model relative wage concern by an additional argument in the 
'In equilibrium, aggregate nominal output is equal to aggregate nominal expenditure 
on consumption 
PAtyAt + PBtyBt Xt ::::::: PtCt 222 
PtCAt +2 Pt CBt -::::: 2 'XAt 
+2 XBt 
where (for example) XAt PtCAt is expenditure by a typical sector-A household. Note 
that P. -ItY. It :ý 
R-ItCAt, in general. This is for two reasons: households which work in 
sector A receive profits also from sector B; and households in sector A can borrow from 
(or lend to) sector-B households. 
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utility function of the representative household. This term is defined as a 
ratio of the two different real wages existing in each sector. The lack of sym- 
metry among (otherwise identical) households in different sectors arising from 
wage staggering is thereby naturally incorporated to wage contracting. We 
postpone a more explicit definition of the relative wage concern arguments 
to the next section. 
The intertemporal optimisation problem 
In period t the household maximises a utility function of the form' 
00 
Uj = Et 
E ok [U(cj, 
t+ki Mj, t+k, Ljt+k, RWj, t+k)] (3.7) 
k=O 
The arguments in the utility functionCi, t+k, 'Mj, t+k and 
Lj, 
t+k are, respec- 
tively, the consumption of the composite good, the end-of-period real money 
balances, and the labour supply of the households. Without loss of generality 
for our purpose here, the utility function is taken as additive separable in all 
its arguments. The standard conditions u, (. )>O, Um(')>Oi UL(*)<07 Ucc(')<Ol 
Umm(*)<Oi ULL(*)<O, where u, (t) denotes the first partial derivative of the 
instantaneous utility function and u,, (. ) the second derivative, with respect 
4 Our aim in this chapter is to highlight the implications of relative wage concern under 
staggering and intertemporal optimisation. A general utility function is sufficient for this 
purpose, so we do not present liere a particular parametrisation. For an example of a fully 
calibrated specification, the reader is referred to the next chapter. 
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the argument r are assumed to be satisfied. Besides, the utility function 
satisfies u RWHýý*Ol URWRW(+ýýO' 
The household's budget constraint evolves according to 
PtCjt + Mjt + 1: Q(st+l I st)Bj(st+') < Mjt-l + Bjt + W3tLjt + fljt + Tjt 
st+l 
(3-8) 
where Q (s'+' I s') is the stochastic discount factor equal to the money value of 
a contingent claim in state s' to one dollar in state s'+'. ' Mjt denotes money 
holdings at the end of period t, Bjt the quantity of bonds, Tjt the nominal 
lump-sum transfer received by the household, Hjt the profits distributed by 
firms and WjtLjt the labour income. 
Households maximise their expected lifetime utility subject to the se- 
quence of budget constraints (3.8), the sequence of labour demand curves 
they face as wage-setters (3.4), and the additional constraint that the nom- 
inal wage is fixed for the next two periods. Their choices are the level of 
consumption, the quantities of money and bonds transferred to the next 
5Let st be the state of the world in period t. Denote with Pr(s'+' I st) the probability 
that in the next period the state of the world will be s'+' , conditional to the state st in 
period t. To lighten notation and avoid indexing each variable with respect the state of the 
world, we use the expectation operator and the dating of the variables. Then, E)t = E)(st) 
and Et (E)k) = E,,. Pr(sk I st)E) (,, 3k), where E)t is whatever variable or function of variables, 
8k is the state in period k>t and the sum is calculated on all the possible future states 
A. 
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period and the level of the norninal wage for the next two periods. The first- 
order conditions for that problem can be expressed as follows (the index J is 
dropped to lighten notation), 
um Rt -I 
uc Rt 
uc(t) = ORtEt 
Uc(t + I)pt 
Pt+l 
OEt(At+, ) 
Q(st+l I St) At 
OEt Uc(t + 
i)Pt 1 
uc(t)Pt+l Rt 
N- or 
xt 
Et-, [Er=o 1- (-UL(t+r)Kt+r 
Et-I N-1 or uc(t+r)Kt+,, 
[Er=o 
Pt+r 
)l 
(3-9) 
(3-10) 
(3.11) 
XC+l. Et-, [1: N-1 URW (t + aRW(t+r) 
E-1 r=o axt 
+- 
N-1 or uc(t+r)Kt+, 
(3-12) 
Et-, [Er=o Pt, +, 
where At is the multiplier attached to the budget constraint. The first three 
equations are standard: (3.9) represents the optimal choice between con- 
sumption and money; (3.10) is the Euler equation for consumption and (3.11) 
gives the gross nominal interest rate Rt. 6 
6 Note that E,,, +, Q(s'+' I s') is the current value of a nominal bond that gives one 
unit of money for sure in the next period. On the other hand, Q(st+l I -s') = OPr(s'+' I 
St) "'(st"Pt- is the current price of a claim of one unit of money contingent on the 
(U(? 
(t)P(S, --i-, )) 
realisation of state s'+' in the next period. 
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Equation (3-12) gives the optimal nominal Nvýioeset by the monopolis- 
tic household-union for the next 2 periods. That expression is composed 
of two terins. The optimal wage is given by a fixed mark-up 
()ver the (jumifity in the curly brackets, which is the ratio between expected 
weighted aveniges of the marginal disutility from (hours of) labour supply 
and the marginal utility of consumption over the next 2 periods. In other 
words, the first component is a weighted average of the optimal flexible wages 
(without relative wage concern) of those periods. The second term is an ex- 
pect-ed weighted average of the colicern for the relative wages resulting from 
the contnichs in effect over the ocxf 2 periods. The weights are defined by 
f3, Pt, +, i and E. 
The i-()I(, of the government is limited to provide lump-sum transfers, 
through which money is introduced in the economy. These traiisfers satisfy 
Tt = Ht, - Ht-, and the nominal money supply process is described by' 
11 It -- /It ,I It -I 
(3.13) 
3.3 Wage contracting and inflation dynamics 
This sect Imi the implications of relative wiige concern in wýige cmi- 
tnicting lilt ert ellipol-al optlinisation 1,,,, taking into account. The Imsis 
'The Imi-ticular stochastic pro(-(, -,,, followed h. v itt is of no particular relevance for our 
; iii1vi. 
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of our analysis is the log-linearisation of the first-order condition for the 
choice of the money-wage (equation (3.12) above) around a deterministic 
zero-inflation steady-state. Ignoring discounting, the log-linearisation yields' 
xt + Etpt+, ] -F [rwt + Et rwt+l ]+ -y -)[Yt+Etyt+, ] 222 
(I) 
ipt 
(3.14) 
Nominal wages are signed taking into account three factors: (1) the price lev- 
els expected to prevail in the two periods of the contract-life, since they affect 
the real wage; (ii) the relative wages resulting from the different, contracts 
in force in those two periods; (iii) an additional adjustment, for the business 
cycle conditions in the life of the contract. 
The crucial novelty of the contracting specification derived above is the 
presence of a combination of both own real wage concern, weighted by Q, 
and relahve real wage concern, weighted by F. ' Both arise naturally from 
intertemporal optimisation under staggered wages and relative wage concern 
on the part of the workers. To better understand this contracting speci- 
fication, a comparison to two widely-used particular cases of it are useful 
benchmarks. First, the "standard" staggered-wage models, either directly 
8 Hereon lower case letters denote log-deviations from steady state values. 
9Q 
5r and 7 are non-negative composites of 
the preference and technology parameters 
of our model economy. Their specific expressions play no crucial role for our argument 
in this chapter, so they are omitted here The interested reader can find them in the 
Appendix at the end of the Chapter. 
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postulated as in Taylor [1980], or derived from intertemporal optimisation as 
the version in Chari et al. [1996] (section 4)1(' or Ascari [1997], impose F=0. 
Wage contracting is then characterised exclusively by own real wage concern. 
Second, FM impose a pure relative real wage concern by implicitly setting 
Q=0 in their directly- postulated contracting specification. The contracting 
specification derived here thus encompasses the two factors that have been 
highlighted in the literature so far. We will now define the rw terms in (3.14) 
above for further analysis. 
Relative wage concern is captured by the RWt+i terms in (3.7) and (3.12). 
We have introduced wage staggering as a fundamental feature of the model, 
and now exploit its implications for the definition of the RWt+i terms. Recall 
that, given the asyncronised wage contracting by the two sectors and the 
fixed length of the contracts, at any period t there are two different wage 
contracts in effect. This breaks the complete symmetry among otherwise 
identical households. We take this fact as the basis for the definition of 
"'The model presented in Chari et al. [1996] is actually a model of price staggering 
rather than wage staggering. Obviously, some differences arise from the fact that different 
nominal variables are staggered. However, the structure of the price/wage setting equation 
is equivalent. In fact, Chari et al. [19961 in their Section 4 use it to highlight the additional 
insights obtained from intertemporal optimisation for that type of wage contracting equa- 
tions. This is the sense in which we refer to their model. A thorough comparison of the 
implications of price or wage staggering under different economic structures is developed 
in Ascari and Garcia [1998b]. 
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the alternative wage. The RWt+i terms are then defined as a ratio of the 
wage contract signed by the households who are currently negotiating their 
nominal wage, to the contract signed by the other sector. We further assume 
that wage setters compare the real value of the wage contracts in the period 
in which the wages are signed in each sector. More specifically, they compare 
the real wage they receive in period t (in which they negotiate the nominal 
wage for the next two periods), to the real value of the wage contracts that 
overlap with it: those negotiated in t-I and still in effect in t, and those 
expected to be negotiated in t+1. The real value is obtained by deflating 
the nominal contracts by the price level for the period in which the contract 
is signed. " Consequently 
Rwt 
Xt/pt 
RWt+j 
Xt-i/Pt-i 
Xt/pt 
(Xt+llpt+i) 
(3-15) 
The log-linearised version of the rw terms then reduces to 
rwt ý (xt - pt) - (xt-1 - pt-1) ; Etrwt+l = (xt - pt) - Et(xt+l - pt+, ) 
(3.16) 
II It is worth noting that in this case, agents behave to a certain extent miopically, since 
the fact that the contracts last for two periods, the one in which they are negotiated 
and the following one, is somehow overlooked. We could also carry out our analysis for 
a "theoretically preferable" case in which agents however compare the real value of the 
contracts in the two periods they last. As a result, the dynamics of such a model would 
be richer. However, a direct comparison to Roberts [1997] would not be possible then. 
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Substituting the above terms into (3-14) and re-arranging, the wage contract- 
ing equation becomes 
9 xt _ 
pt+Etpt, +i 
t-i) - (xt -pt)1 ( -i -p xt 
+ r' [Et (xt+l -pt+, ) - (xt -pt)] 2 
[yt+Etyt+, ] (3-17) + G) 
We are now in a position to analyse the implications of the contracting 
specification in greater detail. To focus the discussion recall that: (1) by 
imposing IF = 0, we are back to Taylor's wage contracting equation (pure 
own real wage concern); (ii) by imposing Q=0 we obtain the equation 
presented in FM and employed in Roberts [1997] (pure relative real wage 
concern). 
Under constant returns to labour 12 , the log-linearised price level is simply 
given by 
I 
-(Xt + Xt-l) 2 
(3.18) 
12 The general expression for the log-linearised price level is given by pt = .1 +xt-1)+ 2 
(Tt 
(1 
Or") yt. 
The aggregate price level is then characterised by both "cost push" and "de- 
mand pull" factors. Recall that labour is the only variable factor of production in our 
stylised economy. It is inmediate that constant returns to scale to labour ((T= 1) are im- 
plicitly assumed in the directly-postulated log-linear models of Taylor [1980] and Fuhrer 
and Moore [1995]. Such an assumption does not affect inflation dynamics in the con- 
tracting specification derived here, so Nve also incorporate it to allow for a straightforward 
comparison. 
CHAPTT--R: ). SO URCES OF LVFLATIOX INERTIA 
Inflation is defined ýus 
Apt ý-- A- pt-l -I (Axt + Axt-1) 2 
96 
(3.19) 
'imple algebra allows to chý iracterise the wage contracting specification 
ws implying 
Axt -- [aApt + bEtApt+1] =ý [yt + Etyt+, ] 
where 
a- 
2F 
b=M+ 
2F 
an dý- Q+ 2F' Q+ 2F Q+ 2F 
(3.20) 
It states that the change in nominal wages is rela, ted to the inflation 
nites in the periods in which the contract will be in force, adjusted by the 
(expected) level of economic activity. 
The notation in equation (3.20) allows for a straightforward comparison 
to the Taylor-t. vpe and the FM contracting specifications. In the former, 
relative Nv; lge concern ls iibseiit (F=O), a=0, so only future (expected) 
inflation matter", for lvýlge setting. In the latter. own real wage concern is 
;i I)s, (, i it (ý 2 --0), (1 =b=1. so ci irrent and 
future inflation are eqi iýi Ily weighted, 
; uid fi)rwmýd looking belmviour is somehow diminished. 
WO (1; 111 HOW allýlllvse the impliciltiolis of Our wage contracting equation 
for t he of iliflation. (3.19) and (3.20) cnn be used to obtain the 
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follmving, expression in terms of the inflation rates 13 
2ý + b(Et, -jApj 
(3.21) bEA'pt, +, + 
The, key featlire of this equation is that inffiflon exhibits the inertia that 
cliaracterises actual inflation dynamics. The source of that inertia. as in the 
directly-postulated equation advocated by FM, is the presence of relative 
wage concern in wage setting. To illustrate this point, consider the traditional 
Taylor-type contnicting equation in which agents an, only concerned with the 
level of their own real wages (F=O). If o, = 0, and we are only left with the 
second terin in the left hand side. that is 
Apt - EtApj, +j =ý 
[(-yt-I + yt)] + (Et, -,, 
Apt - Apt) (3.22) 
This equation captures the trade-off between output and inffition fluit char- 
ýwtenses the so-called --N(., NN- KeYnesimi Phillips curve*'. Its main virtue is the 
fact tImt, the nominal rigidities, which underlie the dynamics of inflation. can 
be derived from intertemporal optimi&ition. However, the implied inflation 
(I. vimnilcs 1,,, not thiit satisfactory. Current, inflation just depends on future 
inflation. with no dependence on previous inflation levels wliatso- 
ever. This is ;i direct consequence of the underl. viii,,, ) contracting 
behaviour: 
I111 is re- rocAl that witholit reLitive concern 
the change in nominal i 
lated mih- to future inflation (i =0 In (3.20) above). As a result, 
N -1 = yt-, 
+Et-,! It and yt = yt +Etyt+l to ecoiloinise 13-Note tImt ive have defined -yt 
terilis in the equations. 
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1011 the period t inflation i-cite is, free to in response to new informati 
thýit becomes ýtvailable in period t, in sharp conti-wt to empirical evidence 
on wluýil inflation dynamics. In short: prices are sticky. but the inflation 
nife is not. Thus, we will henceforth refer to it ýis a, (standard) sticky-price 
Model. 
Consider now the more genera, l contracting specification derived here. 
The counterfactiud flexibility of inflation described above is not, present, in 
equMion (3.21). Simply by re-arranging terms, a somehow more explicit 
expres,, sdoil for (3.21) is 
Apt - 
aApt, -, +2 
bEtApt, +, [(Yt-i + -YI)l +2 (Et-jApt -Apt) 
(b) 
(3.23) 
In the List equation, new information about current, or future monetary 
pollc. v tImt, b(, (-()iii(, s available ýit t can be reflected in EApt+l but, not. by 
definition, on The presence of Apt-, in (3.23) limits the flexibility 
of ciii-l-ent, inflation. In fact , it rules out counterfactual jumps in response 
to Ilew information, in contrast to the sticky-price model given by equation 
(3.22). This c(limhon can therefore better replicate actual features of inflation 
dvilaillic"'. III whilt follmvs. Nve thus refer to this equation as the stickY 
inflatioll niodel. 
With vespect to the directly postulated cqumion in Fulirer and 
[1995], wo share the of relative Nva-c cmiccrn in Nva-(ý cmitnicting 
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ýmd. consequently. of inflation inertia. Fuhrer and Moore [1995] implicitly 
impose 0 i. e.. pure relati-ve wage concern in wage setting. As a result. 
a= 1) = t, and eqiiýitlon (3.23) becomes 
Apt, -I [Apt-1 + Et,, Apt, +, ] 
[(-y , 1), -Ap/). 2 t-I 
+ yt)] +2 (Et -A 
(3.24) 
FM tesf this sticky-inflation equation against the Taylor-type sticky-price 
niodel. Their results show that sticky- inflation models fit U. S. data, het- 
ter i lt,, ai sticky-price ones. The intuition behind their results is simply that 
T(iylor-type wýigc contracting e(limhons provide price stickiness but are not 
ýible to ýwcount for the degree of inflation stickiness observed in U. S. data, 
v, ndc, r rafio, aal c. x-pectahoas. FIM*s, result suggests that inflation persistence 
should be ;I illust for ; I11Y model ýiiiniiig at replicating ,, t, N, Ilzed facts of U. S. 
itmci-() (Ld ýi. However. equýitioii (3.23) allows us to identify the effect of the 
omission of own real wage in FM's contracting specification. The degree of 
niffition inertia, is weighted by a= 2F/(Q + 2F). By imposing Q=0, FM 
cmitnicting, specilficýifion maY assign an excessive weight to lagged inflatioll, 
and diiiiiiiish the 1.01c of forward looking behaviour. This may pLiy a crucial 
1'()I(, t(, -"t Ill((-" empirically competing li. ypotheses on the of iiiflatio,, 
inertia. In the remaining part of the chapter we investigMe that conjecture. 
NVO desurlbe the AterliMive swirce of inflation inertia next. 
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3.4 Non- fully- rational Expectations as Source 
of Inflation Inertia 
In mi interesting contribution, Roberts [1997] considers an alternative inter- 
pretation for the source of the observed inflation inertia. Surveys of inflation 
expectations often do not pass the usual tests of rationality. " If those sur- 
veys are to be considered (i reliable proxy for actual inflation expectations, 
non-fully-i-cItIonal expectations may be the source of the observed hiflation 
II ler tial. 
Consider (3.22) ýigmii and recall that we labelled that equation ýis the 
si icky-price model smce it does not imply inflation inertia, In the previous 
section we have highlighted that feature as a, major weakness. We have also 
showed that, by considering relative wage concern, equation (3-23) allows for 
inflation inertia, and cmi therefore better replicate actual inflation dynamics. 
However, whether or not (3.22) exhibits inflation inertia depends on the 
inflation expectittion process. This argument can be easily understood by 
con, siderm, u), again equation (3.22). 
(3.25) API Yt-l + yt)] + (St-, -ý, J)t - -Apt) 
Specific; I11Y, if inflation expectations are not fully rational, they inay well 
depend oil hist period level and equation (3.25) call then exhibit smile degree 
II Rohcrtý, ý1997] and references therein. 
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of inflation inertia. Assume further that the inflation expectation for next 
period, StApt+,, is given by a weighted average of the inflation rate in the last 
period, Apt-,, and of the mathematical expectation of next period inflation, 
MtApt+,, that is 
StApt+l -I [aApt-I + bMtApt+, ] 2 
By relaxing rational expectations in this specific way, an sticky-price 
model becomes observationally equivalent to an sticky- inflation one. Both 
equations show the dynamics of inflation being "sticky", since it depends 
on previous period value. However, the key point is that their implications 
for the source of inflation inertia are radically different. In the case of the 
contracting specification derived in the previous section, inflation is sticky as 
a result of intertemporal optimisation by wage-setters concerned with rela- 
tive wages. The source of inflation persistence is thus the wage contracting 
behaviour. The alternative interpretation of equation (3-23) instead consid- 
ers inflation stickiness being the result of sticky prices in presence of "sticky 
expectations". It is the lack of full rationality of inflation expectations which 
makes the current, inflation rate depend on its lagged value, leading to sticky 
dynamics for inflation. 
If we relax the assumption of rational expectations, whether price stick- 
iness or inflation stickiness best characterises the actual inflation process is 
then an open empirical issue. It is important, to stress that the imperfect 
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nationality of inffition expectations is a necessary condition for the .,,, ticky- 
I)rices- pli is- I ess-thý ii i- fully- ra t ion ýi I expectAlons to hold. However, it is not 
sufficient. biffiihon may well be sticky even if inflation expectations ýuv 
imperfectly rAional. The question has to be settled empirically. given the 
potenthil observational equivalence between (3.25) and FAI's sticky-inflation 
equ, ition (3.24). Roberts [1997] provides some evidence favouring the stan- 
(Lird sticky-price models. The test is based oil the lack of statistical sig- 
nificalice of lagged inflation once survey data, are used ýis proxy for attual 
inflation expectations. The conclusion is that the presence of less-thaii-fully- 
nitional expectations is the preferred explanation for inflation stickiness. 
Our contribution to the debate is to aiialyse the competing hypotheses 
of inflation inertia on the light of the contracting specification derived here. 
RecAll thm. the crucial novelty of this wage setting equation is the presence 
of ii combination of both otivi real wage concern. weighted by Q. and rclative 
1 ise iiat- ivid wa,,,, (, concern. by F, in the wage setting rule. Both ari 
iii-ally froin intel-temporal optlmisýitlon under wage staggering and relative 
The contractlný(,, specification thus generalises the directly pos- 
tiil; it(, (l equation by F-M. since intertemporal optimisation adds an additional 
(3.23) own IvA wýloe under sta, -ýý)(, nlig. Equation sliow,,, -, that 
the (. (mt ril ctill'o, specification derived here maY also become ohservAionally 
equivalelit to a sticky-price model if inflation expecti4ions were ilon-fully- 
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ratimml. In the r(ýnwiiillil-) , (, (-tions of the chapter we investigate the source 
of inflation inertia when Nvýige contracting is defined by the eqiuitlon derived 
here. 
3.5 Econometric specification 
3.5.1 Deriving the estimation framework 
Our wage contracting specification implies inflation persistence by a coinbi- 
nation of both own mil wage (weighted by Q) and relative real wage concern 
(weighted by F) 
- 
Our purpose here is to highlight the importance of the omis- 
sion of own real wage concern in the empirical results presented in Roberts 
[1997] to discriminate between the sticky-inflation model and the competing 
hypothesis, of sticky prices. 
To allow for a straightforward comparison, we follow Roberts [19971 in 
m; ikni, -,, wages in 
(3.17) dependent, only on the current period business cycle 
(: ()ildltioii,,,,. That is the terin (1/2) [yt+Etyt+, ] In (3-11 reduces to yt. n We 
15This is without loss of generalitY since next period expected level of economic 
(. ýIjj he silliply proxied hY the current, one. 
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()1)t1ilI 
pt, + Etpt+1 
2 
= 60 + -Y yt 
-1 -pt-1) - 
(. Et -I)t)] 
[(Xt 
F [Et, (xt+l Pt+l) - (11"t -Pt)] (3.26) 
The kisis for the empirical analysis is given by the implications for in- 
fi, a, tl()ij persisteiwe of equation (3.26). Proceeding as in previous sections, 
making use of (3-19) and re-arrailging to take full ýidvýiiitýq, -(, of hiffiAlon ex- 
jwctýitlons, simple algebra leads to 
Apl, 
51-lApt + S(A])I+l 60 
+ 'Y [yt-l + yt] + ct - 222 
[(St-'Apt - Apt-') + (S`Ap`+l - Apt)] 
(3.27) 
This expression provides by itself a nested version of both competing 
spec ific; o Recall that a= 2F/(Q + 2F). It is then immediately obvious 
tliýit ýi stick. N- price i-nodel, that one without relative wage concern (F = 0, 
and therefore (I = 0) iiiipll(, S 
st-iAllt + Sl--\Pt+l 60 
t-l + Yt] + 
Hence a simple waY to discriminate between the two specifications is to 
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estimal (, 
'Apt, - 
sfApt-ý-, Yt-i 60 +61 
1 yt, I 
-6* [(St-,, Apt - Apt-1) + (stAl)l+l 
(3.29) 
ýaid test whether or not 6* is stýitistically different from zero. 
Alternatively, we cmi re-write equation (3-29) as follows 
Apt, - 
st, 
-lA/)/, + 
stApt+i 
---- 61+61 
[Yt-1 + y/ + 6// + 
121 
----i 0121t 
[Apt-i 
- 
St-lApt + StL\I)t+i 
21 
(3-30) 
and test whether the estimate P is statistically different from zero. 
3.5.2 Data description 
Our regression results are carried out for semiannual data,. Semiannual data 
is useful in the present context for two reasons. Firstly. it seems logical 
to colitnicts for the nominal wages. Therefore, since a, 
key of the preselit fnimework is wage staggering and two-period 
colitnich" this lcýlds, naturally to semiannual estimation in order to b()ost 
the explailotol-Y powel. of the Secondly. semiannual 
ýihso ifflows, iis to perform our tests using dota on inflation expectaiOns as 
lvpmýted oll the "III-vely". 
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Assource of inflation expectations Nve employ both the Michigan SurveY 
and the Liviiit))ston Survey of ecoliolinst, "' forecast of iliflatioill(). The "()- 
called Miclugan survey is conducted by University of Michigan as part of the 
programme to ýissess households' behaviour. It is ýi survey of households' 
inflation forecasts as measured by the expected change in the CPI twelve 
inonths ihcýid. The Livingston survey was launched by ajournalist of that 
nmiic in the 1940s and is currently conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Pliila, delphiýi. The data, are obtained from ýi panel of more than forty 
ecmioimsts. The Livingston survey reports expected levels of CPI for the 
upcoming 6 and 12 months. Lack of rationality of inflation expectations is 
often found for forecýist horizons of ii year or longer. In order to incorporate 
Lick of rationality in our ostimMion, we use inflat, ion expectations for the 
upcoming 12 montlis, implicitly assuming that agents expect the same rate 
of inflation for the two 6-month periods. The Livingston survey reports the 
expect ed CPI levels 12 months ahead from the date of publicAlon. However. 
due to the presence of publication lags of the official CPI, the usual forecýist 
is inade. for 14 months. To extract the implicit rates of inflation we follow 
the approach mggested bY C(Irlssmi [19771.17 To conform with our measures 
16 The (Uitýi ; ire currenth- w, -, uhible froin the wel) , it(, s. An alternative source of inflation 
J, Ojvcý,, st is tile, Survev of Professional Forecasters (SPF). It however refers to the GDP 
deffiltor. 
-, 
(( 
Lp, 12 ) 
12/1-1 
where cpl'12 is the i\-(, i-, age valite of the 'S'pecifically. -, -1 1. " t+12 - 
00* 
Cp? 0 
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of inffition expectmions we use the consumer price index ýis our measure of 
inflat 1011. 
We preseiit regression results employing the three major measures of eco- 
noinic ýwtivlty: the unemployment rate, GDP and capacity utilisation mea- 
sures. For GDP and unemployment we present results from detrended data. " 
As usual in the business cycle liteniture, we employ Hodrick-Prescott filtered 
(Litýi. We make use of two values for the filter's smoothing parameter to 
estimate the trends: (/, -, =:: 1,600) and (/, - = 100). The former is the value 
suggested by Hodrick and Prescott in their seminal contribution, and it is 
employed in Roberts [1997]. The results using that value therefore allow for 
a direct comparison to those in Roberts [1997]. The latter vallie is chosen by 
ýid. justlng the recommended value for quarterly data, with the fourth power 
of the observation frequency nitlOS, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig [1997]. 
The purpose is then to filter the datýi so as to obtain cycles in our semian- 
inial datýi of the same approximate length of those obtained with the value 
of i, - =1,600 for quarterly data. 11) 
i-(, I)ort(, (t price levels hY siinvy participants and c1no is the last value of the actual price 
level published at the point in time in which the surveýv -was conducted. 
l, 'All the (Lan employed in our alialYsis have been obtained froin the International 
Fiiiaiwml Stýitistics Database. Otherwise the explicit data source is mentioned in the 
illaill text. 
1'. 'It should he mentioned liere that wheii alternative ad . justinents 
for the filter parameter 
pi-eviously considered in the liternture are employed ( that Is by inultiplyin, the standard 
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It is hard to explain the history of inflation in the 1970s without account- 
ing for the large changes in real oil prices. Such changes are a potentially 
important and readily identifiable source of shocks to inflation. We therefore 
incorporate an additional regressor in our regressions to account for them. 
Arpo is defined as the percentage change in the real price of oil, where real oil 
prices are obtained by dividing nominal prices by the GDP deflator. As mea- 
sure of nominal oil prices we employ those for the West Texas Intermediate. 
The estimated equations are 
- 
[St-lApt + StApt+i =- Yt-i + Yt Apt 
21 
60+61 
121+ 
62 A? POt + Et 
-6* [(St-, Apt - Apt-, ) + (StApt+l - Apt)] 
(3.31) 
instead of (3.29), while in place of (3.30) we estimate 
St-iApt + StApt+1 6, + 
-f [Yt-i + Yt] + Apt -I16 6f Arpot + Ef' 20122t 
[Zýpt-l st-lApt + StApt+i 
21 
(3.32) 
Two additional comments should be made clear before presenting our em- 
pirical results. OLS estimates of the above equations may have two potential 
smoothing parameter value 1,600 by the square of the alternative sampling frequency as 
in Backus and Kehoe [1992] or linearly with the frequency of the data as in Correia et al. 
[1992] or Cooley and Ohaiiian [1991]), the qualitative results are not altered. Our results 
also hold v,, lien GDP is filtered by applying a quadratic time trend. 
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of blas Firstly., the economic activity measures ma. v be (-()i-i-(, Iate(I 
witli the term. In this respect. we follow Roberts [1997] and take sup- 
port from the results in King) and Watson [19941 to ýissume that the, v are 
not correlated with the error term, at least for the period length implied bY 
the equations we, estimate. The assumption of lack of correlation between 
regressors and Hie error term is however not justifiable for Hie terms involv- 
ing lagged niffition in equations (3.31) and (3.32), since the errors are likely 
to be correlated. Therefore we employ the instrumentM variable niethod in 
our regressions, with the instruments being three lags of the economic ac- 
tivity inc; usures. '(' Secondly, as a consequence of the overlapping inflation 
(,, x1)(, (-tAIo1is Iiid wage coiltnicting. the empirical model developed in the 
List section may suffer from the presence of residua, l correlation. In order to 
provide cm-rect the stmidm-d errors presented are those obtained 
Ater applying the Newey-West [1987] correction for up to eight lags. 
3.6 Empirical Results 
Table 3.1 below presents results for detrended output as measure of economic 
We the HP filter making use of a value for the smoothing 
--) "\\-(, have il, -,, o emplo. yed more justifiable Oxog('11011'ý iiistriiiiieilt,. Results employing 
the (. 1inii, o in the federal funds nito. M2 and real overiiiiient expenditure as iii. struinents 
pollit at the '4111le qualitative result that tho,, c presented here. 
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Table 3.1: Economic Activity: detrended GDP, HP filter, r, =100. 
110 
Test for sticky inflation. Semiannual data. 
Two-stage least squares. Newey-West correction, eight lags 
Sample 1961: 1-1996: 2. Dependent variable Apt - [St_jApt + StApt+, ]/2 
Livingston Survey 
Constant 0.24 
(0-15) 
Real oil price 0.025 
(0.01) 
Detrended GDP' 0.32 
(0.10) 
[St-lApt - /, Xpt-i+ -0.28 
+St, Apt+l - Apt] (0-060) 
Apt-, - 
-(St-1, Apt + StApt+1)12 
-2 R 
SER 
-2 R, first stage 
0.35 
(0.21) 
0.036 
(0.012) 
0.45 
(0-13) 
0.358 
(0.121) 
Michigan Survey 
-0-13 
(0.15) 
0.024 
(0.008) 
0.29 
(0.094) 
-0.249 
(0-051) 
-0.18 
(0.21) 
0.033 
(0.011) 
0.39 
(0.12) 
0.29 
(0-09) 
0.46 0.45 0.39 0.38 
0.96 1.33 0.95 1.27 
0.45 0.36 0.33 0.27 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
'Average of current and previous period. 
parameter of K= 100 to estimate the trend. 
Overall, the point estimates are in line to their expected values. De- 
trended output has the correct sign and is statistically significant. So are 
real oil prices. With respect to the parameters of interest for our test, the 
results axe conclusive. In the four cases, the parameter estimates are signifi- 
cantly different from zero, the value they should take under the sticky-price 
hypothesis. The corresponding p-va-lues are lower than 0.01 in all cases. 
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Tiws(ý resillts I lI('i-ef()i. (, ýdlmvs us to clearly reject the sticky price model in 
favour ofan sticky-inflation contracting specification. The rest of the chapter 
i to ý, sscss the robustness of those results. 
We starf, by considering some sensitivity to detrending by an alternative 
value for the, smoothing parameter in the HP filter. 
Table 3.2: Economic Activity: detrended GDP, HP filter, /, -, =1,600. 
Test, for sticky inflation. Semiannual da, týi. 
Two-stage least squares. Newey-West correction, eight lags 
Sample 1961: 1-1996: 2. Dependent variAle Apt - [St-1, Apt + StApt+1]12 
Livingston Survey Michigaii Survey 
0.22 0.32 -0-16 -0.22 
(0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.21) 
Real oil pri(I'(1, 0.027 0.038 0.027 0.036 
(0.009) (0-01) (0.007) (0.009) 
Detrended GDP' 0.24 0.33 0.19 0.25 
(0.077) (0-10) (0-065) (0-085) 
[St-,, ý, ]), - Apt-, + -0.268 -0.23 
+St__vt+i (0-061) - (0.062) - 
0.35 0.27 
+ St, -\1)1+1)12 
(0.10) 
0.47 0.46 0.36 0.36 
SER, 0.97 1.32 0.99 1.29 
R'' first, shlgw 0.45 0.38 0.32 0.26 
Not es: Numbers iii parenthesis are standard errors. 
of current and previous period. 
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Specifically, we consider /, -, =: 1,600, as it is usual for quarterly data and 
employed for example in Roberts [1997]. The point estimates in Table 3.2 
ýirc very similar f() those in Table 3.1. In fact, the results in Table 3.2 are 
also strongly supportive for the sticky-inflation contracting specification. 
We, now proceed to present some sensitivity aiiýilysis to the measure of 
economic activity. Table 3.3 presents the results obtained by employing ca- 
imcity utilisation as the measure of economic activity. 
The results mv soinewhat less conclusive. Specifically, the results for 
t he Livingston Survey datýi mv in line to those for detrended output. The 
c, stlinýited values are statistically different from zero for standard significance 
mcýisures (p-values <0.01 in both cýiscs). Instead, for the Nlichigan Survey 
pothesis that the parameter 6 is statistically not data we cannot, reject the hy 
different from to zero. The point estimates become slightly lower. However, 
their standard ori-ors nre substantially higher. Consequently, the implied 
for the sticky-price hypothesis are respectively 0.065 and 0.128. 
our of persistence arises from relative wage concern 
seems logical to look at the results from the estimation 
of equations (3.31) and (3.32) using the rate of unemplo. vinent ýi, ý iiwii, -ýurc of 
Ili Table 3.1 Nve preselit results both for rim- unenipb). vinent 
and in Table 3.5 below Nve report results for HP-detrended v; iluos. 
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Table 3-3: Economic Activity: Capacity Utilisation 
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Test for sticky inflation. Semiannual data. 
Two-stage least squares. Newey-West correction, eight lags 
Sample 1961: 1-1996: 2. Dependent variable Apt - [St_iApt + StApt+1]12 
Constant 
Real oil price 
Capacity Utilisation' 
[St-lApt - Apt-i+ 
+StApt+i 
Livingston Survey 
-9.11 -12.5 
(2-54) (3-35) 
0.027 0.038 
(0-008) (0-01) 
0.11 0.15 
(0.042) 
0.342 
(0.088) 
Michigan Survey 
-5-54 -6.66 
(2.96) (3-65) 
0.032 0.038 
(0.009) (0.01) 
0.065 0.078 
(0-037) (0.046) 
-0.17 
(0.091) - 
0.20 
(0-13) 
(0.032) 
-0.267 
Apt] (0.046) 
Apt-l - 
-(St-, Apt + StApt+1)12 
-2 R 
SER 
-2 R, first stage 
0.49 0.48 0.37 0.30 
0.96 1.31 0.99 1.36 
0.49 0.38 0.26 0.26 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
'Average of current and previous period. 
The results for raw unemployment rates are similar to those for capac- 
ity utilisation. That is, for the Livingston Survey data they are strongly 
favourable to the sticky-inflation hypothesis. Instead, for the Michigan Sur- 
vey data the point, estimates are substantially lower, and for standard signif- 
icance levels we cannot reject the hypothesis that the parameter of interest 
is statisticallY not different from zero. However, some caution should be 
taken when interpreting the latter results, since the point, estimates from the 
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economic activity are so low that they are not statistically significant either. 
Table 3.4: Economic Activity: Unemployment Rate 
Test for sticky inflation. Semiannual data. 
Two-stage least squares. Newey-West correction, eight lags 
Sample 1961: 1-1996: 2. Dependent variable Apt - [St_jApt + StApt+1]12 
Livingston Survey Michigan Survey 
Constant 2.25 2.84 0.55 0.67 
(0-06) (0.62) (0.48) (0-57) 
Real oil price 0.033 0.042 0.033 0.04 
(0-009) (0.01) (0-008) (0-01) 
Unemployment Rate' -0.31 -0.39 -0.12 -0.14 
(0.078) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
[St-iApt - Apt-I+ -0.20 -0.177 
+StApt+l - Apt] (0.062) - (0.076) 
1"'pt-1 - 0.26 0.21 
-(St-, Apt + StApt+, )/2 - (0.099) (0.11) 
V 
0.45 0.50 0.29 0.29 
SER 1.07 1.35 1.13 1.38 
-2 R, first stage 0.48 0.41 0.29 0.30 
Notes: Numbers ill parenthesis are standard errors. 
'Average of current and previous period. 
When detrended unemployment, values are employed, economic activity 
becomes strongly significant. With respect to the parameters of interest, the 
estimation is now strongly favoura-ble to the sticky- inflation hypothesis. The 
parameter estimates are significantly different, from zero, the value consistent, 
CHAPTER, '). SO t- R(ýES OF INFLATION LVERTIA 115 
", 'ith ýinsticky-price model, with the corresponding p-values beIng lower than 
0.025 in all four cases. 
Tible 3.5: Economic Activity: detrended Unemployment Rate 
Test for sticky inflation. Semiannual data. 
Two-stage least syim-es. Newey-West correction. eight lags 
Smiiple 1961: 1-1996: 2. Dependent variable Apt - [St, -, 
Apt + SlApt, +1]12 
HP Filtcr r, = 100 HP Filter t, - = 11 600 
Livingston Michigan Livingston Michigan 
Cmv"týlllt 0.27 -0.13 0.26 -0-15 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Real oll price, 0.025 0.024 0.026 0.025 
(0-009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Unemployment Ratel -0.69 -0-59 -0.69 -0-59 
(0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) 
ISI-I'Apt - APt-i+ -0.25 -0.23 -0.25 -0.21 
+StApt+i - l4t] (0.044) (0.085) (0.044) (0.094) 
-2 P) 0.47 0.39 0.47 0.38 
SEIR, 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 
-2. fir"t shl-c R, 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.48 
Notes: Numbers iii parenthesis are standard errors. 
'Averýige of current and previous period. 
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3.7 Subsample Stability 
In order two assess the robustness of the results presented so far we ii(, xt (-()ii- 
sider the subsample stability of the results presented in the previous section. 
SI)ecifically, thive subsamples are considered: 1961: 1-1978: 2,1970: 1-1989: 2 
and 1980: 1-1996: 2. 
Table 3.6: Subsample 1961: 1-1978: 2 
Two-stage least squares. Newey-West Correction with eight lags. 
Semiannual (Lihi. Dependent variable Apt - [St-1, Apt + StApt, +I]I2 
(( nist iI lit 
B(,; il oil price 
Economic ýwtivitvl 
[St-l-Vt - 
+St--\])I+l 
P) 
SER 
Det. Unem. R, ate2 
Liv. Alich. 
0.56 0.13 
(0.14) (0.24) 
0.005 0.01 
(0.002) (0.005) 
-0-96 -0.81 
(0.24) (0-36) 
-0-32 -0.21 
(0.046) (0.14) 
0.52 0.24 
(). ý)ý 9 1.07 
Detrended GDp2 
Liv 
- 
"N' 11 cII. 
0.38 0.12 
(0.10) (0.20) 
0.005 0.009 
(0-003) (0-006) 
0.41 0.: 1 -1 
(0.071) (0-11) 
-0.39 -0.27 
(0.042) (0.10) 
0.51 0.23 
0.84 0.98 
Cap. utilisation 
Liv. Mich. 
-6-76 -5.01 
(2.99) (3.28) 
0.01 0.01 
(0.004) (0.007) 
0.085 0.061 
(0.037) (0.04) 
-0-38 -0-36 
(0.062) (0.12) 
0.30 0.12 
0.97 1. () () 
-Numbers in jmr(, nth(,.,, i,, are standard errors. 
of current and previous period. 
2 HP filter. t-ý =I 00. 
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Despite the fact that the evidence from the first subsample is less con- 
clusive, for the remaining two subsamples the broad picture remams largely 
unchanged. The parameter estimates do not indicate substantial problems 
of subsample instability of the results presented is the previous section. 
Table 3.7: SubsamDle 1970: 1-1989: 2 
Two-stage least squares. Newey-West Correction with eight lags. 
Semiannual data. Dependent variable Apt - [St, -, 
Apt + StApt+1]12 
Constant 
Real oil price 
Economic activity' 
[St-lApt - ""-Pt-i+ 
+st, Apt+i - /Utl 
R2 
SER 
Det. Unem. Rate 
Liv. Mich. 
0.24 0.024 
(0.26) (0.22) 
0.024 0.021 
(0.011) (0.009) 
-0.71 -0.60 
(0.24) (0.23) 
-0.26 -0.24 
(0.048) (0.07) 
0.47 0.39 
1.17 1.13 
Detrended GDp2 
Liv. Mich. 
0.21 0.012 
(0.23) (0.20) 
0.024 0.021 
(0.012) (0.010) 
0.33 0.29 
(0.11) 
-0.28 
(0.07) 
0.46 
1.14 
Cap. utilisation 
Liv. Mich. 
-13.48 -11.22 
(3.23) (3.40) 
0.018 0.018 
(0.01) (0-009) 
0.17 0.139 
(0.11) (0.041) (0.043) 
-0.26 -0-31 -0.27 
(0.046) 
0.40 
1.09 
(0.042) 
0.61 
1.02 
(0.055) 
0.43 
1.07 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
'Average of current and previous period. 
2HP filter, K =100 
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Table 3.8: SiibsamT)le 1980: 1-1996: 2 
Two-stage lowýl squýires. N(mvy-NVeýt Correction with eight lags. 
S(ýmianimal dafa. Dependent variable Apt - [St-1, Apt + StApt+1112 
Det. U nein. Rate 2 Detrended GDP-' Cap. titilisation 
LIv. __\ II ch. Liv. Mich. Liv. __\ Ii ch. 
Constmit, -0.10 -0.23 -0.093 -0.27 -5.22 -3.32 
(0.077) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (2.46) (2.21) 
Real oil price 0.044 0.041 0.048 0.045 0.047 0.048 
(0-006) (0-005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Economic activity' -0.18 -0.19 0.12 0.15 0.064 0.037 
(0-15) (0.10) (0.11) (0.072) (0.030) (0.028) 
[St'_jApt' - Apt, -, + -0.32 -0.35 -0.27 -0.29 -0.26 -0.25 
+st, Apt+i - ý\Pt] (0.039) (0.061) (0.048) (0.046) (0.030) (0.072) 
w2 0.65 0.58 0.59 0.53 0.60 0.47 
SER, 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.80 
Notes: Numhers in parentliesis are standard errors. 
'Avera, w, of current and previous period. 2HP filter, h,::::::::::: 100 
3.8 Some additional tests 
, ')'o far our empirical analysis has 
followed the approach carried out in Roberts 
[1997]. The purpose is to ifflow the reader for a, direct comparison to the re- 
, presented there. 
Howevei-. such an approach is hased on a restricted sults 
model. In this section. Nve present some additional empirical ýniýilvsls. The 
purpose is twofold. Firstly. we provide a direct test of the restrictions im- 
P(), -ý'(Nd ill Hie equations Nvc 1mve estimated ill the pivvioii, ý section's. 
Though 
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the, restricted niodel may be. justified as appropiate in the light of the lim- 
ity of data on inflation expectations, it is also true that some Ited ýMllhlbili 1111 
w1ditional inforination cýiii be obtained from testing on a more unrestricted 
model. Therefore, we also aim ýit obtaining additional evidence on the sig- 
nificance of lagged inflation through the estimation of alternative equations. 
To derive the estimated equations (3.31) and (3.32) in the thesis, we first, 
impose 2' the restriction a+b=2. 
We cnii test that restriction ns follows. Firstly. we rearrange equation 
(3.23) above ns follows 
APt, = 61 + 62 
Yt-I + Yt 
+ 6, ArPOt + 64 [St-IIAPt + StIAPt+11 + 65 [IAPt, -Il 21 
where 64 = 1)/(4 - a) and 65 = a/(4 - a). The restriction a+b=2, 
therefore implies in linear forin that 264 + 65 1. This linear restriction can 
be tested from the estimation of the above equation. 
1R(, (.. . ill that o =- 2F/(Q + 2F) and b= 
(2Q + 2F)/(Q + 2F) 
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Table 3.9: Alternative test for lagged inflation 
Two-stage least squares. Newey-West Correction with eight lags. 
Sample 1961: 1-1996: 2. Semiannual data. Dependent variable Apt 
Det. Un. Rate 2 Detrended GDp2 Cap. utilisation 
Liv. Mich. Liv. Mich. Liv. Mich. 
Constant 0.38 -1-66 0.37 -1.76 -16.37 -10.9 
(0.32) (0.65) (0-32) (0.62) (4.07) (3.24) 
Real oil price 0.035 0.028 0.036 0.028 0.033 0.027 
(0.0012) (0-010) (0-013) (0-010) (0-011) (0.008) 
Ec. activity' -0-93 -0-62 0.45 0.31 0.19 0.10 
(0.28) (0.25) (0.13) (0-11) (0.047) (0-037) 
st-iApt + StApt+I 0.33 0.57 0.32 0.59 0.44 0.76 
(0-063) (0-16) (0.091) (0.13) (0-093) (0.21) 
Apt-1 0.33 0.12 0.35 0.10 0.29 -0-052 
(0.083) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.26) 
w2 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.85 0.84 0.85 
P-value for Wald stat. 
(264 + 65 = 1) 0.981 0.009 0.961 0.009 0.058 0.005 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
'Average of current and previous period. 2HP filter, K=100. 
From the results reported in Table 3.9, note that when the Livingston 
survey data is employed both Apt-, and [St_jApt + StApt+, ] are statistically 
significant. That, is however not the case when we employ the Michigan 
survey data. Specifically, the estimated coefficient for Apt-, is substantially 
lower than those for [St, -, 
Apt + StApt+, ] or the estimates for the Livingston 
survey. Consequently, lagged inflation is no longer statistically significant 
when we use the Michigan survey data. 
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Witli respect to the linear rostriction 264 + 6.5 =I- at standard significance 
levels we cannot re. ject the restriction for the Livingston Survey dafii for any 
of t he alterliative mewsures of economic activity considered. Instead. for the 
Michipii survey datýi, the restriction is rejected. 
To fest for equal coefficients for [St, -, 
Apt, + StApt+1/2] and --\pt, -, in 
the 
estimated equ(--itions in the previous sections, we impose a+b =2 and factorise 
to ol)ta, in 
Ap, - 
S/-IApt + st"Apt+i 61 + 62 Yt-l 
+ Yt 
+ 6: jzýkl'j)ot 
221 
+64 
St-lApt + stApt+i 
+ 6FApt-i 
21 
The additional restriction imposed in the equations estimated in the thesis 
*(', Il "'(, cmi directly test, oli the (Lita bv estimating the t 11ý1, t ()f -64 --":: 651 Whi I 
hist equation above. 
The ivý, ults mv summerised in Table 3.10 below. They are in line with 
t liose in the previous table. That, is. we cannot reject the restriction for 
the Livingnston Survey data, for anY of the alternative measures of econoinic, 
vitv considered. However, for the Michiý. datýi. the i-estriction act II11 
i 1'('j(t('(1. 
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Table 3.10: Testing for equal coefficients 
Two-stýige least s(livires'. Newc , y-West 
Correction ývitli eight lags. 
Sýmiple 1961: 1-1996: 2. Semiannual clata. 
Dependent variable Apt - [St-1, Apt + St,, Apt+, ] /2 
122 
Constant 
Det. Un. Rate 2 
Liv. 
_-Mich. 
0.38 -1-66 
(0-32) (0-65) 
0.035 0.028 
(0.012) (0.01) 
-0-93 -0-62 
(0.28) (0.25) 
-0-33 0.15 
(0.12) (0-32) 
0.33 0.12 
(0.083) (0.21) 
0.46 0.49 
Detrended GDp2 
Liv. Mich. 
0.37 -1.76 
(0-32) (0.62) 
0.036 0.028 
(0.013) (0.01) 
0.45 0.31 
(0-13) (0-11) 
-0-35 0.19 
(0-18) (0.27) 
0.35 0.10 
(0-13) (0-16) 
0.45 0.49 
Cap. utilisation 
Mich. 
-10.9 
(3.24) 
0.027 
(0.008) 
0.10 
(0-037) 
0.53 
(0.42) 
-0.052 
(0.26) 
0.50 
Bc; il oil price 
Economic activityl 
[St-1, Apt + StApt+, ] /2 
Apt 
-I 
-2 R, 
P-v; dne for Wald slat 
( b4 + (ý7> = 0) 
Liv, 
-15-65 
(3-58) 
0.032 
(0.011) 
0.18 
()0. ()41 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
0.39 
(0-088) 
0.56 
0.981 0.018 0.961 0.009 0.058 0.005 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
lAvenige of current and previous perjocl. 2HP filter, /-ý, =100. 
The results reported here are a consequence of a rather different, behaviour 
for inflatiOll (IXP (IC t at lolls depending on whether they are formed by con- 
suiller's ()I. profesional economists. A preliminary analysis of the inflation 
('-xpcctýltimi scrics pomts at the presence of more important role for actual 
ilifiatioll ill the expectation formation for the to- 
-101wi, with a ililich stn)II-er response to hu)-ed expcctýitioiial errors with 1 11 "1-, 
1 
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r(, spect to that of the Livingstoii survey data. This ma. v explain the lack of 
significmice of Apt-, for the Michigan survey in the results reported in Table 
3.9. The additional evidence reported in this section suggests fliat a thorough 
anAysis of the expectation formation processes is likely to be needed before 
seýuvliiiig for ýi inore definite answer to the source of inflation persistence. 
3.9 Concluding comments 
U. S. inflation exhibits substaiitial inertia,. Therefore, it should be a, funda- 
iiwiitýd feature for any monetary dynamic ma, cromodel to account for. Unfor- 
hin(itely, the current strand of research incorporating New Keynesian ingre- 
(Ilents, in particular nominal rigidities, to the dynamic general equilibrium 
f. niniework developed for the s'NdY of business cycles, has failed to ýwcoiint 
for it. Replicating that degree of inflation persistence is thus a, fundamental 
ýiivýi for future research. Two departures from the standard New Keynesian 
fnimew-ork have been proposed. Fuhrer and Moore [19951 have advocated for 
contracting specific at ions, on the basis that their empirical results re- 
ý()uiidindv r the Taylor-type contracting specifications. Roberts [1997] 1 1-1. 
1. (, Iaxlllg Hic rational at ions hypothesis on the basis of some 
from dlrect ohservýitioiis of inflation expectations. Moreover. ev- 
pi-eselited III Roberts [1997] that by incorporating lack of 
ratiolialitv into Tivlor's contracting specificati the hvp()th- 1,101, Nve cau i-e,. j 
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esis that inflation is inh(, rently persistent ýis a consequence of contracting 
1) ch a viour. 
In this cllýipter. we lmve incorporated relative wage concern to a dyliamiC 
general equilibrium macromodel with wage staggering. Our purpose here 
wýis to obtain additional insights for the implications of relative ivao)(, con- 
sidenitions on wage contracting. Specifically, wc. have shown that the result 
of (tymmic optllnlsýition under Nvýige staggering and relative wage cmicern is 
ýl Wý)ge cmitna-fing speclficýltlon comprising both own real wage and relative 
ivýd wage considerations. Previous studies have therefore consider simplified 
versions of the contnicting specification derived here. The theoretical part 
of the chýipter has stressed how relative wage. concern under -"-ýiggc , 4ýiggcr- 
Ing allows for ilifiation pel-sistence, in colitnist to the sort of Taylor-type 
cmitrýicting equ; ition commonly derived in recent literature on staggering. In 
this ISCILS(I, We share our result ivith the directly- post ula ted log-lillear equation 
employed in Fuhrer and Moore [19951 by incorporating exclusively relative 
\výilgc cons iden it ions. 
In the empirical part of the chapter we, have build a test equation that 
allmvs 11", to discriminate between the hv() sources of inflation inertia previ- 
ously in the related literatin'e. namely relative wage (-()ii(-(, i-n in 
sel ting and the lack of rationalitY of inflation expectations. Foll()N\-iiil()) 
71, we employ (lirect ()hservýitious of inflation the iippi-om-11 in Roberts [1991 
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expectýifioiis to relax the ýissiiiiiptlon of rational expectations 
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Our results 
have shown that ; ilternatn, (, sources, of inertia beyond that imparted hY the 
lack of ftill rationality of expectations might be needed to characterlse U. S. 
inflal i0ii dynamics. The intuition behind our results lies in the richer (1, v- 
immic structure of the contracting specification derived here, which allows 
us to reverse the results in Roberts [1997]. 
3.10 Appendix 
The expressions for the weights in the wage contracting specification (equýi- 
tion (3.14)) mv &ý follows: 
Q= -EUI, 
(t)Kt[E, q, + 1] (E - I)URII, 
XtE 
UR 11, 
(t) XtE 
- 
U1, (t) Kt 
E 
F+ 
ý11? 11']URII'xt 
E_ Up, II- (t) Xt -- 
U1, (t) Kt 
Kt 
ul Kt 
Chapter 4 
Relative Wage Concern: an 
Explanation for Output and 
Inflation Persistence? 
4.1 Introduction 
ýý fo(I(, I. ll hilsilles", cycle research is almost entirely carried out within the con- 
text of quaiitltýitlve dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) macromodels. In 
veitrs, liwiwtary DGE macromodels have incorporated various forms 
of lioninial rigidities to studY the role of monetar. v shocks in generating the 
Output fluctuatiolls observed in actual data,. In that approach. the overlap- 
pilig colit I.; wl's illodeh, of GAN-() [19('ý3] and Tiylor [1979.80a. ] have plalved a 
196 
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proniiiwiit role. Th(, is that sucli contracting schemes bring in not 
only the nominal rigidity iwcessýiry for the impact effect of the inonetai-Y 
innovation, but also provide a nominal propagation mechanism, the so-called 
contract multiplier. in ýi framework otherwise lacking endogenous propaga- 
tl()ii mechanisms. 
Becent quautitýitive DGE macromodels, notably Cha, ri. Kehoe and TAR- 
Grattan [1996] (CKM henceforth) and Ascari [1997], have however cast seri- 
ous doubts on the explanatory power of staggered price/ I wage setting in ac- 
counting for output persistence. They show that persistelice, does not exceed 
the length of the contracts. In other words, there is no contract multiplier. 
This ivsults arlses because persistence requires endogenous stickiness in the 
sclusel thM price-setting agents choose not to change their prices/wa, ges by 
ýi large ýauoulit, when they reset them. CKM and Ascarl [19971 have shown 
thiit. for sensible values of the intertempora, l elasticity of substitution of con- 
suniption and/or the intertemporaI elasticity of substitution of labour, the 
i-esponse of wiiges to the output gap is too high to generate output persis- 
I Icc. 
This cluipter reconsiders the existence of a contract multiplier. Our ap- 
proach is based on incorporating an explicit relative real wag(! concern in 
the 'sctill(O) PP)C(I, -;, s. that othenvise takes place 
in a standard staggered 
fashion. N\'(, focus oil -A; woonno for two iviismis- FirstIv. we 
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thýit 1wi-sistent nominal rigiclities ýire more likely to m-ise in the labour inar- 
ket, rather thým in the goods market. Secondly. we will argue that the wage 
, setting process is better represented as the result of the combination of small 
nominal and real rigidities. Our source of real rigidity in the Libour mar- 
ket arises from an explicit account of relative real wage concern. have 
reviewed in Chapter 2 the empirical evidence pointing ýit relative wages ýis 
ýi, fundamental factor in the wage setting process. We, have also shown that 
the Taylor contrw-fing specification does not incorporate a "Keyneslan" com- 
ponent of relative wage concern on the paxt of the workers as was initially 
thought. Relative w, -, i, ge concern considerations have been therefore left out 
of the ýiiiAysis so far. Such an omission seems to be a serious weakness of the 
coiih-acting specification assumed in Taylor's model. In Chapter 3 we have 
employed the structure of the wage contracting specification and showed thM, 
relative wage concern could be the source of the observed inflation inertia. 
H(, i-(, Nve ýiiiii at ýi further aiiýA, N/, sis of the dynamic general equilibrium features 
of our model. 
NN"(, keel) our analytical framework as close as possible to those of the pre- 
vious, st udics which ha, -\-(,, highlighted the weaknesses of the Taylor contractim, 
\1 and A,; (arl [1997]. By incorporating relative specificAlon, namely CKM. F'- 
WWI(, ('011CO1.11 ill that fraillework, we try to (-ýipture the spirit of the original 
work bv Tivlor it \\-ýls almed iit relative \viil(-, )e considera- 
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tions. Our analysis should then be seen ýis a first step towýirds assessing how 
crucial the omission of relative wage concern is for the analytical and quaii- 
titýitive results of CKNI. In particular, the aim of the chapter is the scýirch 
for ivasollable values of the relative wage concern parameters. 
(', ()ntra, ry to previous studies., the quantitative version of the model pro- 
vl(l(,,,, strong support, for the existence of a powerful contract multiplier. Two 
features of the model strengthen the importance of our result. Firstly. the 
wage contracting specification is the only mechanism through which the ef- 
f(, (-t,,, of nominal shocks are propagated in our model. We refrain from in- 
t-n)(hicing cýipltal accumuLition. adjustment costs, input-output structure, 
endogenous ium-k-ups. or any other possible factor which inay enhance the 
nominal propagation mechanism derived here. Secondly, ýis in previous anýil- 
y,,, (,,,, of staggered wage setting, our results also highlight the potential role 
of high interteniporal elasticities of substitution of consumption and labour 
supply in fa\-()i-iiig persistence, but by no ni. cans rely on them to generate a 
sllhstantiýll (legive of persistence. This latter point is evident from our ca, li- 
bnition (-xercise. Notwithstanding these features of the model. we find that 
output, persistence Is a likely outcome. 
for the. sharp contrast between our results and those of 
Cl\-ý I call he obtailled bY comparing a log- linearis atim i of our contract- 
ill" (I(Illation t he'll. ". A key difference is the elasticity of Nvýwcs with respect 
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to busilless cycle (-()iiditions. Relative wage concern on the part of wm-kers 
lowers that elasticity. The calibrýition of the parameters, governing relative 
wafl)e Cons i der at ions genemtes a powerful contract multi 1 and thus sub- 
stýintlal persistence in both inflation and output. 
The remainder of the chýipter is organized &ý follows. In section 2 Nve 
present, our model. We study the analytical implicýitioiis of relative wage con- 
cern in section 3, and compare our findings to previous studies of staggered 
wage/price models. We then proceed to analyse the quantitýitive implica, - 
tions. Section 5 describes the calibration of the model and reports our sim- 
uLition ivsults. This analysis is extended in sections 6 and 7, that consider, 
,. (ý, ýJ)ecý, tlvejv, sensitivity of the results to the callbratlon of the key parameters 
aild the definition of the relative wage agents are concerned with. Finally, 
Section 8 suminerises the inain conclusions. 
4.2 Relative Real Wage Concern and Stag- 
gered Wage Setting 
TIw purpose of this chapter is to analYse the implications of the omission of 
roliltive Nvýlllw for the recent research that lias questioned the power 
,,, -0 t Ing to -encrate I)er-, I, -,, t(, iit real effects of money slwcks. Of týI NN ýI 
The inodel presented III this chilptel. Is a stralgllfonvýlnl e:, "tell"Iml to the 
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model introduced in the previous chapter. The most important differences 
are the following: (i) our benchmark definition of the relative wage the agents 
are concerned with; (ii) the fact that we consider four period contracts and 
four sectors, instead of just two. We however describe it in detail again to 
allow the reader to proceed to this chapter without constant, references to 
the material presented in previous one. 
Wage setting in our model is defined by two features: (i) staggered wage 
setting; (ii) relative real wage concern. 
(i) Staggered Wage Seffing 
This setting is standard in the related literature. The economy is divided 
into N sectors. Each sector is composed of the industries indexed by i 
[0,11N] and their corresponding unions (indexed by j)'. Wage contracts, 
denoted by X, are negotiated in nominal terms, and are fixed for N periods. 
That, is, for a, union setting the nominal wage in period t, 
Xjt+k Xjt 
for k=0,... N - 1. Furthermore, unions indexed jC [0,1 IN] set their wages 
in periods 0, N, 2N, unions indexed 3C [11N, 21N] do so in periods 1, 
N+ 1) 2N + 1, etc. Note that staggered wage setting breaks the complete 
symmetry among households in different sectors. However, unions belonging 
1 continuum of industries means that no imperfectly competitive agent is 'large' 
relative to the economy as a whole. The ' ho i isehold- union' should be taken as an aggregate 
of all the households who work oil the industry, who implicitly collude in the wage setting 
decision. 
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to the same sector will set the same wage'. Thus, in any period t there are 
N different contracts in effect. 
(ii) Relahve Real Wage Concern 
Taylor's model was aimed at incorporating relative wage concern on the 
part of the workers. However, we have showed in chapter 2 that, his con- 
tracting specification is analytically equivalent to a model in which workers 
are concerned only about the level of their own real wages. Chapter 2 also 
presents some evidence that suggests that relative wage considerations play a 
fundamental role in the wage setting process. Then, the two questions of in- 
terest for our purpose here are how to introduce relative wage concern in the 
model and how to define the reference wage index to model it analytically. 
With respect to the first question, taking support on the evidence pre- 
sented in chapter 2, we model relative wage concern by including an ad- 
ditional argument, in the utility function of the representative household. 
Despite the available empirical evidence on unions' behaviour, and sociolog- 
ical and psychological considerations, our introduction of relativities in the 
Let us call the new wage set in period t in industries iC [0,11N] , Xt. Then, unions 
indexed jE [11N, 21N] will set their new nominal wage in period t+1, unions indexed 
iE [21N, 31N] will set their new nominal wage in period t+2, and so on. There- 
fore Xt, Xt+N, Xt+2N ... are the wages 
fixed by the sector which comprises industries i 
E [0,11N], Xt+l , Xt+l+N, 
Xt+1+2N 
... the wages fixed by the sector that comprises indus- 
tries iE [11N, 21N] and so on. 
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utility function may be seen as an ad hoc unjustifiable short-cut. However, 
by introducing relative wage considerations explicitly we aim at: (i) identify- 
ing the analytical implications of relative wage concern in wage setting; (ii) 
establishing whether sensible values of the key parameters governing relative 
wage concern can explain output and inflation persistence. We can then ýis- 
sess how crucial the omission of relative wage concern is for the analytical 
and quantitative results of CKM. 
We now turn to the definition of the reference wage. We denote the 
relative wage argument in the utility function of the representative household 
CCCPPý 
J, RWt'. Following FM', we define the contract prZce M period s, s as 
the value of the contract signed by the union j in period s. To clarify the 
definitions note that in this subsection we use the index t to refer to the 
period in which the real wage comparison takes place. s instead refers to the 
period in which the contract is signed. Recall that for a union setting the 
nominal wage in period s, Xs+k =: X. for k=0,... N - 1. Workers compare 
the value of the contract they sign in period s, that is CP,, to the index of 
contract prZces "V". Crucial to the modelling of the relative wage concern is 
311, what follows we keep the notation as close as possible to that of FM. The definition 
of our benchmark case corresponds to their Theoretically Preferable Case. Section 4.7 
introduces two alternative specifications as part of our sensitivity analysis for the main 
results of the chapter. We also present a brief comparison of our inodel with FM's one in 
Section 4.3. 
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the choice of the reference wage index for comparison purposes. We define 
Vt as the average of the contract prices of the workers in the other sectors in 
effect in period t, that is, the average of the contracts negotiated by the other 
unions. We believe this "outward comparison" specification to be the most 
relevant in the real world. ' Thus, RWtj is defined as the ratio between the 
value of the contract in force for union j in period t to the index of contract 
prices signed by the other sectors and still valid in period t. 
At any period t there are N different contracts in effect, therefore N 
different CP, and N different, RW/ , one 
for each representative sectorial 
union. Consider the problem faced by a union that sets the nominal wage 
in period t and assume that the contract lasts for four periods (N - 
The decision of the union then takes into account that by setting X, it also 
fixes CP, for the next four periods (hence, we have indexed it by s). The 
optimal X, is thus set by comparing the current price contract the union is 
negotiating (that, is CP, ) to the indexes of real contract prices V in effect 
in periods t to t+3. The RW the workers will face in period t and in the 
following three periods as a result of the wage they negotiate in t are then 
'The term "outward comparison" follows a recent work by Carrol et al. [1997]. Its 
purpose is to highlight the absence of own variables in the deffiiition of the reference stock 
for comparison purposes. Specifically, in our setting the "own contract price" does not 
enter the definition of the index of contract prices to which it is compared in the bargaining 
process. 
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RWt'= (cpiaý - cp, RWi'+ I= 
(cp. cp, 
Vt (113)(CP, 
-3+CP, -2+CPs-1) 
Vt+l) (1/3) (CPs-2+CPs-l+CP., +I) 
CPI (CP. ) - CPI RW' t+2 = 
(VI- 
RW 
+2 ýVt+3) (1/3) (CP,, -l+CP,, +l+CP., +2)) 
t+3 (1/3) (CP, +I+CP, +2+CP, +3) 
Note that, because of the "outward comparison" specification, the Vt 
terms are not just updated symmetrically in the four periods of duration of 
5 the contract. 
We suppose that the workers are concerned with their average real wage 
over the life of the contract. Accordingly CP is defined as the money wage 
deflated by a weighted average of the price level in the four periods in which 
the contract lasts. Hence: CPt = XtIPt, where 
p 
t +OR t+j + 
02 Pt+2 +03 Pt+3 
Pt 
1+0+02+03 
Agents therefore calculate the average Pt by discounting the future price 
levels by the preference discount factor 0. They then compare the value of 
their contract, i. e. CPt, with an average of the ones that overlap with it, 
that is 
cpt = 
xt 
RWt 
Xt/pt 
(1/3) 
Xt-3 
+ 
Xt-2 
+ 
Xt-1 
(T 
t-3 
-p 
t-2 
T; 
t-I 
ý'Future variables are replaced by their expected values. We drop the expectation 
operator for convenience. Note also that the RW terms axe different for each household- 
union in different sectors, depending on the period in which they set their wage. 
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We, present two alternative formulations for RIT't, in section 4.7. 
4.3 The Model 
136 
There are three types of agents in our model economy: firms, households and 
the government. The economy consists of a continuum of industries indexed 
by 71' E [0,1], and a continuum of industry-specific unions. EverY indiistrY 
produces a, differentiated perishable product and comprises a continuum of 
firms. The goods market in every industry is hence competitive. All house- 
holds have the same preferences. Household J consumes a, composite good. 
defined by a CES index over consumption goods of each industr, y, i. e. 
0 1 0-1 -i 
Ct dz] Ciit 
The chisticity of substitution ainong goods, 0, is assumed strictly greater 
than ()ii(,. This specificAlon --lves rise to the standard demand function 
Ciit Pi t-0 ý"jt 
Pt, 
1 
Pt 
(4.1) 
is liouseliold's total nominal expenditure on goods. and Pf is the 
1 
1-0 
w,, n .. Me price iil(l(, x deffiled ýis Pt Pit di 
I* 4.3.1 F irms 
All firins, luive the smiw techiiolon-, (mven hy V. -liere labour is the I -ý. ýý It = () 
L 'it, N\ 
onlY [ýwtoi- of production. Firins within each iii(histry (in, price týikers both 
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in the goods and the labour market. Profits are maximised period by period 
given I he nominal wage Xt , set 
by the sectorial union. The labour demand 
and output of firm Z are given by 
I X", U-1 I xlt a-I 
Lit, =-- 
I 
(), (T Pi 1, 
Yit = o' 
I 
WT Pit 
(4.2) 
Inip), sing the equilibrium condition in the goods market, given by 
1 
Cit C. jitdi' = Yit Vz c [0.1], (4-3) 
yields the following relation between the Libour demand mid the nominal 
wage 
L Kt, -N-, T' where 
0 
(T + (I - (T)o 
Xt 
and Kt = (Tý 
(4.4) 
The labor demand function faced by the monopolistic union in each indus- 
ti-Y exhibits a, collstalit nioiiey-wýige, elasticity equal to E., Nvhich depends on 
tedinology and preference parameters. Kt is parametric to the union, which 
1 
takes iiggivgýitc wiriAles ýis given (Nt = fý Xjtdj = aggregate nominal ex- 
peilditill, c). 
4.3.2 Households 
The two fun(Liniental features, of the households' behaviour are their monopoly 
ill 110iiiiiial \výwc ýcttino and their concern with relative 
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The industry-specific household-unions enjoy monopoly power because 
labour is not allowed to move across industries. In period t the household 
maximises a utility function of the form 
00 
U 
j= Et 
E, 3k [U (ct+k 
, rnt+k, 
Lt+k, RWt+k)] (4.5) 
k=O 
The arguments in the utility function Ct+k, 'rnt+k and Lt+k are, respectively, 
the consumption of the composite good, the end-of-period real money bal- 
ances and the labour supply of the households. ' The specification of the 
relative wage argument RWt+k is the novelty of the chapter and has been 
discussed in Section 4.2. The utility function satisfies u RW 
H ýý* 01 URWRW 
H<0- 
The household's budget constraint evolves according to 
PtCjt + M3t + 1: Q(st" I st)Bj(st+') < Mjt-l + Bjt + WjtLjt + lljt + Tjt 
St, +i 
(4-6) 
where Q (s'+' I s') is the stochastic discount factor equal to the money value of 
a contingent claim in state s' to one dollar in state s'+l -7 Mjt denotes money 
holdings at the end of period t, Bjt the quantity of bonds in period t, Tjt the 
'The utility function satisfies the standard conditions u, (. )>O, U? n(*)>O, UL(*)<Oi 
Ucc(')<O, U? n.? n(')<O) ULL(*)<O) where u, (t) denotes the first partial derivative of the in- 
stantaneous utility function and u,, (-) the second, with respect the argument r. 
7 Following CKM, let st, denote the state of the world in period t. Denote with Pr(st+1 I 
the probability that in the next period the state of the world will be s'+', conditional to 
t-1 the state q in period t. To lighten notation and avoid indexing each variable with respect 
the state of the world, -, N-e use the expectation operator and the dating of the variables. 
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nominal luinp-, siiiii transfer received bY the household from the government. 
1-1 t the profits distributed by firms and Ljt Up the labour income. .1 
Households maximise their expected lifetime utility subject to the , (, - 
quence of budget constraints (4.6), the sequence of labour demand curves 
and the additional constraint that the nominal wage will be fixed for 
N periods. Their choices mv the level of consumption, the quantities of 
money and bonds transferred to the next period and the level of the noin- 
iiial wage tliýit must, be fixed for N periods. The first-order conditions for 
that problem can be expressed as follows (the indexj is dropped to lighten 
notation) I 
'"Itil, (t) 
- 
Rt -1 (4-7) 
llc(t) Rt 
Uc(t + 1)Pt (4.8) 
Pt, +i 
o t+l t 
OEt(At+, ) Uc(t + I) pt, 
Rt 
(4.9) s18 At 
3Et 
( 
uc(t)pt, +l 
,,, 
Pr(s" where Ot is whatever varl Then. Ot = (-)(s') and El (0ý-) =7 iable or 
f, 111(. tIon ()f, ,k is, the st,, ite in period k>t and the sum is calculated on all the 
flifure, st; ltes S 
A. 
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N- 1 or (-UL(t+r)Kt+, 
xt 
Et-, [Er=o 
N-1 or uc(t+r)Kt+r Et-, [Er=o Pt+, 
xc+l Et-, N-1 URW (t +) o9RW(t+r) E-1 
[I: 
r=o axt 
N-1 or uc(t+r)Kt+, Et-, [Er=o Pt+r 
)l 
where At is the multiplier attached to the budget constraint in period t. 
The first three equations are standard: (4.7) represents the optimal choice 
between consumption and money; (4.8) is the Euler equation for consumption 
and (4.9) gives the gross nominal interest rate Rt. 8 
Equation (4.10) gives the nominal wage set by the monopolistic household- 
union for N periods. Firstly, note that we assume the wage to be set before 
the realisation of period t shock, hence based on t-1 information set. That 
expression is composed of two terms. The optimal wage is given by a fixed 
mark-up E& - 1) over the quantity in the curly brackets, which is the ratio 
between expected weighted averages of the marginal disutility from (hours 
of) labour supply and the marginal utility of consumption over the next 4 
periods. In other words, the first component is a weighted average of the 
optimal flexible wages (without relative wage concern) of those periods. The 
second term is an expected weighted average of the concern for the relative 
8Note that Et. +, Q(s'+' I q') is the current value of a nonUnal bond that gives one 
unit of nioney for sure in the next period. On the other hand, Q(st+l I s') = OPr(s'+' 
st) 1'('(s1+1ý, 
P))is the current price of a claim of one unit of money contingent on the ( 
71 (' (t) P (s +' 
realisation of state qt+' in the next period. 
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resulting from the contracts in effect over the next 4 periods. The 
are defined by /3., Kt, -, - 
Pt+i and E-ý' 
4.3.3 Government 
The role of the government is limited to provide the lump-suni transfers 
through which money is introduced in the economy. These transfers satisfY 
Tt = Ht - At, -l 
and the nominal money supply process is described by 
A It, = /it Mt -i 
wherc p.,, follows a. stocliýishc process (to be specified below). 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
The resource coustraint for this econonly is obtained by aggregating (4-6) 
over all houseliolds and imposing equilibrium conditions on the money and 
boild itim-kets 
11 
Pt C. j t (11' < (TV tLjt + fljt)dj (4.13) 
io 
'Given (4.10), note that it is ex-po, ýt optimal for the unions to satisfy an unexpected 
111cren'se ill I'aboul. demand. Households are obviously ex-post Nvilling to ,,, ýitisfv extrn de- 
inand for labour initil the real wage Is equal to the competitive one. In what follows we 
flult to he the (-, use. The fact that employment is alwaYs on the labour 
delimild curve is lience con. sistent with optimisation in this case, in contrast to the old 
stN, 
I(, 
Grm--Fisclier-Ti. vlor models ill which the ivýige Nvis set ill accordance ývith a týir, -(, t 
level Him cleared the labour market ill expcctýitioit. 
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while flie equilibrium condition on goods markets (4.3) implies 
PtClt(li' Pityit(II, = PtYl, 
where 
0 pity? 'tdi Yt, - Pt, 
= ct 
is ivA aggregate output, defined ýis in national income accounting. 
Ali equilibrium for this economy is (1(,,, (-i-ibed by ýi vector of allocýitjoiis 
I Cjt 
I Mp, Bjt, Xt-Aý, Ljt, Yit, Pt,, Pt,, Yt, Rt ,Q 
(s'+' I st) I for k=0, ---, N- 
I such that: (i) taking other sectors' variables and aggregate variables as 
given, consumer allocations solve the consuiller's problem Vj. that is, (4.7), 
(4.8)ý (4.9) and (4.10) hold Vj: (ii) taking the nominal wage ýis given, firms' 
output, and labour deniand inaximise profits according to (12) and (4.4); 
(111) t-he transfers and the inone. y supply process sýitlsf. v (4.11) and (4.12); 
(Iv) the re'source constraint (4.13) and the goods market equilibrium ((4.3) 
mid (4.14)) ýav satisfied. 
To solve for the model d. vimmlc, ý, l Nvc 
first, calculate the deterministic 
of the model. We then apply Blanchard- Khan [1980] niethodol- 
to the log-linearised model around that steady state. 
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4.4 Analytical Implications'of Relative Wage 
Concern 
In this section we provide some intuition on the how relative wage, considera- 
tions may influence both the output, and the inflation persistence properties 
of staggered wage setting. 
4.4.1 The "-y-puzzle" 
A crucial property of the wage setting equation postulated by Taylor is the 
dependence of wages on business cycle conditions. We have already high- 
lighted this feature in Chapter 2. There we show that persistent real effects 
of nioneN, shocks require slow adjustment of nominal N, -ýAr`bles to output filic- 
tuations. Since output levels feed back directly into the wage contrm-fing 
equation. it immediately follows that fluctuations of output will have ýi small 
linpýict ou prices if and only if the elasticity of wages with respect to output, 
Mi, vlorýs -ý, is low. Early authors have estimated this parameter from macro- 
da, O. For the US, Ta, vlor [19801)] estimates -y to be between 0.05 and 0.1. 
w1lile Sachs [1980] estimates it to be between 0.01 and 0.07. In his numerical 
Inve"t1ý2)-iltion of persistence properties of Taylor's [1980a] model. West [1988] 
11'ses tNN'() p "'Sible výllllcs, for ý: 0.01 and 0.1. More recentlY. Plialieuf [19901 
t; ik(,,,,, estiniated vnhics for 7, for Canada. G'erinany. lfýily, VX mid US. He 
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finds -y to lie b(ýtween 0 and 0.. -)2 and hence Ambler and Phaneuf [1992] cal- 
jhrme -ý --= 0.15. Jeýmiw [1997] siigý, -, )ests that -, should 
lie betweeli 0.05 and 
0.2. These results a value for -y around 0.1, -\vhich is cousistent with 
the existence of ýi contract multiplier. 
Recent research incorporating staggered wa, ges/prices into a, DGE frame- 
work, notably CKM and Ascarl [1997]., has opened the "bla, ck box- of the 
ad hoc parameters in the wage seffing equation. Log-liiwýirlslilg- the FOC 
for wage setting around ýi deterministic steady-stýite with constant money 
supply (1-t = 1) and constant returns to scale to labour ((T= 1). the para. m- 
eter -y is found to be determined by the elasticities of the marginal utilities 
of c(msumption with respect to consumption, i. e.. q,., and of Libour with 
1-(""Pe(ý't to la'1)Ollr' 1*('** 'ýLl I)oth eva, lua, ted at stcady state. For example, 
;i log-linem-PsAlon of the present model with (-In additively separable utility 
function in all its m-guments and without relative wage concern gives'() 
- T/ 
ý77L 
f-IlL 
(4.15) 
iI 
(liven the existing evidence from inicrodata on the intertemporal elastim- 
ties of substitution of consumption (-IITI, ) aýnd of labour supply 
;i sciisible calibrAion of (4.15) gives a value of -y far too high to generate 
"'The pre,, ent niodel without the relative wa-, e concern terin coincides exactly ývltli 
A, scnrl's ý1997] model. Ascýirl [1997] for an exhaustive analysis of the pers'st("'('(' 
properties of such a niodel. 
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persistence. " As a, conclusion, the calibrAion of -y Imsed on well-establislied 
(, videiice from niicro(hitýi is at odds with all the empirical estlinates from 
macrodafýi. This, is what Nve call the "-y-puzzle" 
4.4.2 Effects of Relative Wage Concern 
Cým our model solve the "-y-puzzle""? We argue that this is the (-; ise. The 
intuition Is as follows. A negative q, determines ýi "following" behavi 1 iour 
in wage setting. 12 Suppose ýi negative shock to the rate of growth of money. 
Agents want to keep their real wage in line with the existing ones. Under 
it, gencrates ýi slower a, ýjustment in nominal variables, that is, a 
of (-ndogc'nous stickilicss, which allows for persistence of the ivýd effects 
of money shocks. In short, relative real wage concern lowers the sensitivity 
of nominal variables to the business cycle conditions. 
The intuition can be, forma, lised as follows. Let the utility function be 
scjmrýihle in all its arguments and the RWt, term be linear in Xt. Then, 
log-1111(, ýIrisiiig Hie iv'sulting wage setting rule around the steady-state with 
"A loiv intertemporal clasticitY of substitution of labour supplY ineans that a substantial 
incrense in wnL, ýes is required for workers to supplY more labour. This makes the inarginal 
s cost to filst 'Ifter n ilioiley shock, puslies tip the noininal variables and 
dampen, 
)('1'H1t (I((. 
12 Chirk and Osw; d(l [19901)ý, - 11RIV represents the elasticity of the marginal titility 
111.11 ive wage term. of the rehative term ill the utility function with respect to the relati 
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the (Iusticit. v of -", ýig)es with respect to output is 
-'71L - 77C q+ 77C 
umv(-) 
E77 
L+Iý[ 
671L + -E 
UL H I'ýt Xt 
[771m, + 67] r, "RIO*t 
E71L +1 -6 
UL (. ) Kjý, Xtýý-'] 
It is the immediately evident th(it is decreasing in the absolute value of 
11R, * The 
first term in curly brackets in the numerator corresponds to the -, 
arising from staggered wages, Le., (4.15). In our model, it is complemented by 
additional terins incorponiting the marginal utility of the relative wage ferin, 
Ul,,,, (. ), and its own elasticity Tl,,,,. The inconsistenc. N, of the microfounded 
wage setting equations and the empirical estimates can then be solved. For 
thisl the presence Of (-T/,,,,, ) increasing the denominator of the expression is 
(. 1-116A, ýIs it, lowers tll(' sensitivity of wages to the business cycle conditions. 
allows for endogenous stickiness and thus makes output persistence a, likely 
()uk-()nw. Its quailtitative implications are the focus of the remaining sections 
of the chapter. 
4.4.3 A Comparison to FM Specification 
This scction completes the description of the analytics of the model by de- 
riviii- t1w full log-linearisation of the money-wa, ge setting rule. Our log- 
linearised model is somehow (-I(),; e to the FM contract equation. Hence, a 
brief comparison between the two at ions ckirific,, further the driving 
f*()i, (-(,,,, behind the model. Morem-el'. the lollý)-lillearl"ed equation 
tli; lt we Obtain will ph. v a fundamental role for the calibration of the 
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i-(! I,, Itlv(, wag(ý parameters in Section '-). 
We imnimeterise the iiistmitmwoiis utility function by 
L, RW In bC" + (I - b) 
IL'+ 
pT 
(4.17) 
Note that the crucial T7 is simply equal to (--F) in our formulation. 
A log-linearisation of (4.10) a, round thestcad. v state ývlth-p =I and 13 
then yields 
333 
Elpt+i F Et, (7, t+l - cpt) + -y- Etyt+7 (4.18) 444 
i=O i=O 
where lower case, letters denote log-deviations from steady state values and 
01(6- 1) [1+E(e-1)] -(kE ; ]F = 
0(-r-1) 
.= 
0-(E-1) [O+E(e- 1)] -OeE 
U(E- 1) - Or(E-1) ' 
ýy 
- Oo-(E-1) 
Q represents the weight oil the own real wage, F weights the relative wage 
concern and -y cýiptures the sensitivity of the nominal wage with respect, to 
the business cycle conditions, exactly as in Taylor's model. " The crucial 
noveltY of the inodel is the presence of the relative wage concern weighted by 
IF in the setting rule. Traditional staggered wage models, like Taylor 
[1980a], and Ascarl [1997], nistead inipose F=0. 
Iv setting rule could be thought ýis a microfounded ()in- log-linearised walo, 
versdon of that of F-M. They present and estimate an ad hoc "... ('011 tal ctilq] 
hich ayco/, 'ý (11-c conccroc(l w1th rco/ llwgcs. Mot 's dofo modc/. /o it, I 
'"Forstandard paninicter A aild F ; 11. (, lion-lic""ative. 
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conststent" (FM, abstract). In FM, agents set nominal wages such that, CP 
equals the average real contract price index expected to prevail over the life 
of the contract, adjusted for excess demand conditions, that is 
3 
cpt fi Et (7)t+i + -yyt+i) (4.19) 
i=O 
Since, given the definition of the contract price in our model, cpt xt 
1 1: 3 
4 j=0 Etpt+i , we can rewrite equation (4.18) as 
-IF313 cpt 4 Q+F 
1: Etq)t+i +4QE Etyt+i (4.20) 
i=O i=O 
which looks very much alike FM's formulation (4.19). 
Note that there are two important differences between our microfounded 
wage setting equation and the one of FM. " First, FM define the vt+j terms 
as the average of the existing real contract prices including the real contract 
price of the sector currently negotiating the wage. As explained in Section 
4.2, we believe that our outward comparison better replicates actual relative 
wage concern. Second, the coefficient on the sum of vt+j is not necessarily 
equal to unity in our model. Put differently, for equation (4.20) to match 
FM's formulation we need to impose Q=0. This implies: (i) setting the 
14 A third minor difference highlights the additional insights obtained from microfoun- 
dations. FM impose the weights fi to be decreasing linearly and estimate the slope pa- 
rameter. Instead, without imposing, 3 = 1. in our model the equivalent to the fi terms are 
decreasing and have a very intuitive interpretation: they depend naturally on the discount 
factor 0. 
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own real ývýio(,, cmicern equal to zero 7 
(11 ) imposing a ()li(, -to-one following 
beliýiviour in wage setfing, since ýi 1% change in v, +, then leads to a I'X 
change in CPt,. 
4.5 Quantitative Implications of Relative Wage 
Concern 
4.5.1 Model Calibration 
We set mie period equal to one quarter and we ýissuinc that colitnicts last 
for onc year (N = 4). The nite of growth of nioney is asý, uniecl to follow the 
stochastic process 
In Itt =p In pt-I + (I - p) In 71 (4.21) 
where ý is a normally distributed i. l. d. mean zero shock -with staii(hrd devi- 
1 15 
ýitioii (iý. Following CKAI. we calibmte 7! = 1.064 and p=0.57. 
Since households cýiii exchange contingent claims, they perfectly insure 
theillselve", against fluctuations in income by pooling resources. They will 
"Snice mv Just interested in the persistence properties of the inodel, we nctually 
fociv, oid. y on impulse fillictiolis to 111011(-. N- shocks. Hence, the standard deviatioll 
of the 1.; It(, of of proccss (toes not play aii. v role. In addition, iii what follows. 
Nve cnlibnae the model w,, closely as possible to to allow for a comparison with their 
re's II Its. 
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therefore attain the same marginal utilitY of consumption in every period. 
Given (4.17), they will eqj*oy the same level of consumption and real 
babi nces in each period. M()i-e()ver., given (4.17), (4.7) implies the following 
money denia, nd equation 
In 
b 
+III Ct - III 
Rt -1 (4.22) 
Pt, b) 
which is identical to equation (43) in CK'M. Following CKNI, we use Nhinkmv 
ýaid Summers" [19861 money demand regressions, and obtain v=- 17.52 and 
b=0.73. 
The parameter c determines the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply 
[1981] suggests c = 4.3, -",, hile Pencavel's [19861 
estimations place c between 3.2 and infinity. We callbrýitc c=6 (which 
implies a, small intertemporal elasticit. v of substitution of labour supply of 
0.2). 
For the discount fiictor ýNv choose the standard value from business cycle 
liteniturc. i. (,. ý3 = 0.96 - 
ýV(, interpret our production function as a short- 
run production function where the level of capital is fixed. Hence, the labour 
shmv of output, i. e. (T. is set equal to 0.67. Following Hairault and Port, ier 
[1993], wo (-Mibrate 0=6.1" Finally vve calibrate o (which iý, just a scaling 
fiwtoi- in this inodel) snch tImt aggTegate output is equal to one. 
"'Tll(, l, (, is lio parameter corresponding to our 0 in CN-M. Siiwe they use a ('Eý functioll 
ns teciniolop- for producing final goods from lilt erinediat e -oods. it follows that their CES 
11ý 11,1 1011 111 Input parmiletei, I, n technolon- parameter which 
the elasticity of suhstitut- 
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4.5.2 Calibration of the Relative Wage Concern Pa- 
rameters 
Crucial for the analysis are the values of the parameters of the relative wage 
cmicern argument, in the utility function, i. e. 0 and T. To our knowledge, 
there are no microestimates in the labour literature for these paraineters. We 
i Ims proceed as follows. 
Traditional staggered wage models (as Taylor [1980a], CKAI or Ascýiri 
[1997]) impose F=0. rhe empirical evidence reviewed in Chapter 2 histead 
sugge, sts thýd, wage setting, hellaviour is better characterized bY strong follow- 
ing behaviour and almost pure relative wage considerations, with the level 
of oNvii real wage playing a minor role, if any A all. We therefore impose 
Q=0 and employ the estimates in FM to calibrate 0 and -r. Specifically, 
froin equation (4.20). ýNvc use the colistraint Q == 0 to pin down then use 
FM's estiniate of -y =0.00109 to determine T. 17 NVe obtain a value for 0 of 
0.76.1' However the value of T implied by the cstiniate of FM is sky-high, 
dellialld. 
výiIiies ýirc extremely low and oilly marginally significant: the t-ratio for their 
Theoretic, illy Preferable S peciti ca t 101, (the equivalent to our belichinark cise) is 1.54. For 
their Shliplified (equivalent to our B iii the appelidix) -f = 0.00435 and the 
t-ratio I -,, 2- "') - 
"The swa(tv state of the model imposes an tipper bound on the value of 0 equal to 
= 0.84. otlienvise the nominal watge is iwý,,, atlve. 
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Figure 4.1 Benchma'rk Case, 1% Money Shock: Output and inflation. 
843.9689, (b = 0.7588. 
equal to 844!!. 
With T= 844 the model generates a ridiculous degree of persistence, 
as Figure 4.1 shows. The level of output remains unrealistically below its 
steady state value for more than 60 periods. However, FNI estimates of -y are 
-ian the results from the empirical literature discussed substantially lower tl 
in Section 4.4.1. Moreover, coming from macrodata, they are likely to pick 
iip all the persistence in the output process. Recall that ý, measures the 
sensitivit,. v of wages to business cycle conditions. An alternative piece of 
cvideiwe on that sensitivit. v, not directly linked with the persistence of output, 
-I 
II 
-- 
is provided by Blancliflower and Oswald [1994]. Thcy estimate the effects of 
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imemployineiit on wýiges iising microclata from household statatistic. s. Their 
(,,,, tllnýites, for more than 10 industriallsed countries, are c()lisi,,, teiltl, v around 
in absolute value. We have shown in Section 4.4.2 that such v lue is a 
not ilicoillpitible With microfundations once relative ge concern is taken 
into m-. c()unt. So, we therefore consider as a benchmark case a value of ý 
equal to 0.1 and use it to pin downT. The implied value of T is 10.2. Table 
4.1 suininarizes the calibration of the model parameters. 
Table 4.1: Calibi-mod Paranieter Values 
Preferences 0 = 0-96ý' 71 = -17.52 ;b=0.73 ;0=6c=6 
Technology (T = 0.67 
Money Growth Process p i = 
1.064 
p=0.57 
Relative Wage Concern 0= 0.76 ; T= 10.2 
Section 4.6 some sensitivity ýinalysis with respect f() the calibra- 
tion of the relative wage concern parameters. 
4.5.3 A brief review of the empirical evidence on the 
effects of money shocks 
Before, pi-esentlul-I ma, (m, 11 s"IllatiOll res"Its. it might be useful to briefiv 
the re"lilts Obtained iii Ilic already výist empirical literature trying 
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to evaluate the dynamic effects of monetary shocks on some key economic 
variables. It should however be clear that reproducing all the effects that 
characterise the responses to money shocks is beyond the scope of our model. 
As mentioned before, our purpose is instead to assess whether the absence 
of relative wage concern in wage setting might be the reason why recent 
theoretical research, mainly CKM, has found that price/wage staggering is 
not enough to generate persistent effects in output and inflation following 
money shocks. Nonetheless, a brief look at the empirical evidence on the 
properties and magnitude of the degree of persistence that our model should 
aim at reproducing could be useful here. 
It should also be mentioned that, despite the substantial effort and the 
large number of papers devoted to the analysis of the effects of money shocks, 
the literature has not yet converged on a particular set of assumptions for 
identifying the effects of an exogenous shock to monetary policy. 19 Neverthe- 
less, there is considerable agreement about the qualitative effects of monetary 
policy in the sense that inference is robust across a large subset of the identi- 
fication schemes that have been considered in the literature. We will report 
the nature of this agreement, with respect to the effects on output as recently 
"The main source of controversy concerns the identification of the shocks to monetary 
policy themselves. The literature has explored three main general strategies for isolating 
monetary shocks. The interested reader can find a through description of the different 
strategies in Christiano et al. [1998]. 
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20 documented in Christiano et al. [1998]. The specific nature of this agree 
ment can be summarised as follows: after a contractionary monetary policy 
shock, short-term interest rates rise; aggregate output, employment, profits, 
and various monetary aggregates fall; the aggregate price level responds very 
slowly, and various measures of wages fall, albeit by a very modest amounts. 
In addition, there is agreement that monetary policy shocks account for only 
a very modest percentage of the volatility of aggregate output. Given our 
purpose of analysis, we will document here in greater detail the qualitative 
characteristics of the identified responses of output and inflation to mone- 
tary shocks obtained from multivariate VARs, the aim being to provide some 
benchmark to which evaluate the degree of persistence shown in the impulse 
responses we are about to present. 21 
With respect to output, regardless of the monetary policy instrument 
chosen (the federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, or total reserves) with 
2"The purpose of that paper is to document the current state-of-art of the empirical 
literature on money shocks, so the reader is referred to such a paper for an excellent 
review of the different approaches and the main recent contributions to this topic. 
" Given the large number of contributions on this literature, as can be seen from the 
multiple sets of impulse responses reported in Christiano et al. [19981 for the different 
identification schemes, we consider innaproplate to reproduce any responses based on a 
particular identifying scheme here. We refer the interested reader to that paper, and limit 
our comments to the qualitative features that we consider as robust in the sense that they 
hold regardless of the particular identifying strategy taken. 
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ýi short delýiy after the shock, there is a sustained decline in real GDP. Such 
ýt decline pi-esents, a severe. --hump shape" w,, also found in earlier litera- 
ture imposing different identifying schemes (see Blanchard and Quah [1989]. 
Cochrane [1994] or Cogley and Nason [1995]). The maximal decline occurs, 
roughly ýi year to ýi year and a half after the policy shock. Finally, output 
refurns to values similar to the initial ones after roughly 12 to 16 quarters. 
With respect to inflation. a more thorough analysis of the impulse rc- 
sponses of inflation has been presented in Yun [19961 and Nelson [1998]. The 
former paper uses a bivariate VAR, with output and inflation, and identifies 
money shocks under the i. ssuniption that such shocks do not have long-run 
effects on output. The reported impulse response of inflation to such shocks 
exhibits mt inimediateJump in the impact period, followed by a. graduýil re- 
turn to the initial value which losses statistical significance after roughly 10 
quarters (see 1). 349). Nelson [19981 highlights the inability of existing mod- 
els of noininal rigidities and optimising behaviour to reproduce two empirical 
regulaxitic, s involving solely, nominal variables: (1) the long la, g from monetary 
, eýrmvfll 
to 111flatioll: (11) the degree of inflation persistence. With respect to 
the lattei-. the author reports ýi first-order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.89. 
with Inglier-order autocorrelations remaining above 0.60 even at lag six (s(, (, 
Table 1 1). 305). That is. inflation exhibits considerable persistence. In fact. 
the resimilse of iliflation to a 1(/(, nionetary innovation. ciilciihited 
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from a hivariate VARsystem consisting of log AIt, (St. Louis Adjusted Mon- 
etary Base (new definition)) and log Pt, reaches a peak after 13 quarters. 
without returning to its initial value for more than 25 quarters. This repre- 
sents ýi degree of persistence impossible to match for the current generation 
of models of dynamic optimisation unless substantial restrictions are imposed 
on the ability of price/wage setters to reset their prices /wa PI)es - 
4.5.4 Simulation Results 
Figure 4.2 shows the impulse response functions for output and inflation, 
following a, 1% iwgýitiveshock to the rate of growth of money. Output jumps 
mi linpict, below its steady state value and the dynamics of ad . justment 
back 
to equilibrium then munics the liump-shaped response of output mentioned in 
the previous section. Pel-sistence both in output and inflation is substmitial. 
Specifically, the effects on output last for roughly 12 quarters. 22 Our analysis 
hence suggests that staggered wage setting together with a relative real wage 
coiicerii cail be ýi powerful mechainsin through which monetary shocks are 
propagated. Previous studies may have therefore failed to obtain output 
ing persistence after money shocks in a inicrofounded i-nodel with stiio, -(, ri 
because of their oversiniplified modelling of the ýNvage setting decisions. 
2"To measure the degree of persistence we take the quarter in which the log-(leviatioll 
of output from stcýidy st; it(, fillIs and renianis thereafter below 0.0. -)(, ''(' in absolute value. 
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Figure 4.2 BenchmaT* Case, 1% Money Shock: Output and Inflation. 
-r = 10.1884,0 -- 0.7588. 
These qiiantitative results show that both output and inflation persis- 
tence are a likely outcome in our framework. The aim of this chapter is to 
highlight the importance of the omission of relative wage considerations in 
wage setting for the findings of the recent literature that questions the exis- 
of a contract imiltiplier. It is then important to stress the robustness 
of our quantitative results. The two crucial elements of our approach are the 
specificntion of the relative wage argument, RIV. and the calibration of the 
p-iraineters governing the relative NýTage concern. ýVe present some sensiti-vity 
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ailalvsls in the next two sections. 
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4.6 Alternative Calibration of the Relative 
Wage Concern Parameters 
We here provide some sensitivity analysis of the two key paraineters 0 and -r. 
Our alin is to show that the results do not critica, lly depend on the 
calibration of these parameters, but, an, mainly due to the introduction of 
rehitive wage considerations in wage setting. This section also contr1butes to 
highlight the mechanisms at work in the model to generate persistence. 
4.6.1 Sensitivity of Persistence with respect to T. 
Figures 4.3,4.4 and 4.5 show the impulse response functions for values ofT 
of 31.63,19-38 and 5.59, corresponding to values of ý of 0.03,0.05 and 0.2 
respectively. Unsurprisingly, the degree of output persistence consistently 
decivases with T. With T- 31.36, the effects of money shocks on output 
(lie, mvay after 21 quaxters. ifT= 19.38 after 4 years and ifT= 5.59 after 9 
(IIIiIrf ers. 
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Figure 4.3 Benchmark Case, 1% Money Shock: Output and Inflation. 
-r = 31.6279,0 = 0.7588. 
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Figure 4.4 Benchmark Case, 1% Money Shock: Output and Inflation. 
T= 19.3767,0 = 0.7588. 
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Figure 4.5 Benchmark Case, 176 Money Shock: Output and Inflation. 
7 =: 5.5942,0 = 0.7588. 
In CKI\4's model: "the persistence propertzes of output are Inghly nonlin- 
ear Vn -y, so that increasing 7 to a small amount above 0.05 reduces persis- 
tence shaTply. [... ] even wtth values of -ý as low as 0.25 output movements 
are not ver7 pemstent. (CKM [1996], p. 15). Values of -y higher than y 
0.25 also decrease persistence in our model. Nevertheless, the perspective 
changes: even with values of y as high as 0.25, our staggered wage model is 
still able to generate output persistence. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, empir- 
ical estimates put 0.25 among the highest possible values for -y- CKM argue 
that only values of -y greater than one are compatible with sound microfun- 
dations in staggered wage models. However, that may not be necessarily the 
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ill Section 4.4.2. On the contntry. our model sug-est-, that 
ti-w1itional stao-ered wage models omit funclamental features of the 
2ý' 
setting. , ()nce the relative wage concern is incorporated, it solves the data 
inconsistency of microfoundedstaggered wage models with respect to the cal- 
i -at"on of -y. We further the relationship between and the keY , bl I 
parameter T. Figure 4.6 shows the trade-off between the N-Aues of -y and -r. 
This relationship is highly non-linea, r. It implies that fairly small departures 
from our benchmark parameter choices can increase persistence sharply. In- 
f- lation persistence is, on the other liand, not very sensitive to changes in T. 
The effects of inmicy shocks on inflation (lie away in all cýises after 10/12 
quarters. as in the Wsc c&w. 
4.6.2 Sensitivity of Persistence with respect to 0 
In the previous section, ývc set Q=0 in our wage setting rule and calibrated 
to he 0.76. However. our nioney-wage setting equation (4.18) incorpmites 
two cleilicilts: (1) the absolute real wage concern (weighted by Q): (11) the 
i-olative Nvage concern (weighted by F). In this section we anal. vse, the impli- 
In fiwt. some of the results they report are quite puzzling : "It tums out that Zf we 
a,,., mmc a labor , mpply clo,,; ficity large cnough to get -ý down to 0-00. tll(' modc/ ycllcratc-s 
c owput effcct., in thc 7mpoct pcriod. followitig a ., hock which raz, sc. s 
flic growth ratc of moncy upply by 1% after onc Ycor f .. 
] Output Of W(/,. " (CK-M 
16). This is instead not trile "I otir illodel. 
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Figure 4.6 -y - -r trade-off. 
cations of both relative wage and level of own real wage considera-tions for 
wage setting decisions. 
Recall that equation (4.18) can be written as (4-20). We consider two 
alternative cases. In the first case 17 = 3Q . The parameter on the, indexes 
of real wages in the other sectors Et,? )t, +i) in equation (4.20) above is 
equal 3/4. Thus, there is no more one-to-one fojjoýNTing behaviour: a 10% 
increase in the sum of the future indexes of real contract prices leads to a 
7.5% in the current contract price,, CP. The implied value for ý, ) in this cý. Lse 
on pers stence decrease to 9 quarters ( see F', -) is 0.62. Olitplit and inflati I imire 
1. holow). 
Ill the second ca-se we set 17 =: Q. There is then equal weighting of the 
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Figure 4.7 Benchmark Case, 11% Money Shock: Output and Inflation. 
-r = 10.1884,0 = 0.6192. 
absolute and the relative real wage considerations in NýTage setting. 
NOýN7 8, 
10% increase in the surn of the future indexes of real contract prices leads 
only to a 5% in the contract price, CP. The implied value for 0 in this uLsc 
is extremely low and equal to 0.2. PersIstelice in both InflatIon (2years) and 
output (7 quarters) decreases further (see Figure 4-8). 
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Figure 4.8 Benchmark Case, 1 1o Money Shock: Output and Inflation. 
10-1884,0 = 0.2032. 
Bot, h output, and infiat-, lon persist-, ellce t-Ilierefore, decrease wIth 0. The in- 
hiltion is simple. If Q-0 wage setting is mainly influenced by relative iArage 
considerations. Persistence is then a likely outcome. Yet, as Q increases, 
uote that we get back to Taylor's model, that we already know generates 
iwither output lior inflation persistence. 
4.6.3 Sensitivity of Persistence with respect to 
a 
A fiiiýd remark concerns thesensitivily of output, and inflation response to , T. 
Our ý4. vllsed production function should be taken as ;i short-run production 
fill, (.. t, loll where capital is fixed. We thus calibrate o, = 0.67. This implies 
(I-a) /(T-- 0.5. Hence ýi 1()(Y(, increase in ()iitl)iit, aut, omatically ](, ads to a 5% 
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increase in prices. llow(, ver, fiwtor hoarding and inventory stocks ina.,,, - limit 
the impa, ct of increased output on prices, leading to nearly constant returns 
to scýilc in the short-run, that is, (T-- 1. For illustrative purposes. Figure 4.9 
show,, t he impulse responses of output and inflation for (T = 1.21 
Inflation becomes much more sluggish: it peaks after 5 quarters and then 
gradually returns to its steady state level. As a, result. the shape of the 
impulse response function for output also changes: after 6 quarters froin 
the shock the economy would enter a, little expansion which peaks after 8 
quarters. This shows how this model can generate strong inflation persisteiice, 
III coliti-ast, to most lllollctýiry dynainic general equilibrium inacromodels (sev 
Nelson [1998]). 
4.7 Alternative Specifications of the Relative 
Wage 
W'(, here consider two additional definitions of the value of a contract and 
lience of R 11'. We also drop the distinction between the indexes s and t 
introduced before for explanatory purposes. ýVe highlight the differences on 
face(l 1). N, - the union j arising in these cases so we also drop the 
, -`III thi's c'A'se. smile viliws of the parameters change: -r = 10.67 (to keel) -, = 0.1) and 
o=4.2 (to keep Q= 0). N-ote that also the tipper value on r) changes, i. e. 0 is noNv equal 
to -i. s, ): t1w vnim, of (, 6 above is still (-oiisi,,, teilt. 
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Figure 4.9 Benchmark Case, 176 Money Shock: Output and Inflation. 
(T = 1, -r = 10.7,0 = 4.2. 
superscript J. 
4.7.1 Case A: Current Value Relative Real Wage Con- 
CeT-n 
In this case agents compare the real wage they earn in period t with the 
average of the real wages earned by the other workers Zn pertod t. Then 
all the nominal wages are deflated by the same price index Pt,. It follows 
that the price level cancels out in the definition of R. W, and we are left 
onl)- with nominal wages. Hence, in every period the wage- set t, behave a. s 
------------- 
comparing their "inoncy wage" with the "money Nvýige` of the ollicr 
CHAPTER4. RELATII'Ell-. AGECO, \'(EPiNI-VDSGE 
sectors. Then, 
CPI, 
= Xt ; ull", 
xt 
(113)(Xt-3 + Xt-2 + Xt-1) 
168 
4.7.2 Case B: Simplified Relative Real Wage Concern 
Workers care about the relative real wage unions manage to attain at the 
rwgofiýJion table. CP is therefore defined as the money wage deflated only 
by the aggregate price level in the period the wage was negotiated. that is: 25 
cpt, - 
xt 
R111"t = 
XtIpt 
Pt (1/3) 
XI-3 
+ 
Xt-2 
+ 
Xf-1 ( 
Pt-3 Pf-2 pt-I 
To sum up, in Case A workers are comparing their real wage period by 
period, in Case B they compare the real wage they manage to attain at the 
time they negotiated. In the case presented in the main text, our benchmark 
case, they instead compare their real wage over the whole life of the contract. 
-'Suppose a union negotiates in period t and succeeds to get a real w, -i--e XtIPt, in period 
t. Then, in the next period, i. e. t +I. another itillon will negotiate a new wage. This union 
does not, wmit, to leave the negotiation table with a real wage for that period lower than the 
mw negotiated List period I)v the previous union. In other words, the real wage the unions 
obt, "Aill ill the ile"lotiMioll is seen bY the lilembers as a sign of their bargaining power. This 
; iI)proach to the wap, har-mmin, ) process implies a cle-ree of nivopic behaviour froin the 
11111011 the wa-e contract Iuts four periods. Eveii if theoretical1v uns; ltisfilctory. this 
beli; ivlmiral hYpothesis: (1) Could be as a slinplified (-ýise of the oile considered 
III the 111,1111 text: (11) it, is prohahlY not far from actual unions' behaviour. 
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Figures 4.10 and 4.11 present the impulse response-, to a 1% money shock 
for these two additional cases. Case A (the Current Value Real ý, ý/age Con- 
exhibil's the lowest degree of output persistence equal to 11 quarters. 
Perslý"I, ellcc Increases to IS quarters in Ca. sc B (Illic Simplified Relative Real 
C() CC ýrlj)20 -k case. Iý, above that of our benchmai 
(D 
CD 
LD 
CD 
CP 
(D 
CD 
10 12 
y 
INF 
--- RGM 
14 16 
Figure 4.10 Current Value Relatt"ve Wage Concern, 11% Money Shock: 
-r == 10.1884,0 == 0.7588. 
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""After ten quarters, output actually lies above the steady s'tato. value. 
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Figure 4.11 Simplified Relative Real Wage Concem, Mo' Money Shock: 
-r = 10.1884,0 = 0.7588 
There is an intuitive reason for those differences. Case A implies the 
lowest order of dynamics in the model, since the price level is absent from 
CP. Agents look backward the same degree they look forward, but both these 
degrees are limited with respect to the two other cases. That is, substituting 
the definitions of CP and the equation for the price level" in equation (4.18) ý 
the highest lagged nominal wage termlS Xt-3, while the highest lead nominal 
wage term is -11, +3. The dynamics instead goes fi-om xt-6 
to Xt+3 in Case B 
in this section and frOM 34-6 
tO It+6 in the Theoretically Preferable Case 
presented in the main text. In fact, in the Simplified Case, the price level 
27 The log-linearised formula for the price level is pt y, + J: j'. O q'xt. -i where 
170 
i i(E-1 
it )/ 
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enters the specification of CP and hence, since Vt includes CPt, -3, 
Xt-6 enters 
equation (4.18). However, since future prices do not enter the specification of 
CPt7 Vt, 
+3 brings in only Pt+3 and hence -Ct+3 -In the theoretically preferable 
case, instead, agents are less myopic and CP includes future prices through 
p. It follows that N+3 depends on Pt+3 and hence -"ýt+6. To sum up, in Case A 
agents basically care about their relative nominal wages over the length of the 
contract and hence the order of the dynamics is limited with respect to the 
other two cases, since the price level does not enter CP. In Case B agents are 
only concerned about the real wage attained in the negotiation period and 
hence they myopically look backward more than they look forward. In our 
benchmark case agents instead compare relative real wages over the whole 
length of the contract and hence look backward the same degree they look 
forward. This implies a higher degree of inertia in Case B with respect to 
our benchmark case and hence an higher degree of persistence, as shown in 
the figures. 28 
2'Higher dynamics do not necessarily imply higher persistence. It mainly depends on 
the relative weights on backward zis forward looking variables. Hence, it seems that the 
relative weight of backward and forward looking variables is not the same in the three 
models. This suggests that the different specifications do not simply spread the same 
relative weights over higher order dynamics. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
Wý liýive reconsidered the presence of a contract multiplier ýis a potential nom- 
inal propigation mechanism in staggered wage economies. Recent reseýirch 
hws, questioned the existence of such a, multiplier because their microfounded 
staggered wage models have failed to generate persistence of the effects of 
nioney shocks oli output Mid inflation persistence. We built a, DGE model 
with staggered wage setting and relative real wage concern on the part of the 
workers and found that this combination of nominal and real rigidities geiier- 
ates a substantial amount of endogenous stickiness, even with a very inelastic 
iiii citemporal elasticity of labour supply. As a result, output and inflation 
pensi, stence m-e a likely outcome in our framework. lkforeover, our results 
show thA failing to account for this specific source of real rigidity might be 
an important weakness of previous staggered wage models, responsible for 
their negative results concerning output and inflation persistence. 
The relative wage concern on the part of workers is the key feature of the 
model. The notion of relative NNage concern is not new for economists. It 
býick (i long wýiy. iit leýist to J. M. Keynes. and has substantial support 
froin ciiipiric; il work. Introducing relative wage concern in the aii. AYsis places 
our work within the growing (, (-oiioini(, literature that drops the assumption 1ý 
of in(, thod()I(), -, l(, al individualism to explain some puzzles that standard eco- 
iloilil(- frailwwoi-k lins trouble with. The explicit account of relative 
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concern allows us to provide clear analytical insights of its effects and rely 
on a key parameter to assess the importance of its omission for the quanti- 
tative results of Chari et al. [1996]. Our analysis can be seen as a first step 
towards a deeper understanding of the effect of relative wage concern on the 
monetary propagation mechanism. 
Our analysis also highlights the mechanism by which our specific combina- 
tion of nominal and real rigidities contributes to the presence of endogenous 
stickiness. We analyse this mechanism by focusing on the elasticity of the 
wages with respect to the business cycle conditions, i. e., the famous param- 
eter -y in Taylor's wage setting rule specification. Only for relatively low 
values of that parameter does output persistence arise (in the order of 0.05, 
the benchmark Taylor's estimate). From a log-linearized version of the wage 
setting equation around a deterministic steady-state with constant money 
supply, CKM have proved the dependence of -y on the intertemporal elastic- 
ity of labour supply and intertemporal elasticity of consumption. According 
to well- established micro evidence, CKM calibrated, ý == 1.22 for their price- 
staggering model, in sharp contrast to numerous empirical studies that place 
it around 0.1. They conclude by discarding completely staggered wages as 
relevant propagation mechanism "'... because -y is necessarily greater than 1 ". 
In our staggered-wage model, from a log-linea-rized version of the wage set- 
ting rule once relative wage concern is introduced in the analysis, we instead 
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show thýil- -,, >, t is not 'ticccss(rnly the case. Nor are the estimated values 
of the empirical literýiture incompatible with sound microfoundations at all. 
High values of -,, ma. y well arise. however, from an oversimplified account of 
the wage setting decisions. 
Our model delivers a suhstýiiitia, l amount of persistence both in output and 
inflation. This result is very robust to different specifications of the inodel. 
Moreover, we derive a simple relationship between the key parameter and the 
value of -y. This reLitionship is highly non-linear. It implies that fairly small 
departures from our conservative parameter choices can incivase persistence 
sharply. Given the substantial amount of empirical evidence supporting a 
reLitive Nvýigc concern on the part of workers. our mialysis leads us to conclude 
that may well be the inissing piece in the nioney shocks persistence 
puzzle. 
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4.9 Appendix: The Solution Method and the 
GAUSS Codes 
The procedure used to simulate the model is the one employed by King ct al. 
[1988] and liýis become fa, irly standard in the related literature. We would 
like to thank Dr. Morten Ravn who gave a course at Warwick University on 
simulation methods in the summer of 1997. Our codes are largely based on 
the smaple programmes supplied during the course. 
The procedure rests on the following steps: (1) solve for the steady stýitc 
of the niodel; (11) linearise the niodel around the stewl, y statc, : 
21) (Iij) I)IIII(I 
the dynaillic, system (list, inguishing aniong control, stýite, (or predetermined 
at period t), and (-()state variAles (or non-predetermined at period t)-, (iv) 
apply the Blanchard and KaIiii [19801 methodology for solving linear dynamic 
systeni with forward- looking variables to the dynamic systenijust built; (v) 
simulate the model to produce impulse response functions. The last three 
stýig-(, s correspond to the three GAUSS codes below which are the codes we 
used to simulate the (%ise, presented in the inain text. 30 
2ý'Giveii that the niodel deals with nominal variables and that the moiwy supplY follows 
n certniii nite of ý,, rowth, we need to inake the system stationary. We (lid that dividing all 
period t v; u'liWes hy MI-, 
"'Eveii if what distinguishes (', ise A and ('ýiso B in the second Appendix from the 
case presented ill the Illain text P,, onlY the definitoli of CP. the dynainic systems mv 
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The first code implements step (iii) and part of (iv). The dynamic system 
for this particular version of our model is made up by 29 control variables 
(yt 
i 
yt+l 
7 
yt+2) yt+3 
i 
yt+4 
ý 
yt+5 
7 
pt 
7 
pt+l 
i 
pt+2 
i 
pt+3 
7 
pt+4 
i 
pt+5 
i 
zt, zt+l 
i 
zt+2) 
Zt+31 Zt+41 l5ti Pt+lý Pt+2, CPt, CPt+l, CPt+2, CPt-3, Cpt-2, Cpt-li Pt-3, 
Pt-2 
i 
Pt-1) 
76 state variables 
(Pt-3 
7 
Pt-2 
7 
Pt-1 
i 
Xt-3 
i 
Xt-2 
i 
Xt-1), 7 costate 
variables 
(Xt, Xt+I, Xt+2Xt+3, Xt+4, Xt+51 Zt+5) and one exogenous variable 
(y). " The code is then divided in several parts: (i) defines the parameter 
values and all of the auxiliary variables we find convenient to build so as 
to build the equations later; (ii) defines the steady state relations and other 
useful variables based on the steady state values; (iii) defines the dynamic 
system, defining the equations for the control, state and costate variables plus 
other variables one wants to build for interest (e. g., inflation); (iv) transforms 
the model according to the algorithm proposed by Blanchard and Kahn. 
The second code calculates the optimal decision rules which are the so- 
lution for the perfect foresight model. They express all the variables as 
function of the predetermined (state) variables and the exogenous variables. 
quite different in their order. The different definitions of CP imply different lag and 
lead structure and hence a different number of state and costate variables in the system. 
However, the codes for Case A and Case B are very similar to the codes for our benchmark 
case, once the corresponding log-linearised dynamic system is built. That is the reason 
wlýy those codes are not presented here. 
'All the variables axe normailsed according to what reported in footnote 29. 
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We suppose that households decide about the wage before the realisation of 
the shock, while the equilibrium values of the other variables in the model 
are defined after the realisation of the shock. Since wages are set before the 
realisation of the shock, we can easily calculate the Impact effect of a. shock. 
Then, for the period thereafter, we can use the optimal decision rules to cal- 
culate the adjustment dynamics of the model from the point in which the 
system is pushed to by the impact effect. Since we are just interested in the 
impulse response function of the model, this procedure is applicable. The 
impulse responses are plotted thorough the third code. 
FIRST CODE 
CLEAR. ALL; 
(Q DIMENSION 0F CONTR. 0L SPACE (NC), PR, EDETEB, MINED (NK), AND NON-PR. EDETERMINED 
VECTOR. S (NS), EXO GENEO US STATE VECTOR. (NN) (0 
(Q QB, DER. ING 0F VARJABLES: 
PREDETER, MINED =ENDO GENO US STATE=K: Pili I Pil I Pi I xill I xii xi 
NQN-PREDETER. MINED = COSTATES = L: XI X1 I X2 I X3 I X4 I X5 Z5 
EXOGENOUS VARJABLES=N: 
R. GM 
FLOWS= CoNTB, OLS=C: 
Y Yl Y2 I Y3 I Y4 Y5 IPI Pl I P2 I P3 I P4 I P5 IZI Zl I Z2 I Z31 Z4 I AP I AP1 I AP2 I CP 
CP1 CP2 CPIII I CPII CPI I APIII I APII I API (0) 
(n) DIMENSION AND NAME 0F CONTR. 0L SPACE (NC), PREDETERMINED (NK), AND NON- 
PR. EDETEIR. MINED VECTOR, S (NL), EXOGENEOUS STATE VECTOR. (NN) (o) 
NC=29; NK=6; NL=7; NN=I; 
NANIEC="Y"I"Yl"I"Y2"I"Y3"I"Y4"I"Y5"I"P"I"Pl"I"P2"I"P3"I"P4"I"P5"I 
"Z"I"Zl"I"Z2"I"Z3"I"Z4"I"PA"I"PAl"I"PA2"I"CP"I"CP1'cl"CP2'lI 
"CPIII"I"CPII"I"CPI"I"APIII"I"APII"I"API"; (o) CONT1R. 0LS (u) 
NANIEK="Plll"Ic'Pllctl"Pl'cl'ýXIII"lý'XI14cl"XI't - ý(o ENDOGENOUS STATES, - 
NANIEL="X"I"Xl"I"X2"I"X3"I"X4"I"X5"I"Z5"; ((v COSTATES 
NAMEE="R, GM"; (o) EXOGENOUS STATES (SHOCKS) 
(o) ECONOMIC PARAMETER, VALUES 
(o)TRANSITION NIATR, IX((t) 
RAA=0.57; 
R, HO=ZER. 0S(NN, NN); 
R. HO[1,1j=R-AA; 
1R. GMBAR. =1.06 A (0.25); 
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NUBAR, =l/R. GMBAR,; 
T=6; 
E=6- 
GAM=0.1; 
S=0-67; 
B=0.73, 
V=-17.52, 
BETA=0.96""(0.25); 
EPS=T/(S+(l-S)*T); 
ZBAR. = ((B*(l-BETA*NUBAR. ))/(l-B))" (1/(V-1)); 
U1=1+ ((l-B) /B) *ZBAR. ^V; 
ZNU1= ((B* (1-BETA)) / (1-B ))A(I/(V_1)) 
ASS=I+((I-B)/B)*ZNU 1AV i 
PSI= (S* (EPS- 1) * (EPS* (E- 1) + 1))/ (EPS*E*ASS); 
TAU= 1+ ((EPS*E* (T-1))/(GAM*T*(EPS* (E-1)+l))); 
Rvcasc galniila=3oluega0) 
O)psi= 3* (s* (eps- 1) * (1 +el),, * (e- 1))) / ((taii- 1) *ASS+ 3*v. *eps*ASS); 0) 
(Ocase, gaillilla=011leg, 10) 
Go=(NUBAR. +NUBA]R, A2+NUBAIR. A3)/'(-I); 
Gl=(l+NUBAR, A2+NUBAR. /'3)A(-l)-, 
G2=(I+NUBAR, +NUBAB, A 3)A(_l) 
i G3=(l+NUBAR, +NUBAR. A 2)A(-I)-7 
VOBAR, =1; 
VIBAR. =l; 
V2BAR, =I; 
V3BAR, =I; 
FNU= (VOBAB. ) A (1-TAU) +BETA* (VIBAR) A (1-TAU) + 
BETA A2* (V2BAR, ) A (1-TAU) +BETA A 3* (V3BAR. ) A (1-TAU); 
AII=I+BETA*NUBAB, A (-E*EPS)+(BETA*NUBAB, A(-E*EPS) )A 2+ (BETA *NUBAR. lý (-E* EPS) )A 3; 
A 12= 1+ BETA*NUBAR, A (R, ()) +(BETA *NUBAR, /(r?, O)) A 2+ (BETA* NUBARA (B, ())) A3 
Al=All/A12; 
A2=FNU/Al2-, 
A3=1+NUBAB, A]R, ( )+NUBAB, A (2*R, ())+NUBA]R. A (3*R. ()); 
A4=4*S* (EPS-1)-PSI*A3*A2*Ul; 
PUB=4*S*(EPS-1)/(A3*A2*Ul); 
A7= I+R. GMBAIR. AEPS+R, GMBAp, A (2*EPS) +]R. GN, IBAIR, A (3*EPS); 
FBN= 1+ (BETA/NUBAR. ) +(BETA /NUBAB) A2+ (BETA/NUBAR, )A 3; 
. 
IBO=FBN A (_ 1); 
JB I =BETA/ (NUBAR. *FBN); 
. IB2= ((BETA/NUBAR, )A2)/FBN; 
, TB3=((BETA/NUBAR. )A3)/FBN; 
-IB4= (-JBl +. JB2+. IB3) *B, AA+ (. JB2+. JB3)*(R. AAA2)+. IB3*(R. AA/3); 
PIP=((4/3)A(-E))*(A7 A E)/(A3*Al)l 
DI=I/E; 
A5= (DI*E*EPS*Ul)/(A4); 
1A ALPHA= (4A (S-S/B. ()))* (A5A (S/E))*(A3A (S/R. ()+S*(l-E)/E))*(A (S/E))) 
EBAR, =R. GMBAR, /ZBAR. -, 
(0) 
01) STEADY STATE CALCULATIONS 01) 
((I) RV 
((, ) AGGREGATE VARIABLES 0) 
A XBAR. =4*S*(A5A(1/E))*EBAB, *A3 ((I-E)/E)*AlA(l/E), 
PBAR. =ALPHAA (_l)*SA(-S)*(0.25)A(S/B, O)*EBAR. A(1-S)*XBAB, AS*A3/(S/B. 0), 
YBAR=EBAR, /PBA1R.; 
IR. BAR. = 1 /(BETA *NUBAR. ) 
LAMBAR. =l/(PBAR, *YBAR, *Ul); 
APBAR. =PBAB, *FNU*FBN; 
CPBAR. =XBAR. /APBAR,; 
((') SECTO R, S' VARIABLES 
XIBAIR. =XBAR. *NUBAR.; 
XIIBAB, =XIBAR *NUBAB., 
XIIIBAB. =XIlBAR. *NUBA1R,; 
XIBAR =XBAIR. *I3 GNIBAR; 
X2BAR, =XlBA1R. *B. GNIBAR; 
X3BAR, =X2BAR, *I3. G NI BAR.; 
X4BAR. =X3BA1R *R, GNIBAB.; 
X5BA1R, =X4BA1R. *R. G NI BAIR; 
PIBAIR. =PBAR. *NUBAIR.; 
PIIBAR. =PIBAR, *NUBAB.; 
PIIIBAB. =PIIBAIR *NUBAR; 
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PlBA1R. =PBAB. *R. GMBAR.; 
P2BAB. =P 1 BAR. *]R. G MBAR.; 
P3BAR. =P2BAR. *R. GMBAR.; 
P4BAR. =P3BAR. *R, GMBAR.; 
P5BAR, =P4BAB. *R. GMBAR.; 
APIBAB, =APBAIR. *NU BAR.; 
APIIBAIR, =APIBAR. *NUBAB,; 
APIIIBAIR, =APIIBAIR. *NUBAR.; 
APlBAR. =APBAR. *R. GMBAB,; 
AP2BAB. =AP 1BAR. *R. GM BAR.; 
XPBAB. =XBAIR. /PBAB.; 
WBAB, = (XBAR. +XIBAR. +XIIBAIR. +XIIIBAB, )/ (4*PBAR, ) 
PABAR. = (4*EBAR. /A3) A (1-S) *ALPHA /(-l) *S /(-S) *XBAR, /S; 
PBBAR. =PABAR. *NUBAR. ^ (EPS*S/T); 
PCBAB. =PABAR, *NUBAIR. /'(2*EPS*S/T); 
PDBAB, =PABAR, *NUBAR, A (3*EPS*S/T); 
YABAR, =ALPHA*A5^ (-S/E)*A3A (-S/E)*Al" (-S/E)-, 
YBBAR, =YABAR. *R. GMBAR. ^ (EPS*S), 
YCBAR. =YABAR, *B. GMBAR. ^ (2*EPS*S) 
YDBAB, =YABAR, *R. GMBAIR. ^ (3*EPS*S); 
LABAB, =A5/'(-l/E)*A3/'(-I/E)*AlA (-I/E); 
LBBAB. =LABAB, *R. G M BAB, ^ EPS; 
LCBAR, =LABAR. *R. GMBAB, A (2*EPS); 
LDBAR, =LABAB. *R. GMBAR. ^ (3*EPS) 
LBAR, = (1 /4) *LABAIR. *A7-, 
(0) PARAMETER, S MODEL AND WAGE RULE 
(Q) LHS WAGE B. ULE 0) 
Kl=-B. ()/A12; 
K2=BETA*KI*NUBAR. ^R, ()-, 
K3=BETAA2*Kl*NUBAR. "(2*R. 0); 
K4=BETA/'3*Kl*NUBAB. A(3*B, ()); 
K5=((EPS/T)-I)/AI2-, 
K6=BETA*K5*NUBAR. /'R. O-, 
K7=BETA"2*K5*NUBAR. A(2*B, ()), 
K8=BETAA3*K5*NUBAR. /'(3*R, ()); 
K9=-K2-K3-K4; 
KIO=-K3-K4-1 
Kll=-K4; 
K29=-(V*(l-BETA*NUBAR. )*ZBAR. /(Ul*AI2)); 
K30=BETA*NUBAR, A(l-EPS)*K29; 
K31=BETA*NUBAB, A (I-EPS)*K30, 
K32=BETA*NUBAR. /'(1-EPS)*K31; 
(Q B. HS WAGE RULE(Q 
0M1= DI*E*EPS * (ALPHA*S) ^ (E*EP S) *ALPHA^ (-E*EPS/T); 
OMBAB. 1=OM1*PBAR, A(E*EPS)*YBAR. A(E*EPS/T)*All; 
OMBAR. 2=XBAR, A(E*EPS)*PSI*FNU; 
0MBAR. =()MBAB. 1+01\IBAR. 2; 
K12=(()NII*E*EPS*PBAR, A(E*EPS)*YBAIR, A(E*EPS/T))/ONIBAR, -) 
K13=KI2*BETA*NUBA]R, A (-E*EPS)-, 
K14=KI2*BETAA2*NUBAR. A(-2*E*EPS)I 
K15=KI2*BETAA3*NUBAR, A (-3*E*EPS); 
1<16=K12/Tj 
K17=Kl3/T; 
K18=Kl4/Tj 
K19=Kl5/T; 
K20=-Kl3-KI4-Kl5; 
K21=-Kl4-Kl5; 
K22=-KI5; 
K23=(l-TAU)*()NIBAIR. 2/()MBAR. -I 
K 24 = (XBAIR. /(E*EPS) *PSI* (TAU- 1) *VO BAB. A (1-TAU)) /0 MBAR'; 
K25=(XBAR, A (E*EPS) *PSI* (TAU- 1) *BETA*V 1 BAR. A (1-TAU)) /0 M BAR.; 
* 26= (XBAR. " (E*EPS) *PSI* (TAU- 1) *BETA A 2*V2BAR, A (1-TAU)) /0 M BAB.; 
*2 7= (XBAR, A (E* EPS) *PSI* (TAU- 1) *BETA A 3*V3BAB, A (1 -TAU)) /()M BAR.; 
K28=E*EPS*0NIBAB. 2/()NIBAR; 
(o)()THEB, USEFUL COSTANTS(o) 
. 10=1/A3, 
. J1=(NUBAR, 
AR())/A3; 
. 12=(NUBAIR. 
^(2*B()))/A3; 
CHAPTER 4. RELATIVE WAGE CONCERN IN DSGE 180 
. 13= (NUBAR. 
^ (3*]R. 0))/A3; 
B 1=- I+ (ZBAB, *V* (I-BETA*NUBAR. ) /(l+ZBAR, * (I -BETA* NUBAR))) + 
((V-1)* (I-BETA*NUBAIR. ) /(BETA*NUBAR. )) -, 
B2=1-(ZBAR, *V*(l-BETA*NUBAIR. )/(I+ZBAIR. *(l-BETA*NUBAIR. )))I 
SS=PABAB, *YABAIR. +PBBAR, *YBBAB, +PCBAR. *YCBAB. +PDBAB, *YDBAIR.; 
SSS=PBAB. *YBAB, -, 
(QNOTE: MUST BE SS=SSS=EBAR, (a) 
SS1=PABAIR. *YABAIR, /SS; 
SS2=PBBAIR. *YBBAB, /SS; 
SS3=PCBAB, *YCBAR. /SS-, 
SS4=PDBAIR. *YDBAR. /SS; 
((t)SSVAL=END STATES I CO STATES I EXSTATES I CONTR. OLS I EXTRACONTR. OLS 
SSVAL=PIIIBAR. I PIIBAR I PIBAR, I XIIIBAR, I XIIBAR. I XIBAR. JXBAR. IX 1 BAR. I X213 AR I 
X3BAR. jX4BAR. jX5BAR. jZBAR. j 
RG MBAR. JYBAR. JYBAR. JYBAR. I YBAR, JYBAR JPBAR. IPI BAR. I P2BAR, I P3BAR. 1 P4BAB, I P5BAR I 
ZBAR. IZBAR. IZBAIR. IZBAB. IZBAB, IAPBAB. IAPlBAR, IAP2BAIR, ICPBAR, ICPBAIR. ICPBAR. 1 
CPBAB. ICPBAIR. ICPBAB. IAPIIIBAIR, IAPIIBAIR. IAPIBAR. 1 
PABAR. IPBBAB. IPCBAR. IPDBAR. IYABAIR. IYBBAIR. IYCBAR. IYDBAR. 1 
LABAR. ILBBAR. ILCBAB, ILDBAR. ILBAIR, IB, BAB. ILAN4BAB, I 
oploploploplol 
(Q (0) 
(QBUILDING THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM: EQUATIONS FOR. CoNTR. OLS, (Co)STATES AND 
AUXULIARY (FLOW) VARIABLES((, ) 
(Q MATRICES IN CONTROL SYSTEM: NICC*C(t)=N4CS*S(t)+NICE*E(t)+ MCEI*E(t-l)+MCEII*E(t- 
2) 
MCC=ZEB. ()S(NC, NC)-, 
MCC[1,1]=l; 
MCC[1,7]=l; 
MCC[1,13]=I; 
NICC[2,2]=I; 
MCC[2,8]=l; 
N, I(', (, '[2,14]=l; 
N4cc[3,3]=l; 
N4CC[3,9]=I; 
MCC[3,15]=l; 
MCC[4,41=1; 
NICC'[4,10]=l; 
MCC [4,16] = 1; 
NICC[5,5)=1; 
NICC[5,11]=I; 
MCC[5,17]=1; 
NICC[6,6)=l; 
MCC[6,12]=1; 
MCC[7,7]=I; 
N, ICC[7,1)=-(I-S)/S; 
MCC[8,8]=l; 
NICC [8,2] =- (1 - S) /S 
N, ICC[9,9]=I; 
NICC[9,3]=-(l-S)/S-, 
NICC[I(), l()]=l; 
NIC! C 10,4] (1 - S) S; 
NIC', C[11,11]=l; 
NI CC 11,5] (1 - S) S; 
MCC[12,12]=l; 
NICC[12,61=-(l-S)/S; 
NICC[13,1: i]=Bl; 
NICC[13,14]=B2; 
N, IC(! [14,14]=Bl; 
MCC, [14,15]=B2; 
NIC! C[15,15]=Bl; 
Nl(', C[15,16]=B2; 
NICC[16,16]=Bl; 
Nl(', C[16,17]=B2- 
Nl(', C[17,17]=Bl; 
NICC[18,18]=l; 
NICC[18,7]=-. IBO; 
NICC[18,8]=-. IB1; 
NICC[18,9]=-. IB2; 
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MCC[18,101=-. IB3-, 
MCC[19,19]=l; 
MCC[19,8]=-. IBO; 
MCC[19,91=-. ]Bl; 
MCC[19,10]=-. IB2; 
MCC[19,11]=-. IB3; 
N4CC[20,20]=l; 
MCC[20,9]=-. IBO; 
MCC[20,101=-. IB1; 
MCC[20,11]=-. IB2; 
MCC[20,12]=-. IB3-, 
NICC[21,21]=l; 
MCC [21,18] = 1; 
N, ICC[22,22]=l; 
MCC[22,19]=l; 
MCC[23,23]=I; 
MCC[23,20]=ll 
MCC[24,24]=I; 
MCC[24,27]=l; 
MCC[25,25]=1-1 
NICC[25,28]=l; 
MCC[26,26]=l; 
A4CC[26,29]=I; 
A4CC[27,27]=I; 
MCC[27,7]=-. IB3-, 
MCC[28,28]=l; 
MCC[28,7]=-. IB2-, 
MCC[28,8]=-. JB3; 
MCC[29,29]=1-7 
MCC[29,7]=-. TB1; 
MCC[29,8]=-. JB2, 
MCC[29,9]=-. IB3; 
MCS=ZER, ()S(NC, (NK+NL)); 
MCS[6,13]=-I; 
N, ICS[7,4]=. 13; 
MCS[7,5]=, J2; 
NICS[7,6]=. Il; 
MCS[7,7]=30; 
N, ICS[8,5]=. 13; 
NICS[8,6]=. J2; 
NICS[8,7]=. Jl; 
N/ICS[8,8]=. 10; 
N, ICS[976]=. J3; 
N, ICS[9,7]=. 12; 
NICS[9,8]=. Il; 
NICS[9,9]=. 10; 
NICS[10,7]=, 13; 
N, ICS[10,8]=, 12; 
NICS[10,9]=. Il; 
N4cs[l(), I()]=. I(); 
NICS[11,8]=. J3, 
NICS[11,9]=. J2; 
NICS[11,1()]=, Jl; 
NICS[ii, il]=. I(); 
NICS[12,9]=. J3; 
MCS[12,10]=. J2, 
Nl(', S[12,11]=. Jl; 
NICS[12,12]=. 10-, 
N4CS[17,13]=-B2; 
N4CS[21,7]=l; 
N, ICS[22,8]=l; 
NICS[23,9]=l; 
N4CS[24,4]=l; 
N, ICS[25,51=1; 
N, ICS[26,6]=l; 
NICS[27,1]=. JBO; 
N, ICS[27,2)=. IB1; 
NICS[27,31=. IB2; 
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MCS[28,2]=. IBO; 
NICS[28,31=. IB1; 
N, ICS[29,3]=. IBOI 
NICE=ZEB, ()S(NC, NN); 
NICE[1,1]=l-, 
NICE[2,1]=I+]R. AA; 
MCE[3,1]=l+]R. AA+B. AA^2; 
M CE[4,1]= I +]R. AA+]R. AA" 2+RAA " 3; 
NICE [5,1]= 1 +]R. AA+R. AA A 2+B, AAA3+R, AAA4, 
MCE[6,11=1+B, AA+R, AA"2+]R. AAA3+B, AAA4+B, AAA5, 
MCE[13,1]=R. AA; 
MCE[14,11=(B, AAA2); 
MCE[15,1]=(B. AA A 3); 
MCE[16,1]=(B. AA A 4); 
MCE[17,1]=(B. AA A 5); 
((, ) MATRICES IN STATE EQUATIONS o) 
(0) ýISSO*E(S(t+l))+MSSI*S(t)=AISCO*E(C(t+l))+NISCI*C(t)+NISEO*E(E(t+l)) + NISEI*E(t) 
(( 1) 
M SSO=ZER. OS ((NK +NL), (NK+NL)); 
MSS()[1,1]=I; 
MSSO[2,2]=I; 
MSSO[3,3]=I; 
N4SSO[4,4]=I; 
MSSO[5,5]=l; 
MSSO[6,6]=l; 
MSSO[7,7]=l; 
msso(8,8]=1; 
MSS()[9,9]=l; 
MSS()[l(), l()]=J; 
MSS()[11,11]=l; 
NISSO[13,13]=B2; 
MSS I=ZEB, ()S ((NK+NL), (NK+NL)) , 
NISS1[1,2]=-l; 
MSS1[2,3]=-l; 
NISSI[4,5]=-l; 
NISS1[5,6j=-I; 
NISSI[6,7]=-l- 
N, ISS1[7,8]=-l; 
NISSI[8,91=-I- 
NISS1[9,10]=-ý-, 
mssl[lo, ll]=-l; 
NISSI[11,12]=-I; 
NISSI [12,7]= 1+EPS* (E-1)-K28; 
MSS1[13,13]=Bl; 
NISCO=ZEB. ()S((NK+NL), NC); 
MSCO[12,23]=K27/3, 
N, ISCI=ZER, OS((NK+NL), NC); 
NISC1[3,7]=ll 
NISCI[12,1]=KI6-K5, 
NISCI[12,21=-K6+Kl7; 
NISCI[12,31=-K7+Kl8; 
NISC1[12,7]=Kl2-Kl; 
NISCI[12,81=-K2+Kl3; 
NISCI[12,9]=-K3+Kl4; 
N4SCl [12,10]=-K4+K15; 
NISC1[12,4]=-K8+KI9; 
NISC1[12,13]=-K29; 
NISCI[12,14]=-K30; 
N4SCI[12,15]=-K31; 
NISC1[12,161=-K32; 
NISCI[12,21]=K23ý 
NISC1 [12,221= (K25+K26+K27) /3; 
NISC1 (12,231= (K26+K27)/3-, 
NISC1[12,24]=K24/3; 
NI SC1 (12,25]= (K24+K25) /3; 
NI SM [12,261= (K24+K25+K26)/3; 
NI SEO= ZERO S ((NK + NL), N N); 
NISEO[13,11= (R. AA /5); 
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NISE1=ZER. ()S((NK+NL), NN); 
NISE1(1,1]=-I; 
N, ISE1[2,11=-l; 
N, ISEI[3,1]=-l; 
MSEI[4,1]=-ll 
NISE1[5,1]=-l; 
MSE1[6,1)=-ll 
MSE1[7,1]=-l; 
N, ISE1[8,1]=-l; 
MSE1[9,1]=-l; 
MSE1[10,1]=-l; 
NISE1[11,1]=-l; 
(ol AUXILIARY FLOW VARJABLESo) 
NXF=24; (Q DIMENSION AND NAMES OF EXTRA FLOWS (o) 
NAMEXC="PA"I"PB"I"PC"I"PD"I"YA"I"YB"I"YC"I"YD"I 
"LA"I"LB"l"LC"I"LD"I"L"I"B, "I"LANI"I"Cl"I"C2"I"C3"I"C4'41 
"C5"I"C6"I"C7"I"C8"I"C9"; 
(o) MF*XC(t) = MFC*C(t) + MFKE*[K(t)IE(t)]'+ NIFL*L(t), (, ) 
MF=ZEB. ()S(NXF, NXF); 
MF[1,1)=I; 
MF[2,2]=l-, 
MF[2111=-l; 
MF[3,3]=I; 
MF[3,1]=-l; 
MF[4,4]=l; 
MF[4,1]=-l; 
MF[5,5]=l , MF[5,1]=S/(S-1); 
MF[6,6]=I; 
N4F[6,5]=-I; 
MF[6,1]=-T; 
A/IF[6,2]=Tl 
MF[7,7]=l; 
MF[7,5]=-l; 
MF[7,11=-T, 
NIF[7,3]=T; 
MF[8,8]=l; 
NIF[8,5]=-I; 
MF[8,1]=-T; 
MF[8,4]=T; 
MF[9,9]=1; 
MF[9,11=1/(I-S)-) 
MF[10,10]=11 
MF[10,2]=I/(l-S), 
NIF[11,11]=I; 
MF[11,3]=l/(l-S), 
NIF[12,12]=l; 
N4F[12,4]=l/(l-S); 
MF[13,131=1-) 
MF[13,9)=l/A7; 
NIF[13,10]=(R. GMBAR. ^EPS)/A7; 
NIF[13,11]=(B. GMBAB, /'(2*EPS))/A7; 
NIF[13,12]=(R, GMBAB, /'(3*EPS))/A7; 
MF[14,14]=l/(R. BAR, -l)j 
NIF[15,15]=l; 
NIF[16,16]=l; 
NIF[16,5]=l; 
MF[16,1]=T; 
NIF[17,17]=ll 
NIF[17,6]=l; 
NIF[17,21=Tl 
NIF[18,18]=Il 
N4F[18,7j=l; 
N, IF[18,31=Tl 
N, IF[19,19]=l; 
NIF[19,8]=l; 
NIF[19,4]=T; 
NIF[20,20]=ll 
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MF[20,11=SS1; 
MF[20,5]=SSI; 
MF[20,2]=SS2; 
MF[20,6]=SS2- 
MF[20,3]=SS3; 
DvIF[20,7]=SS3; 
MF[20,4]=SS4; 
N/IF[20,8]=SS4; 
MF[21,21]=I; 
MF[21,14]=1; 
MF[22,22]=I; 
NIF[22,6]=I; 
MF[22,2]=S/(S-1), 
MF[23,23]=l; 
MF[23,7]=ll 
NIF[23,3]=S/(S-1); 
MF[24,24]=I; 
NIF[24,8]=1-7 
MF[24,4]=S/(S-1); 
CAZ=INV(MF), 
MFC=ZER, OS(NXF, NC)-) 
MFC[1,1]=I-S; 
MFC[1,7]=l-S-, 
MFC[14,13]=V-1, 
MFC[15,1]=-1-7 
MFC[15,7]=-l; 
MFC [15,13] =-V* (U 1-1) /U 1; 
MFC[16,1]=I; 
MFC[16,7]=T; 
MFC[17,1]=I; 
MFC[17,7]=T; 
MFC[18,1]=I; 
MFC[18,7]=T; 
MFC[19,1]=l; 
MFC[19,7]=T; 
N4FC[20,1]=l-) 
MFC[20,71=11 
MFC[21,2]=I; 
MFC[21,1]=-l; 
MFC[21,7]=-l; 
MFC[21,8]=ll 
NI FC [21,13]=-V* (Ul-1) /U 1 
NI FC [21,14] =V* (U 1- 1) /U 1; 
N, IFKE=ZER, ()S(NXF, NK+NN); 
NIFKE[1,4]=-(I-S)*R. ()*. 13; 
M FKE [1,5] (I-S) *R, ()*, 12; 
NI FK E [1,6] (1-S) *R, () *. 11; 
N, IFKE[2,6]=EPS*S/T; 
MFKE[3,5]=EPS*S/T; 
AIFKE[4,4]=EPS*S/T-, 
NIFKE[10,6]=l/(S-1); 
A, IFKE[l 1,5]= 1 /(S-I), ) NIFKE[12,4]=l/(S-1); 
N4FKE[22,6]=S/ (S- 1) -) 
MFKE[23,5]=S/(S-1)7 
1\, IFKE[24,4]=S/(S-1); 
NIFL=ZEIR, ()S(NXF, NL); 
NI FL [1,1]= (1-S) *R. ()* (1-10) +S; 
AIFL[2,1]=-EPS*S/T; 
NIFL[3,1]=-EPS*S/T; 
NIFL[4,1]=-EPS*S/T; 
NIFL[5,1]=S/(S-1); 
NIFL[9,1]=l/(S-1); 
(n) FVC LINKS EXTRA CONTROLS To FUNDAMENTAL CONTROLS 
FVC=(INV(AIF))*NIFC; 
(n) FVC LINKS EXTRA CONTROLS To ENDOGENOUS STATES AND EXOGENOUS STATES 
(q) 
FVKE=(INV(NIF))*NIFKE; 
to) FVL LINKS EXTRA CONTROLS To COSTATES 
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FVL=(INV(MF))*MFL, 
((:: 411 
0 FUNDAMENTAL STATE-COSTATE DIFFERENCE EQUATION 
MSssO = MSSO - MSCO*(INV(NICC))*NICS; 
MSssl = MSS1 - MSC1*(INV(NICC))*MCS-, 
MSse, 0 = MSEO + MSCO*(INV(MCC))*N, ICE; 
MS, sel = MSE1 + N, ISCI*(INV(MCC))*MCE; 
W -(INV(MSssO))*MSssl; 
R. (INV(MSssO))*I\lSs(, O, 
Q (INV(MSssO))*MSsel; 
al) EIGENVECTOR. -EIGENVALUE DECOMPOSITION OF STATE TRANSITION MATR. IX 
o) FIB. ST WE FIND THE REAL PARTS OF THE EIGENVALUES (XI) 
AND EIGENVECTOR. S (X3) (6) 
jXl, X3j=EIGV(W); 
Xll=]R. EAL(XI); 
AMU=ABS(Xll); 
((, ) SECOND WE ORDER. THE EIGENVALUESo) 
IN=SoBTC(AMU, 1); 
IND1=INDNV(IN, AMU); 
1=1; 
Do UNTIL I>(NK+NL)-l; 
IF IND1[I, I] == IND1[I+1,1]; 
INDI[1+1,1] = I+IND1[I, I]-l 
ENDIF, 
1. I=I+ , ENDO-7 
(6) THIR. D WE OR. DER. THE COLUMNS OF THE EIGENVECTOR. S (X3) BY THE 
INDICATOR. R. ESULTING FR. OM THE OR. DER, ING OF THE EIGENVALUES(4 
P=ZEB, ()S((NK+NL), (NK+NL)); 
I= 1; 
DO UNTIL 1>(NK+NL)-, 
P[I: (NK+NL), I]=X3[1: (NK+NL), IND1[1,1]]; 
I=1+1; 
ENDO; 
((v FINALLY WE FoB. M A DIAGONAL NlATR. IX (MU) IN WHICH THE DIAGONAL HAVE THE 
EIGENVALUES IN ASCENDING ABS( )LUTE VALUE(d) 
MU=ZEB. ()S((NK+NL), (NK+NL)), 
I=I; 
DO UNTIL I>(NK+NL); 
MU[I, I]=Xl[IND1[I, I], l]; 
I=1+1; 
ENDO; 
0) WE NOW HAVE P AND MU FOR. WHICH WE KNOW THAT P*MU*P^-l=W (ALSO 
X3*DIAG(Xl)*X3=W) (n) 
(Q) (0) 
(0) PARTITIONING THE MATRICES 0) 
NIUI=NIU[I: NK, I: NKI; 
NIU2=N, IU[NK+I: NK+NL, NK+1: NK+NL]; 
Pll=P[I: NK, 1: NKI-, 
P12=P[I: NK, NK+1: NK+NL]; 
P21=P[NK+I: NK+NL, 1: NK], 
P22=P[NK+1: NK+NL, NK+1: NK+NL], 
PS=INV(P)-, 
PS11=PS[I: NK, I: NK]; 
PS12=PS[1: NK, NK+1: NK+NL]-, 
PS21=PS[NK+1: NK+NL, 1: NKI; 
PS22=PS[NK+1: NK+NL, NK+1: NK+NL]; 
R. KE=R. [l: NK, 1: NN]; 
R, LE=R, [NK+1: NK+NL, 1: NN]; 
QKE=Q[l: NK, 1: NN]; 
QLE=Q[NK+1: NK+NL, 1: NN]; 
(o) COMPOSITE EXPRESSIONS ý0) 
SP1=-(INV(ý, IU2))*(PS21*R. KE+PS22*BLE); 
SP2=-(INV(I\IU2))*(PS21*(ýKE+PS22*(ýLE), 
KLK=P11*MUl*(INV(P11)); 
KTL=(Pll*N, IU1*PS12+PI2*NIU2*PS22)*(INV(PS22)); 
NAME=NAMEK INAMEEINANIELINAMECINAMEXC; 
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SECOND CODE 
((I) ((v 
(o) COMPUTATION OF DECISION RULES 
IN THIS PIROGRAM WE WILL COMPUTE MAR. KOV DECISION RULES (XIDR. ) 
FOR. THE LINEAR. DYNAMIC MODEL(Q 
FL = SP1*B, HO + SP2-7 
IB, HO=EYE(B. ()WS(B. Ho))-, 
I= 1; 
LEE=ZEB, ()S(NL, NN); 
Do UNTIL I>NL; 
Q=FL[I, 1: NN]; 
N, IU21=1/MU2[l, l], 
DSUAI=INV((IB, Ho-MU2I*B, HO)); 
LEE[1,1: NN]=(2*DSUM-, 
I=1+1; 
ENDO; 
((I, 
((') STATE DECISION RULES (0) 
KEC=R, KE*R, H0+QKE+KTL*LEE; 
ULE=(INV(PS22))*LEE, 
ULK=-(INV(PS22))*PS21; 
(Q) (0) 
0) SYSTEM DECISION BULES (n) 
0) 0) 
MKE=ZEB. ()S(R. ()WS(KLK)+NN, CoLS(KLK)+COLS(KEC))-, 
MKE[I: B. ()WS(KLK), l: COLS(KLK)]=KLK; 
MKE[B, ()WS(KLK)+l: B, ()WS(KLK)+NN, I: NK)=ZEIR, ()S(NN, NK)-, 
MKE[I: R, ()WS(KEC), CoLS(KLK)+I: CoLS(KLK)+COLS(KEC)J=KEC; 
N, IKE[R, ()WS(KEC)+I: B, ()WS(KEC)+B, ()WS(R, HO), COLS(KLK)+l: CoLS(KLK)+CoLS(KEC)]=R. HoI 
(o) INCORPORATION OF SHADOW PRICE, CONTR, OLS AND OTHER, FLOWS 
0) 
LKE=ZEB, ()S(NL, NK+NN), 
LKE[., I: CoLS(ULK)]=ULK; LKE[., CoLS(ULK)+l: CoLS(ULK)+CoLS(ULE)I=ULE; 
Z=(INV(MCC))*MCS; 
MOCK= Z [1: NC, 1: NK], 
N, IOCL=Z[I: NC, NK+1: NK+NL], 
MOCE=(INV(MCC))*MCE; 
N IOCKE= (MOCK+ MOCL*ULK) -(N I OCE+ MOCL*ULE); 
FKE=FVC*N40CKE+FVKE+FVL*LKE; 
((')R, R, KE=(ULK-ULK*KLK)-(ULE-(ULK*KEC+ULE*R. Ho)); ((, ) 
H=LKEIMOCKEIFKE, 
(o) THE IMPACT PERJOD (Q) 
B3=(-B2/Bl); 
((ý) SHOCK (o) 
B. GMT=0.01-1 
ZT=B. GNIT*R, AA/(Bl*(l-B3*RAA)); 
ELT=ZER, OS(2, l); 
ELT[1,1]=B. GMT; 
ELT[2,1]=ZT; 
(o) VARJABLES: YIPILIIR. ILAI\l (o) 
VIP=ZER. ()S(5,2), 
VIP[1,1]=Sl 
VIP[1,2]=-S; 
VIP[2,1]=I-S; 
VIP[2,2]=-l+S; 
VIP[3,1]=l; 
VIP[3,2]=-l; 
VIP[4,2]=(B, BAR -l)*(V-1); 
VIP[5,1]=-l; 
VIP[5,2]=l-V*(Ul-l)/Ul; 
IP=VIP*ELT; 
k(i) IP = YIPILIR]LANI COLUNIN VECTOR 
NIKE=B. EAL(NIKE); 
LKE=]R. EAL(LKE); 
MOCKE=REAL(MOCKE); 
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H=REAL(H); 
FKE=]R. EAL(FKE); 
LOCATE 1,1; 
FORMAT /LDS 4,3; 
OUTPUT ON; 
OUTPUT FILE=CKTPFM. OUT RESET; 
---- -------------- -- IMPACT EFFECT 
'6Z lc;; ZT; 
Ity c4;; IP[1,1]; 
"P ";; IP[2,1]; 
"L ";; IP[3,1]-, 
"R, ";; IP[4,1]1 
"LAM ";; IP[5j]; 
WAIT, 
NEAR. STEADY STATE DYNAMICS AFTER. FIR. ST PERJOD'c; 
It 
it PI'S 
cc ";; $NAME[1: NK+NN, 1]'; 
I= 1; 
Do UNTIL I>NK- 
$NAN, lE[l, l];; MKi[I,. ]; 
1=1+1; 
ENDO; 
1=1-, 
Do UNTIL I>NL; 
$NAME[I+NN+NK, 1],; LKE[I,. ]; 
I=I+I; 
ENDO; 
1=1; 
Do UNTIL I>NC- 
$NAME [I+NK+Ný+NNj];; M0CKE[I, 
I=I+l; 
ENDO; 
I= 1; 
Do UNTIL I>NXF-, 
$NANIE[I+NK+NL+NN+NC, 1];; FKE[I,. ]; 
1=1+1; 
ENDO; 
WAIT; 
FOR. MAT 4,4; 
cc 
PARAMETER, IZATION 
7 
cc 
PARAMETER, S-, 
"DISCOUNT FACTOR, ";; BETA-, 
"B ";; B; 
64V It ;; V; 
"ALPHA ";; ALPHA-, 
"DI ";; Dl; 
"PSI ";; PSI; 
"RELATIVE WAGE 1R. ISK AVER, SION (TAU) ";; TAU; 
"SIGMA ",; S; 
"THETA ";; T; 
"INTERTEMPORAL ELASTICITY OF LABOUR, SUPPLY "; J/(E-1); 
"TREND IN THE MONEY SUPPLY PR. OCESS ";; R. GMBAR., 
-AUToCoR, R, ELATION MONEY SUPPLY PR. OCESS ";; RAA; 
WAIT; 
STEADY STATE: AGGREGATE VAR. IABLES"; 
"STEADY STATE OUTPUT -;, YBAR.; 
"STEADY STATE VELOCITY OF MONEY ";; l/ZBAR; 
"STEADY STATE PR. ICE LEVEL ",, PBAR.; 
"STEADY STATE AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT ";; LBAR; 
"STEADY STATE NOMINAL INTEREST RATE ,;; B. BAR.; 
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"SS REAL INTEREST RATE ",, R, BAR, /R, GNIBAR,; 
"SS LAMDBA ";; LAMBAR.; 
WAIT, 
STEADY STATE: SECT0 R. S' VARJABLES 
"STEADY STATE WAGE SECTOR. A ";; XBAR.; 
"STEADY STATE WAGE SECTOR, B ";; XIBAR.; 
"STEADY STATE WAGE SECTOR. C"; ; XIIBAR,; 
"STEADY STATE WAGE SECTOR. D ";; XIIIBAR.; 
"STEADY STATE 0UTPUT SECTOR. A ";; YABAR.; 
"STEADY STATE 0UTPUT SECTOR, B ",, YBBAB.; 
"STEADY STATE 0UTPUT SECTOR. C ";; YCBAR. -, 
"STEADY STATE OUTPUT SECTOR. D ";; YDBAIR.; 
"STEADY STATE PR. ICE SECTOR, A ";; PABAR.; 
"STEADY STATE PR. ICE SECTOR. B ";; PBBAR.; 
"STEADY STATE PR. ICE SECTOR. C ";; PCBAB,; 
"STEADY STATE PR. ICE SECTOR. D ";; PDBAR.; 
"STEADY STATE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR. A ";; LABAR,; 
"STEADY STATE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR B ";; LBBAR.; 
"STEADY STATE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR, C ";; LCBAIR. -, 
"STEADY STATE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR, D ";; LDBAIR,; 
0UTPUT 0FF; 
THIRD CODE 
(O)STARTING POINT AFTER. THE IMPACT EFFECT 0) 
S=-B, GMTI-B. GMTIIP[2,1]-B. GMTI-B, GA, ITI-B. CýA, ITI-]R, CýMTIB. GMT*B. AA; 
(0) FORECAST HOR. IZON 0) 
NIB, =11- 
(o) GENýBATING IMPULSES 
TI=SEQA(1,1, NIR. +l); 
IB, =ZER. OS(]R. ()WS(N4KE)+B. ()WS(H), NIB. ), 
1=1; 
DO UNTIL I>NIB,; 
IB. [I: B. ()WS(MKE), I]=S; 
IR. [R. ()WS (NIKE)+ I: B. ()WS(IR. ), Ij= (H*S); 
S=MKE*S; 
I=I+l; 
ENDO; 
IIR. =R, EAL(IR. ); 
IR, I=ZEB, 0S(1R. 0 WS(IR), l); 
IR. I[7,1]=R. GNITl 
IR. I[15,1j=IP[l, lj; 
IR, I[21,1]=IP[2, l]; 
IIR, I[27,1]=ZT; 
IR, B, I=0NES(4,1); 
IR. I[44: 47,1]=IP[2,1]*IB. B. I; 
IR. I[48: 51,1j=IP[1,1]*IR, R, I; 
IR. I[52: 55,1]=IP[3,1]*IBR, I; 
IR, 1[56,1]=IP[3,1]; 
IR. I[57,1]=IP[4,1jj 
IIR. 1[58,1)=IP[5,1], 7 
(u) - -------------- 
(0) 
Tic TOT). ff C-TRTý-S-lfýffvtl N IRý (o) 41) 
--------------------- =z I 1T EB. 0 1, N INF[1,1j=IP[2, lj; 
INF[1,2]=IB. I[7,1]+IB. [21, l] -IP[2,1]; 
INF [1,3: NIB. + 1] = IR. [7,1: (NIB. - 1)] +111- [21,2: NIB. 
]-I]R, [2 1,1: (NIR, - 1)] 
IR. 11=111.1-IR.; 
IR=I]R. IIIINF; 
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IB. =IR, *100 I 4ý PLOT 1MPULSE RESPONSES 
LIBRARY PGRAPH, 
GRAPHSET; 
_PLEGCTL=f 
2,3,6,4.51; 
_PCOLOR. =1151-1 
_PLTYPE=fl, 
6,31; 
_PDATE=""; PLEGSTR, = 
44INF\000"\ 
"Y\()()()"\ 
"B. GM\000"; 
XY(TI, IR. [68,. ]'-IB, [15,. ]'-IR. [7,. ]'); 
Conclusions 
In this thesis we have analysed three potential sources of inflation persistence. 
The importance of investigating in detail thesource of inflation iiwrtiýi mises 
from the fact that it is that, persistence which drives the c(), sts in terins of 
output of disinflationary policies. As a consequence, the optimal monetary 
policy strategy aimed at civoiding those costs should take into account the 
re; isoii why inflation is persistent. Along this thesis we have considered two 
different frameworks in which different sources of inflation persistence can be 
(, ýisily incorporated 
We have started our analysis by considering the lack of credibility of 
monetary polic. y. The framework developed in the first chapter has allowed 
us both to casily incorporate it and to anal. vsc the stnitegy of pegging the 
exchange rate to a 1mv-11iflation (, (-()iiom. vs() as to counteract the (, fl'(, (-ts of that, 
hick of credibilltv. Our 1110(1(, l lias provided a better (lescription of the ýwtiml 
EMS ýls 1); Il. t of that sfnlteý, ýIlv. 
Specifically Nve have modelled the Eur()pemi 
Moilotnry System (EMS') ; is mi adjustable peg This is the reýisoil whY 
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some factors not previously considered in the previous literature on the EMS 
collapse in the summer of 1992 have been studied here. The result is what 
we believe is a better description of the crisis in 1992 and its driving forces. 
Specifically, we have shown that uncertainty about the future of EMU may 
have played an important role, as unanimously emphasised by the earliest 
interpretations of the crisis. 
The second part of the thesis incorporates relative wage concern into 
a dynamic general equilibrium macromodel. Chapter 2 has motivated the 
approach we have taken on the basis of the available support both from the 
economic literature and empirical evidence on the topic. The purpose of 
Chapters 3 and 4 has been to investigate its effects on two stylised facts 
of U. S. macrodata: (1) the inertia component that characterises the actual 
inflation dynamics (ii) the persistence of the real effects of money shocks. 
In chapter 3 we have introduced a wage setting rule which is derived under 
intertemporal optimisation by wage setters under the assumptions of stag- 
gered wage setting and the existence of relative wage concern. We have then 
employed the structure of that contracting equation to analyse a competing 
hypothesis on the source of inflation inertia supported by recent empirical 
results, namely the existence of non-fully-rational expectations of inflation. 
By employing the same approach of Roberts [1997], we have however shown 
that the existence of non-fully-rational expectations is not enough to discard 
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i-ehitive wage concern as source of inflation inertia. 
Chapter 4 has mainly focused on the seýirch for reasonable values for the 
I)m*m1leters governing relitive wage concern in a fully-calibrated vendon of 
the model. The purpose is to analyse whether the omission of relative wage 
concern can be an explanation for the lack of persistent real effects following 
money shocks in macromodels with staggered wage setting. The main rea- 
son why such lack of persistent arises is because such contracting scheines do 
not incorporate enough endogenous stickiness in the that Nvage, setting 
ýigeiifs choose not to chýmgc then- wages by much ývheii they have the climice 
to re-set their wages. Relative wage concern can in principle provide the mo- 
tivation for such endogenous stickiness to arise. Assessing how strong that 
reLitive wage concern needs to be so ýis to allow for persistent real effects of 
money ,,,, Iiocks is then fundamental That is the purpose of the (-Aibnition 
and simulation exercises carried out in chapter 4. Our results show that for a 
benchmark calibration of the parameters governing relative wage concern in 
mir frainework there is substantial output and inflation persistence. 
persistence also arises for alternative specifications of the relative wages 
the an, colicerl, with and for alternative calibration of the parameters 
1-clatiVC Wý)(-Ye 
In smil, the result-; in this second part of the thesis have highlighted 
t1w potential role of relative to ('xPlmil two piizzl(,,,, raised bv 
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recent literature. Firstly, the existence of substantial inertia in the inflation 
dynamics. We have shown that it may well arise as a result of the wage 
contracting behaviour. Secondly, the endogenous stickiness necessary for 
the persistence of the real effects of money shocks may also arise from the 
existence of relative wage concern. We believe that those results clearly 
show that relative wage concern should be an avenue to explore in models 
incorporating nominal rigidities by imposing staggered wage setting. Our 
results are strongly supportive for such an approach. Further analysis is 
however needed before a full assessment of relative wage concern can be 
made. In particular, two obvious avenues should be explored to investigate 
the robustness of our results. 
First of all, the modelisation of relative wage concern should be improved. 
Introducing the existence of status concern in the structure of preferences of 
the agents has the obvious limitation that the results rely on how justifi- 
able the assumption is by itself. We do agree on the limitations of such an 
approach, and that is the reason why we have devoted an entire chapter 
to motivate the study of relative wage concern by reporting evidence that 
supports it. There is an obvious need for further microfoundations of rela- 
tive wage concern. In the terminology introduced by Cole et al. [1993] our 
model can be however considered as a reduced form of a fully- microfounded 
model in which status concern in the form of relative wages arises. How- 
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ever. it Is precisely this reduced-form analysis those authors advocate for 
their attenipt to '-provide some macrofoundat ions to microeconoinics'". Our 
ýipprwcli lias allowed us to Atain clear insights mi the effects ()f the exis- 
tence of relative wage concern. It is precisely the potential importýince of 
our results which demand the search for sound microfoundat ions of relative 
wage concern. An investigation into the circuinstýmces in which it may arise 
will improve our position to ýissess its Implications. In our opinion, there 
m-e ýit lea, st two promising lines for research in that direction. Firstl, v. the 
analysi, s of wage staggering in ýin environment with limited information on 
the shocks affecting workers' productivity may give rise to direct comimi-ison 
with other sector wages so as to infer information on the actual productivity 
level. Secondly, there is substontial evidence polliting ýit a strong reLitionship 
between rchitive wages mi effort, supply by workers. Explicit bargaliling over 
hours and effort could also give rise to the presence of relative wages ýis a, 
fundamental clement in the labour supply function. 
Fiiiallv. we would like to our support for the use of , urveys ýis a 
potential ll('N\' sollive of information to guide economic reseiirch. NN(, made 
Intensive lise of from surveys both to inotiviite the of rel- 
atiVC aild the fact that inflation expectations iaiiv suffer from 
lack of ratiolialit. v. It cannot be denied that survey information may suffer 
from the usual cavents. M iMi-ticular the lack of incentive of survey partici- 
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pants to provide true information. We however believe that enough evidence 
nowadays exists on their usefulness for econornic analysis, and that further 
research on them should be carried out so as to extract the information they 
contain. Specifically, the surveys on inflation expectations are a remarkable 
data source to which apply recent contributions on adaptive learning. We 
also plan to follow this line of research in a near future. 
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